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Abstract 
 
 
Dismayed over the increasing conservatism of the U.S. Supreme Court, state judges, 
lawyers, and scholars in the 1970s argued for a new judicial federalism. State courts, using state 
constitutions, may provide protections exceeding the federal minimum. In addition to allowing 
states to experiment with solutions to rights disputes, and recognizing unique state traditions, 
judicial federalism had instrumental value in ensuring state level protections that were protected 
from review at the federal level. While supporters saw judicial federalism as a means of realizing 
the principle of dual constitutional rights protection through principled development of a body of 
state law, the reality proved to fall short of these hopes. Rights issues in state courts still focus 
heavily upon federal law with limited development of state constitutional law. Explanations for 
the limited development of judicial federalism have tended to focus on the court centric 
explanations of judicial ideology, separation of powers, and state political environment.  
This dissertation examines the limited development from another angle by examining the 
support structure for state constitutional activism. Courts rely upon lawyers to develop claims for 
courts to act upon, and the strength of this structure helps explain how state courts have dealt 
with state constitutional activism. Courts, however, are not powerless to influence the content of 
the arguments presented by lawyers. Through their opinions, courts send signals and give 
guidance about the kinds of claims it wishes to hear. Given that lawyers are conditioned to think 
of rights issues in federal terms only, the support structure should generally be fairly anemic with 
lawyers focusing on federal law primarily. However, two kinds of signals can alter this behavior. 
First, the federal retrenchment signal occurs when the U.S. Supreme Court overrules or narrows 
a rights doctrine, and where it refuses to recognize new rights claims. Second, the internal 
encouragement signal occurs when a state high court embraces state law either in the form of a 
particular doctrine or a broader theory of state constitutional law. Under either of these signals, 
lawyers should turn to state law providing state courts with a stronger support structure for state 
constitutional law.  
This dissertation explores these questions through an examination of legal arguments 
presented to four state high courts (New York, Ohio, Oregon, Washington) and a set of remand 
arguments in 14 states from the 1970s to 2000. Three principle findings are identified. First, the 
support structure is normally quite weak. Absent signals from either state or federal courts, 
litigants rely upon the federal law they have been taught when dealing with rights issues with 
virtually no attention to state law. Second, federal retrenchment does lead to more state 
constitutional arguments but in a limited manner. Lawyers tend to give limited attention to the 
traditional legal arguments in favor of attacking the policy choices involved in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s retrenchment in an attempt to convince the state court to simply evade this change by 
applying the previous federal rule under the dressing of state law. Third, state court 
encouragement also leads to greater attention to state constitutional arguments but without the 
same focus on policy concerns. Instead, lawyers tend to abandon concern for shifts in federal law 
in favor of the legal factors and arguments taken from the guidance of the state high court. In 
addition to adding to our knowledge of the reasons for the limited development of judicial 
federalism, this research adds to our understanding of the interactions between lawyers and 
courts in the development of legal doctrine.  
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Chapter 1  
 
Judicial Federalism and Lawyers 
 
 
 
Judicial federalism   
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court, under the influence of four Nixon appointees, put a 
clear stop to the Warren Court’s trend towards applying equal protection doctrine to economic 
inequalities. Education reformers built upon these liberal precedents to attack state school 
funding schemes tying funding to local taxes. These systems were criticized as providing 
dramatically different educational opportunities depending on where students live, that this 
discriminated against the poor and denied a fundamental right to education. While a number of 
lower courts accepted these claims,1 in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez 
(1973)2 the Supreme Court rejected both claims by a narrow 5-4 vote. The Court put a clear end 
to the economic equality arguments, declaring not only that the poor are not a suspect class but 
that education is not a fundamental right. The Court demonstrated an unwillingness to take on 
the massive task of constitutional oversight across fifty states and decided to defer to local 
judgment to remedy the problem. The Court clearly ended all federal options to remedy this 
problem but reformers did not abandon the judicial remedy; they simply reoriented to another 
venue: state courts. Nearly every state constitution requires the state to provide a free system of 
public schools to their children and reformers deployed these documents to convince state courts 
to reach a different result than Rodriguez. State courts across the country took up this challenge, 
                                                
1 See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal., 1971).  
2 411 U.S. 1.  
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striking down their systems and, in some states, dramatically altering the state’s education and 
tax systems. School finance became the most dramatic symbol of state court power and judicial 
federalism (Bosworth 2001; Paris 2010). To date twenty-five state high courts have ruled in 
favor of education reformers and eighteen in favor of the states.3 
School finance is the principal example of judicial federalism, the use of state 
constitutions to protect rights beyond the level set by the U.S. Supreme Court. A common legal 
trope provides that federal constitutional rights precedents set only the floor for rights protection 
and state law can provide a higher ceiling.4 Since the 1970s, judicial federalism has been 
prominent in a variety of areas from abortion regulations, criminal procedure, and LGBT rights 
(Andersen 2005; Latzer 1991a; Wharton 2009). Supporters described judicial federalism as an 
expression of the dual protection of rights our federal system was meant to achieve. Critics 
asserted, however, that judicial federalism was just a backdoor method of protecting earlier 
liberal victories in the face of conservative Supreme Court retrenchment. While supporters 
sought to make state constitutional law a consistent, independent alternative to federal law, the 
practice of judicial federalism was uneven over time, across issue areas, and between states.  
Traditionally explanations for the limited development of judicial federalism focus on the 
court-centric factors of judicial ideology, institutional structures, and state political 
environments. While these explanations are important, I argue they skip an important step in the 
legal process: the interactions between lawyers and state high courts in the development of state 
constitutional arguments. Courts rely upon lawyers to develop and present legal claims for them 
to act upon. Yet there is good reason to believe that lawyers present few state constitutional 
                                                
3 The National Education Access Network provides the most comprehensive source for school 
funding suits, http://schoolfunding.info/ (accessed April 9, 2012).  
4 It is also true, though more rare, that state constitutional protections can be less protective than 
federal law (Latzer 1998b); of course, federal law is still supreme.  
. 3 
arguments due to the limitations imposed by legal education. I explore the degree to which the 
support structure for state constitutional law is present and, more importantly, the degree to 
which state courts can guide lawyers and induce the development of such a support structure. 
Through a comparative examination of lawyers and courts in four states, I find that the support 
structure is typically anemic, offering little support for the development of a truly independent 
body of state constitutional law. Where state courts encourage and guide lawyers, however, 
lawyers respond with greater attention to state constitutional law providing courts with more to 
work with in developing state constitutional law more completely. 
 
Judicial Federalism in Theory and Practice 
The rise of judicial federalism is inextricably linked to developments in federal 
constitutional politics. Political struggles to influence the U.S. Supreme Court led to the push for 
increased state constitutional activism. The Warren Court represented a dramatic expansion of 
judicial power in the service of liberal policy goals actively supported by Presidents Kennedy 
and Johnson (Gillman 2006). The Warren Court expanded protections in a diverse set of areas 
such as criminal procedure, free speech, and religious freedom protections through the 
application of nearly the entire Bill of Rights to the states (Powe 2000). This liberal activism in 
turn elicited a conservative backlash; Richard Nixon’s 1968 campaign focused heavily on a 
criticism of the Warren Court as being too friendly to criminals in particular and promising to 
appoint more conservative justices to correct this tendency (Simon 1973). While a common view 
of Nixon’s court was one of a failed counter-revolution (Blasi 1983), this ignores the limited 
goals that Nixon expressed. On the issues that Nixon cared the most about, criminal rights and 
desegregation, the Court delivered much of what he hoped for, successes that were built upon by 
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Reagan’s more expansive attack on the liberal legacy (McMahon 2011). The Court never 
completely delivered on the goal of conservative activists to reverse the Warren Court’s legacy 
but the sustained opposition lead to a Court that maintained some liberal rights while severely 
constraining others, and then turned the Court’s activist power to the protection of conservative 
rights claims (Keck 2004). Through the 1970s and ‘80s the Court failed to overrule significant 
criminal procedure precedents but conservatives succeeded at dramatically limiting a number of 
these precedents and also limiting Warren Court privacy and economic equality arguments. This 
rights retrenchment, however, was open to contestation from below because the rules of 
American federalism allow for divergent constitutional rights doctrines through state 
constitutions.  
Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment extended some federal constitutional restrictions 
to the states the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the meaning of state 
law; it could declare state laws unconstitutional but it was bound by the interpretations given by 
the state courts.5 This became the basis for the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine. 
For the first century of its existence, this doctrine held that “where the judgment of a state court 
rests upon two grounds, one of which is federal and the other nonfederal in character, our 
jurisdiction fails if the nonfederal ground is independent of the federal ground and adequate to 
support the judgment.”6 Under this formulation a state decision based on a mixed or unclear legal 
basis was presumed to be state based and thus unreviewable. The early stage of judicial 
federalism complicated this rule however. As discussed below, the frequency of state 
constitutional decisions increased in the late 1970s and early 80s but the legal doctrine 
                                                
5 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875).  
6 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935).  
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supporting these decisions were usually murky and confusing at best. Responding to this 
experience, in Michigan v. Long (1983), the Court adopted the “plain statement” rule:  
Accordingly, when, as in this case, a state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily 
on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law, and when the adequacy and 
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, 
we will accept as the most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the 
way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so. 7 
 
Long altered the presumption of federal jurisdiction. Now mixed or unclear decisions were 
presumed to be based on federal law unless the state court included a plain statement that it 
relied only upon the state constitution and any reference to federal law was for persuasive 
reasoning only. While this rule may have made it more difficult to avoid federal review, it 
established a clear and simple rule for state constitutional activism: state courts could provide 
expanded state protections with a simple statement that it was doing so based solely on state and 
not federal law, ensuring that its decision was insulated from review by the U.S. Supreme Court.  
This justification for evasion of federal retrenchment received dramatic support from 
Justice William Brennan in a high profile article.8 Brennan (1977) instructs liberal lawyers 
dismayed over the increasing conservativism of his own Court to remember federalism: 
"Federalism need not be a mean-spirited doctrine that serves only to limit the scope of human 
liberty," instead "one of the strengths of our federal system is that it provides a double source of 
protection for the rights of our citizens" (Brennan 1977: 503). He reminds state lawyers and 
courts that federal law is not dispositive on the meaning of state constitutional provisions and 
should be followed "only if they are found to be logically persuasive and well-reasoned, paying 
due regard to precedent and the policies underlying specific constitutional guarantees" (Brennan 
                                                
7 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41.  
8 A study of law review citations found that Brennan’s article was the eighth most cited law 
review since 1979 (Shapiro 1985).  
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1977: 502). While Brennan’s argument disclaims any preference for particular results, this was a 
transparent denial when read against his jurisprudence, which did not show great support for 
federalism, his message was that "state courts should vindicate personal liberties along the lines 
undertaken by the Warren Court by reading their state constitutions expansively and should 
justify their actions by referring to the 'neutral' principle of federalism" (Maltz 1988: 432). 
Brennan’s theory then amounts to an instrumental one: state courts should utilize their 
constitutions to evade federal retrenchment. While James Gardner (2005) defends 
instrumentalism as a principled element of federalism in resisting federal tyranny in the denial of 
legitimate rights protection, other judicial federalism proponents view this as illegitimate and 
offer a variety of state constitutional theories to support state constitutional activism in a legally 
principled manner.   
Judicial federalism gave rise to a new legitimacy issue: where all courts grapple with the 
idea of judicial review in general, state courts were also faced with a legitimacy question over 
whether they should disagree with the U.S. Supreme Court (Tarr 1998b: 174-77). State 
constitutional theory can be reduced to three broad approaches for answering this legitimacy 
concern. First, lockstep proponents essentially argue that independent state interpretation is never 
justified (Maltz 1988; Williams 2009: Ch.7). Lockstep is appropriate as due deference to the 
Supreme Court’s role as constitutional arbiter and it ensures a simple set of rules for the whole 
nation to follow. Critics of lockstep argue that this approach ignores the independent force of 
state law where it is used in an unreflective manner, simply assuming that state law always 
follows federal changes; the security of the dual protection of rights “would be lost if states 
abdicated their responsibility to interpret their declarations of rights” (Tarr 1998b: 181). But state 
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constitutional law must still be guided by some principles beyond a desire to simply evade 
federal law as called for by instrumentalists.  
Second, the supplemental or criteria approach views federal and state constitutional law 
as inherently mixed and interdependent. The criteria approach received its earliest development 
in a concurring opinion from Justice Alan Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court. While it 
may be true that state constitutions are separate legal documents, “our national judicial history 
and traditions closely wed federal and state constitutional doctrine” and “a considerable measure 
of cooperation must exist in a truly effective federalist system. Both federal and state courts 
share the goal of working for the good of the people to ensure order and freedom under what is 
publicly perceived as a single system of law.”9 Only where federal law fails to resolve the issue 
should state law be considered and, further, an independent state constitutional rule must be 
justified by some neutral set of criteria such as text, state constitutional history, state law 
precedent, structural differences, matters of particular local concern, state traditions, or public 
attitudes.10 This approach sought to ensure that something more than just disagreement with 
federal law justified a state court’s decision but critics complain that it provides federal law a 
“presumption of correctness” (Williams 1997, 2009: 185)11 and that it may actually make the 
legitimacy problem worse because it only provides a state interpretation where federal law is 
unsupportive of the rights argument (Tarr 1998b: 183).  
Finally, primacy theorists answered this problem by requiring state constitutional issues 
to be argued first with federal law being resorted to only where state law fails to end the claim. 
This sequence is required by the fact that federal jurisdiction is premised on the state denying 
                                                
9 State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 362-63 (1982) (Handler, J., concurring).  
10 Hunt, 91 N.J. at 364-67.  
11 See also Hunt, 91 N.J. at 350 (Pashman, J., concurring).  
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some right and if state law remedies this denial there is no further legal dispute (Linde 1970b, 
1980, 1984). This approach answers the instrumental problem by making the consideration of 
state issues mandatory rather than discretionary (Tarr 1998b: 184). Under primacy, the meaning 
of state law is to be determined according to the same rules of construction applied to any other 
law with federal precedent bearing no greater weight than any other persuasive legal precedent. 
Primacy theorists advise lawyers and judges “to imagine a world in which there is no federal 
law” (Friesen 2006: 1-64) but this “seems to demand heroic efforts on the part” of state courts 
because it denies state courts the accumulated legal doctrines built over decades by federal courts 
(Tarr 1998b: 185). For this reason it is probably unsurprising that few courts have attempted to 
follow the primacy approach.  
While these various legal theories were developed to encourage principled state 
constitutional interpretation, studies of both case outcomes and legal reasoning demonstrates that 
federal law generally remained dominant in rights disputes. A study of six state high courts in 
1975 found that 17% of all constitutional issues were resolved on state law grounds (Fino 
1987b). In a broader study of all equal protection cases from all state supreme courts, 1975-84, 
found that equal protection was particularly dominated by federal law with only 6.7% relying on 
state law alone to reach the court’s decision (Fino 1987a). A study of self-incrimination cases 
from all state high courts, 1981-86, found that 22% rested solely on state law but there was 
significant variation between states with fourteen states never relying on state law and eight 
states relied on state law in more than half the cases (Esler 1994). Emmert and Traut (1992) 
examined all instances of facial challenges to state statutes, 1981-86, finding that state only 
grounds were relatively rare for invalidations. Of the 21% of statutes struck down on equal 
protection grounds, 5.6% utilized state law only; of the 9.7% struck down on due process 
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grounds, 1.2% rested on state law; 7.9% of statutes challenged on criminal rights grounds were 
struck down with a relatively high 3.8% based on state law; finally, 27.3% of statutes challenged 
on other bill of rights grounds were struck down with only 6.8% relying on state law (Emmert 
and Traut 1992: 44; see also Beavers and Emmert 2000).12 More impressionistic studies of small 
issue areas or only a few courts have similarly found that while judicial federalism may have 
increased in frequency in the 1980s, the “area continue[d] to be largely reactive” (Collins and 
Galie 1986: 113; see also Davis and Banks 1987; Porter 1982). Another study of criminal 
procedure and First Amendment rights parallels found that in a third of cases the state court 
adopted a broader rule; two of the three most common areas of expansion were in search and 
seizure and free exercise claims both responding to federal retrenchment, but jury claims were 
similarly frequent and cannot be explained solely with reference to federal law (Cauthen 2000). 
The picture of case outcomes demonstrates that judicial federalism is the exception rather than 
the rule but that judicial federalism varies by issue area. Examination of the rationale of opinions 
similar demonstrates a tendency to converge federal and state law.  
Barry Latzer (1991) examines all instances of state constitutional interpretation in 
criminal procedure cases from the late 1960s to 1989 to gauge the degree of rejection or adoption 
of federal rights doctrines. Contrary to the view by some that judicial federalism “is of a wholly 
liberal legal movement” regularly expanding criminal procedural rights (Latzer 1991: 157), two-
thirds of the cases adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court. There was considerable 
variation in the one-third of cases that rejected the federal rule with the most common area being 
search and seizure because that is the area of strongest federal retrenchment where the Burger 
                                                
12 Unfortunately, Emmert and Traut’s coding rules are unclear. They include a category for 
invalidations on “both” constitutions that appears to accept any citation to a state provision as a 
separate basis. Because of this I only report their findings for state only invalidations.  
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Court’s “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence had clearly been given a pro-police cast” (Latzer 
1991: 32). Only four state high courts (Alaska, California, Florida, and Massachusetts) regularly 
expanded state constitutional protections (Latzer 1991: 164).13 Cauthen (1999) utilized Latzer’s 
case samples for 25 state high courts and extended the data through 1994, finding that while the 
aggregate degree of expansion was consistent with Latzer’s original finding, there was substantial 
variation over time. In the 1970s, the degree of expansionism was actually quite high but was 
concentrated in a handful of prominent decisions from only a few early adopters of active judicial 
federalism and in the 1980s as state constitutional issues spread to more states the rate of 
expansive decisions dropped off. But in the 1990s, an increasing trend of expansion emerged 
(Cauthen 1999: 529).  
In a prominent critique of judicial federalism, Gardner (1992) examined all constitutional 
cases decided by seven14 state supreme courts in 1990. By looking at all constitutional disputes, 
Gardner’s analysis avoids a narrow focus on areas where judicial federalism was more likely than 
not and illuminated the constitutional discourse used by state supreme courts. Rather than being 
a source of truly independent law as pictured by some theorists, state constitutional law as 
practiced “is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and essentially unintelligible 
pronouncements” (Gardner 1992: 763). What state constitutional discourse that exists is “often 
borrowed wholesale from federal constitutional discourse, as though the language of federal 
constitutional law were some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argument generally” (Gardner 
                                                
13 However, California and Florida were both restricted in the early 1980s from issuing 
expansive state rights decisions by forced linkage provisions and all cases after these 
amendments were excluded in Latzer’s sample.  
14 Gardner’s seven states: California, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New 
York, and Virginia.  
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1992: 766). The hopes for independent state law were low because “state courts by and large 
have little interest in creating the kind of state constitutional discourse necessary to build an 
independent body of state law” (Gardner 1992: 804). 
Thus the picture of state constitutional law from studies of case outcomes and legal 
reasoning present an image of judicial federalism that is both uneven over time and across issue 
areas. Even though state constitutions provide state courts with a significant degree of latitude in 
judicial policymaking without fear of vertical review, state courts only engage with state law 
infrequently in rights disputes. This finding opens up the question of why state law remains so 
relatively underdeveloped.  
 
Explanations  
Attitudes and institutions 
Explanations of court behavior frequently center on two models of judicial decision-
making: the attitudinal and strategic models. The attitudinal model views law as simply window 
dressing for ideological preferences: “the Supreme Court decides disputes in light of the facts of 
the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of the justices” (Segal and Spaeth 2002: 86). 
The strategic model accepts the underlying importance of ideology but argues that ideology alone 
is not enough because “law, as it is generated by the Supreme Court, is the result of short-term 
strategic interactions among the justices and between the Court and other branches of 
government” (Epstein and Knight 1998: 18). Courts are composed of multiple members who 
have to agree to reach a decision and thus they engage in negotiation and bargaining to reach a 
majority result (Matlzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000). Outside of the internal interactions 
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between justices, courts sit within a system of separation of powers that has to be navigated to 
achieve a desired result (Bailey and Maltzman 2011; Clark 2011). These models have been aimed 
at explaining state court behavior, both in general use of judicial review as well as some limited 
attempts to explain judicial federalism specifically.  
A number of studies have explored the interaction of state courts with their broader 
political environment finding that shifting institutional rules influence the behavior of state high 
courts. Brace and Hall (1990) argue that variations in judicial selection method, internal rules 
about opinion assignment, and the existence of intermediate appellate courts had dramatic effects 
on the rate of dissenters from court opinions. In studies of death penalty decisions by justices in 
eight states, they conclude that attitudes (as measured by party identification) were mitigated by 
the institutional rules of their courts and state political factors, in particular finding that judicial 
tenure was important: “Democrats with long terms are least likely to support the death penalty 
… Republicans with long terms are most likely to support the death penalty" (Brace and Hall 
1995: 24, 1997; see also Traut and Emmert 1998). Similarly, a study of challenges to abortion 
restrictions suggests that reception to such challenges varied greatly by institutional situation 
with elected courts being less likely to invalidate restrictions with life tenure or divided state 
government making it more likely for courts to invalidate restrictions (Brace, Hall, Langer 1999). 
Utilizing a more sophisticated measure of state judicial ideology than simple party identification 
(Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000), Langer (2002) conducted a comparative study of judicial review 
in four issue areas finding that judicial attitudes were constrained by institutional rules and 
political divisions with the other branches. Justices were more likely to vote their sincere 
preferences if the issue was of low political salience to other political elites and/or the justices 
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were protected by generous selection and tenure rules. Similarly, Savchak and Barghothi (2007) 
find that variations in the rules of judicial retentions affect judicial decision-making, with state 
judges responding to the constituency that controls their retention in office. These studies 
confirm the importance of a mixture of attitudinal and strategic factors in judicial decision-making 
in the states. Less clear work has been done in the specific area of judicial federalism, though it 
tends to track with these studies.  
Scholars have long asserted that  "while in theory state court activism need not have a 
political bias, in design and practice the so-called 'new federalism' is often a device for advancing 
the liberal political agenda" (Maltz 1989: 233). In a study of early examples of judicial federalism, 
the most common reason was “ideological disagreements” with the U.S. Supreme Court (Galie 
1982: 779). Studies find that while ideology clearly plays a significant role in decisions to expand 
state rights protections, the institutional structure and political environment of their home state 
also play a substantial part. In his study finding a relatively low degree of expansionism, Latzer 
(1991a: 166-71) concludes that intrastate political pressure to conform to federal precedent was a 
substantial cause of this limited development. Utilizing Latzer’s case sample, a statistical 
analysis argues that longer terms and the support of a liberal state citizenry15 were strong 
influences on decisions to expand rights protection (Beavers and Walz 1998). Tarr and Porter’s 
(1988) comparative study of Alabama, Ohio, and New Jersey’s high courts, though not focused 
on judicial federalism, finds that the development of a state’s institutional and political cultures 
influenced their degree of state constitutional activism. Elections also posed a threat to judges 
                                                
15 Oddly, Beavers and Walz did not find judicial ideology to be a significant effect but they 
admit that this may be because they used party identification and that may not capture ideology 
as well and they note that citizen ideology may be a better measure.  
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willing to embrace broader state constitutional protections. For example, the defeat of three 
California justices in 1986 was directed at their liberal voting record on the death penalty (Wold 
and Culver 1987). Constitutional amendments also posed a threat to judicial activism with a 
number of states amending their constitutions to reverse rights protective decisions involving the 
death penalty and search and seizure (Williams 2003). These studies all point to legitimate 
explanations of ideology and institutional relationships that play a role in the limited 
development of judicial federalism. However, these court-centric explanations skip an important 
step in the litigation process: the legal arguments offered by lawyers to state high courts.  
 
Lawyers and courts, support and signaling  
The traditional court-centric models focus on the internal and external influences on how 
courts decide a case. These models, however, skip an important step in the legal process: the 
actions of lawyers. Lawyers develop and present arguments that shape and influence the options 
available for the courts to act upon. This section briefly outlines two interrelated theories of the 
role of legal support structure and court signaling in the development of rights law and the next 
section explores what these approaches suggest about judicial federalism.  
A number of studies detail the importance of lawyers and legal mobilization on the 
outcome of court decisions. Marc Galanter’s (1974) classic article shows how the rules of 
American courts give preference to those with greater resources, the “haves,” who can pursue 
and support litigation. For example, expansion of federal funds for legal support services for the 
poor lead to significant alteration in legal rules affecting the poor by ensuring a sufficient degree 
of support in bringing the litigation necessary to force change (Lawrence 1990). In his 
examination of conservative rights groups, Steven Teles (2008: 12; see also Southworth 2008) 
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details how legal mobilization is necessary to capitalize on shifts in other institutions, such as 
new judges: "Where the composition of the judiciary is reshuffled without a corresponding shift 
in the support structure, legal change may fail to occur or, at the least, be substantially limited 
and poorly coordinated or implemented.” This support structure of lawyers is a necessary, 
though not sufficient, cause for rights revolutions, as most fully discussed in Charles Epp’s 
(1998) comparative study.  
Epp examines rights revolutions, the “sustained, developmental process that produced or 
expanded the new civil rights and liberties” (Epp 1998: 7), in Canada, India, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Traditionally studies of rights revolutions emphasize the 
importance of formal bills of rights with activist judges willing to enforce these rights and Epp 
acknowledges the importance of these two factors as necessary to rights revolutions but not 
sufficient alone. He demonstrates that “rights revolutions depend on widespread and sustained 
litigation in support of civil rights and liberties” (Epp 1998: 18). While judges do occasionally 
take the initiative in crafting legal changes without the push from lawyers, the support structure 
is still necessary to build upon and enforce such changes (Epp 1998: 21). His comparative study 
finds that in the two broadest rights revolutions, Canada and the U.S., a broad support structure 
for the rights claims preceded and supported the work of courts. Even in the U.K., where no 
formal bill of rights existed,16 a limited rights revolution developed through the concerted effort 
of reform litigators. Finally, India never saw a sustained rights revolution despite the support of 
the high court because of the limited ability of rights litigators to mobilize and support this 
judicial interest. The findings of Epp and others demonstrate the importance in understanding 
                                                
16 Similarly, Galligan and Morton (2006) present evidence that a limited rights revolution 
occurred in Australia without a bill of rights under the influence of a few activist judges.  
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how lawyers are participating in a movement for legal change.17 However, signaling theory notes 
that courts are still important in the development of this structure. 
Ultimately the litigation process is iterative and the support structure approach highlights 
one half of this process by demonstrating the importance of lawyers in presenting courts with 
cases to act upon. Court signaling theory, on the other hand, stresses the power of courts to 
influence the claims presented by lawyers through an expression of interest in particular policy 
areas or legal claims (Baird 2007; Baird and Jacobi 2009a, 2009b). Baird (2007: 4) argues, “that 
the incentive to support litigation in particular policy areas varies over time in accordance with 
litigants' changing perceptions of Supreme Court justices' policy priorities." Through their 
opinions and other actions, justices send signals that they are interested in particular kinds of 
claims and legal arguments and “policy-minded litigants base their strategies of selecting cases, 
issues, and legal arguments on information from the Supreme Court" (Baird 2007: 31). For 
example, in an immigrants rights case out of California the litigants preferred to rely on arguments 
about equal protection or due process but negative trends in those areas from the Supreme Court 
made the claims unlikely to be successful. Instead the litigants shifted to federalism arguments 
after an increasing trend of signals about the revival of federalism from the 1990s Supreme Court 
(Baird 2007: Ch.3; see also Baird and Jacobi 2009a).  In a related vein, the Supreme Court’s 
earliest decision on university affirmative action pushed both universities and litigants on both 
sides of the issue to reframe their approaches and challenges to the policy in the Court’s terms to 
push for further action (Keck 2006).  
                                                
17 Urribarri, et al. (2011a, 2011b) offer a recent critique of Epp’s support structure concluding 
that support structures are neither necessary nor sufficient. However, their conclusions at times 
miss the point of his argument (Epp 2011).  
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The interrelated approaches of support structure and court signaling suggest an 
alternative method of approaching judicial federalism by pointing to the question of how, if at 
all, lawyers approached state constitutional law. The next section details this approach with 
discussion of the special restrictions lawyers face in arguing state constitutional claims and the 
signals state courts are likely to offer.  
 
Support, signaling, and judicial federalism  
While Epp focuses on resource mobilization as the primary means of supporting court 
action, support in the form of legal arguments is also an important element of the support 
structure. Courts are required to provide legal justifications for their decisions and it is these 
“opinions themselves, not who won or lost, [that] are the crucial form of political behavior by 
the appellate courts, since it is the opinions which provide the constraining directions to the 
public and private decision makers " (Shapiro 1968: 39). Legal arguments frame the options 
available to courts even if the final decision “is the product of those litigant claims, legal bases, 
and judicial sympathies that the temper of the times create and join together" (Lawrence 1990: 
122). In her study of the early development of civil rights litigation in the 1940s, Risa Goluboff 
(2007) demonstrates that lawyers were faced with an open field of legal possibilities and how 
their choices and interactions with courts throughout the decade shaped the options ultimately 
available to the Supreme Court in the 1950s. In their study of death penalty and abortion 
litigation before the Supreme Court, Lee Epstein and Joseph Kobylk (1992: 8, emphasis in 
original) find that while traditional explanations of judicial ideology, political environment, and 
interest group pressure were all important to the Supreme Court’s doctrinal shifts, “it is the law 
and legal arguments as framed by legal actors, that most clearly influence the content and 
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direction of legal change.” A study comparing the texts of legal briefs and Supreme Court 
opinions finds that 10% of the language in Supreme Court opinions was drawn directly from the 
briefs (Corley 2008).  
The norms of judicial behavior require courts to rule only on the issues and arguments 
presented by the litigants. While this norm against sua sponte issue creation are solely in the 
judgment of courts, crowded dockets make it unlikely that courts will regularly violate this 
rule—though exceptions certainly exist, as my findings in Oregon most clearly demonstrate. 
Courts dealing with crowded dockets have little time to independently research the legal issues in 
each individual case and thus they rely on the arguments as briefed and submitted to them. One 
appellate advocacy guide argues that the “overarching objective of a brief is to make the court’s 
job easier” for exactly this reason (Scalia and Garner 2008: 59). As the West Virginia Supreme 
Court of Appeals poetically declares, "[w]e have said many times that a skeletal argument, really 
nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim … Judges are not like pigs, hunting for 
truffles buried in briefs."18 One study of issue creation at the Supreme Court concludes that 11% 
of cases were decided on issues not presented by one of the parties (McGuire and Palmer 1995, 
1996), but a follow-up study of the same data demonstrates that nearly all of these instances were 
the result of faulty data gathering rather than genuine instances of issue creation (Epstein, Segal, 
and Johnson 1996).  
A weakness in the legal support structure is likely an important element to the limited 
development of judicial federalism. Unfortunately failure to raise state constitutional claims has 
rarely been examined, though it has frequently been asserted (see Collins, Galie, and Kincaid 
1986; Esler 1994; Williams 1991). Donald Farole (1998) provides one of the few exceptions. In 
                                                
18 State v. Ladd, 557 S.E.2d 820, 831 n.1 (W. Va., 2001) (citations omitted).  
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his study of obscenity and takings cases, Farole examines interest group litigation in state and 
federal courts finding that “[a]ll else being equal, interest groups typically prefer to locate policy 
conflicts in national rather than state courts” because of the broader impact of federal decisions 
(Farole 1998: 20). But where legal incentives are present, they will go to state courts and, less 
often in his cases, to state law. Where federal procedural or substantive law had weakened 
support for their legal claims, groups did turn to state courts. But this study of interest groups is 
limited because such groups are necessarily policy activists with a national focus whereas most 
lawyers serve individual clients and practice law in single states and thus may have different 
interests. In particular, duty to their client is of foremost importance and the failure to raise state 
claims may have disastrous consequences. A former judge of the New York Court of Appeals 
notes a series of recent cases where his former court adopted broader state protection but warned, 
“[o]bviously, if defense counsel had not argued state constitutional law their clients, instead of 
being exonerated, would have gone to jail” (Hancock 1993: 276-77). Justice Robert Berdon of 
the Connecticut Supreme Court (1994: 197) describes a case where a mentally ill man lost his 
federal claim and opines that a state claim, if made, would most likely have resulted in his 
removal to a mental institution rather than prison. Further, Farole’s choice of cases was good for 
the issue of choice of venue but weaker in terms of judicial federalism because neither obscenity 
nor takings were areas of state constitutional activism for most of the scope of his study (Tarr 
1998a). 
Unfortunately, lawyers litigating in state courts are constrained by a significant limitation 
that Epp and others do not consider: legal education. Constitutional law, a required course in all 
law schools, is taught as a solely federal subject. State constitutional law is rarely taught and only 
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as an elective. In 1997 only 22 law schools, of the 177 ABA-accredited law schools, had courses 
in state constitutional law (Esler 1994: 32, n.58). This is little changed today; for the 2007-08 
school year, only 24 of the nearly 200 accredited law schools offered state constitutional law 
courses (Sutton 2009: 166).19 Esler (1994: 31-32) describes this situation as creating a “self-
perpetuating cycle” in that the “typical law school curriculum produces lawyers who are not 
versed in raising claims under state constitutional law, which means that state grounds often are 
not presented in court. The result is that judges usually refuse to base their decisions on state law, 
which in turn discourages law schools from taking state law seriously.” Lawyers are not trained 
or prepared to offer state constitutional arguments and their poor performance was the source of 
annoyance for many state supreme courts.20 Two potential objections may counter this argument 
about the limitations of legal training.  
First, Gardner (1992: 810) asserts that “[i]f lawyers are not making state constitutional 
arguments, it is because doing so does not help them win.” Gardner rejects education and training 
as a limitation because lawyers do not have a similar problem offering other state legal arguments 
such as in torts or other common law issues. This argument ignores, however, the fact that 
common law subjects are specifically taught as state based with attention to variations between 
states (Sutton 2009). Further, his assertion about lawyers not using state constitutional arguments 
because they do not win is unconvincing in light of the findings in the following chapters 
because there is no evidence of early attempts to use state constitutional arguments that failed 
leading to an abandonment of state arguments, at least not by the time of his study.  A second 
                                                
19 Sutton also found that 11 schools offered state specific constitutional law courses but it is 
likely that these courses are offered by some of the same institutions that offered general state 
courses.  
20 See e.g. State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985) (admonishing poor legal briefing of state 
constitutional law and ordering supplemental briefing on the issue).  
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objection is that law school is aimed more at imparting a frame of mind to law students rather 
than instructing them in specific legal points (Mertz 2007). From this perspective, lawyers are 
trained to take claims and research them anew with each new client and thus should in the course 
of their ethical duty to their clients offer state arguments where available. While plausible, this 
claim ignores the importance of background knowledge in shaping the options lawyers 
investigate. If lawyers are taught that suspension from school for hate speech implicates the First 
Amendment, and only that, they are unlikely to uncover alternative state provisions. Even if 
Mertz is correct that law school is more about imparting a view of the world with specific 
knowledge being minimal and aimed at teaching research tools, this still does not undermine my 
argument. After all, the research tools in constitutional cases are centered on court opinions and 
thus the dominance of federal constitutional law weighs against the potential of state 
constitutional claims. And in fact this may weigh in favor of my signaling argument discussed 
below.  
Given these limitations, I argue that the support structure for state constitutional 
arguments is likely to be quite weak. Lawyers are conditioned to think of rights in federal terms 
and have little experience with non-federal frames of reference. Court signaling theory, however, 
provides a means of explaining how lawyers overcome this limitation and probing the extent to 
which a support structure can be enticed into existence by state courts. We can conceive of a 
number of potential signals, as Baird (2007) acknowledges. For example, many sitting and 
former state high court justices wrote law review or bar journal pieces extolling the virtues of 
state constitutional law and offering lessons on how it should be approached (Berdon 1994; 
Carson 1983; Clarke 1987; Durham 1989; Hancock 1993; Linde 1980, 1984; Satter 1982; Utter 
1984; Utter and Pitler 1987). We might also expect some influence from speeches from justices 
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and a number of the articles written by justices began as speeches to local or national bar 
organizations. But the greatest influence courts and individual justices have on lawyers comes 
from their judicial opinions. Lawyers litigating constitutional issues are trained to research these 
opinions and frame their arguments to respond to the legal theories presented by opinions. Here I 
outline two signals that should have strong effects on how lawyers litigate constitutional rights 
claims. Both should increase the likelihood of state constitutional arguments, though in different 
ways. 
The first signal is external to the states, federal retrenchment. Retrenchment occurs where 
the U.S. Supreme Court reverses or limits a prior rights doctrine or refuses to recognize a new 
rights claim. A lawyer is primarily driven by a desire to win her case and where federal law has 
soured on her claim, state constitutional provisions provide a means of avoiding a new, 
unfavorable federal direction. Retrenchment points lawyers to the instrumental benefit of state 
constitutions through the independent and adequate state grounds doctrine and fits well with the 
arguments of Brennan (1977) and Gardner (2005). State constitutions become a means of 
resisting retrenchment.  
The second signal is internal to each particular state and comes in the form of state court 
encouragement to pursue state constitutional claims. Some courts became frustrated with 
arguments simply seeking to evade federal retrenchment, fearing that such evasion lacks 
sufficient legitimacy for a separate constitutional doctrine. State court encouragement is aimed at 
overcoming the limitations of legal training and practice by guiding their lawyers in when or 
how to present competing state constitutional rights claims. A state court may pursue this 
encouragement in a limited manner by focusing on the development of a particular state 
constitutional doctrine. Some courts go further, however, and adopt one of the particular theories 
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of state constitutional law and instruct their lawyers to follow this path. This kind of continued 
guidance provides lawyers trained to think in terms of federal law a path to follow in making 
independent state constitutional arguments.  
Ultimately signals from courts should influence the degree of support arguments receive 
from the legal bar and with greater support, state courts receive a stronger foundation to build 
independent state law. As Tarr and Porter (1988: 246) argue, “although courts can encourage 
litigation in particular areas, they are, as one commentator has wryly observed, like unreliable 
clocks, which must be shaken to be started. Whether such shaking occurs depends on whether the 
attorneys in a state heed and act on the signals they receive. Thus a complex pattern of reciprocal 
influence operates.” This dissertation explores the degree to which lawyers heed these signals 
from federal and state courts across issue areas and over time.  
 
Expectations 
Given the limitations imposed by training and legal education, I expect to find little 
evidence of a support structure in areas where federal law is relatively stable in its protections 
and where state courts have remained silent on the issue. In this case lawyers should focus on the 
protective federal doctrine with no significant attention to any potential state issue. However, as 
federal law turns negative, lawyers will turn to state arguments. Where federal law is still 
uncertain but trending negative, it is likely that lawyers will still utilize federal claims while 
providing a state claim as a backup. But as the negative federal precedent builds to a more clear 
answer, lawyers will abandon federal claims for a solely state argument. However, state 
arguments under federal retrenchment are likely to take a particular form because they are 
influenced by a primarly instrumental motivation. Lawyers will likely deploy state arguments as 
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invitations to evade federal retrenchment with little attention to traditional legal factors. Instead, 
claimants will focus on policy criticisms of federal law, attempting to convince the state court 
that federal law is misguided and should be ignored. These arguments are the kind so many 
critics of judicial federalism targeted and one reason why some courts adopted particular theories 
or approaches to state constitutional law.  
Under the internal encouragement signal, state courts adopt a particular doctrine of state 
constitutional law or a broader approach towards state law. As the state court’s guidance sinks 
into the legal community, the arguments should become more clearly independent focusing on 
the traditional legal factors and less on attacks upon the policy of federal law. The method of 
encouragement should lead to different changes in how lawyers argue state claims. Under the 
criteria approach, arguments should primarily be focused in areas where federal retrenchment is 
relatively clear but the substance of the arguments should track more closely to the criteria 
required by the court. The primacy approach, on the other hand, likely will result in greater 
independent attention to state constitutional issues across issue areas with less regard for federal 
retrenchment or concern with the policy effects of federal rules.   
The goal of this project is not to necessarily demonstrate that state arguments are causing 
greater attention to judicial federalism. The legal arguments offered by lawyers frame the options 
available to courts but ideological, strategic, and legal factors influence the resolution of a case. 
Instead, my goal is to explore the degree of support for judicial federalism in the norm and, 
further, how the signals sent by courts impact this support structure. Specifically, my aim is to 
establish the degree to which state courts may be able to induce a significant degree of support 
from its lawyers in developing an independent body of state rights law.   
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Plan of the dissertation 
Chapter 2 establishes the research design by laying out the rules for case selection, 
coding and analysis rules, and the logic behind the choice of states chosen for the case studies. 
Chapter 3 discusses the direct effect of federal retrenchment through the examination of remand 
briefs finding a dramatic shift in arguments after a Supreme Court reversal. Chapter 4 examines 
judicial federalism in Ohio where the Ohio Supreme Court has largely ignored state 
constitutional law. The lawyers in Ohio responded with minimal engagement with state law. 
Chapter 5 examines New York where the Court of Appeals has resisted any clear theory 
preferring to engage in an ad hoc approach to state law with the exception of one particular 
doctrine. New York lawyers offered a number of policy based attacks on federal retrenchment 
but engaged in a more consistent legal interpretation in the doctrinal area. Chapter 6 looks at the 
Washington Supreme Court’s adoption of the criteria approach finding a dramatic shift in the 
way that state arguments were made, not necessarily in the frequency of state arguments but 
clearly in their content. Chapter 7 explores the effect on lawyers from the adoption of primacy 
from the Oregon Supreme Court where the dramatic preference for state law normalized state 
constitutional law to the point where federal and state issues were essentially in equal proportion 
for much of the period. Chapter 8 offers some comparative examination in evaluating the effects 
of various court signals on the support structure for judicial federalism. Additionally, I offer 
comments on the importance of these findings and some directions for future research.    
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Chapter 2 
 
Research Design 
 
 
Legal briefs 
While other aspects of the litigation process, such as oral arguments (Johnson 2004), 
provide important information to courts, it is the legal briefs presented by parties and other actors 
that provide most of the information courts receive. I utilize the briefs presented by litigants 
claiming a rights violation—because the terms vary widely, I refer to these litigants as rights 
claimants.1 As my interest is in how the legal bar supports constitutional rights arguments against 
governmental behavior, I do not consider the opposing briefs.2 I also do not examine amicus 
curiae briefs. While amici are important means of interest group involvement (see, e.g., Collins 
2008; Comparato 2003; Farole 1998; Songer and Kuersten 1995), my focus is on how the 
broader legal bar approaches issues of constitutional rights and not on how organized interest 
groups act. Thus I utilize only the rights claimant’s (who may be an interest group or represented 
by one) initial brief. While it is always possible that additional arguments will be made in 
subsequent briefs, litigants are still expected to offer their primary legal arguments in the initial 
brief. Further, it is infeasible to collect the entire record for each case.   
My primary source of data is drawn from briefs presented to four state high courts—I 
discuss the remand sample below. I utilized cases from 1970-2000.3 This date range is aimed at 
capturing how constitutional rights claims shifted over time from an era before significant 
                                                
1 Where a case involves multiple consolidated cases, I utilize the first rights claimant’s brief 
available in the relevant collection.  
2 However, in two Washington cases discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, the state’s brief is utilized 
because it was the side seeking broader restrictions due to unusual state specific facts.  
3 Except for Ohio, as explained below, which runs from 1978-2000.  
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interest in judicial federalism existed through the early years into the later stages of judicial 
federalism where state courts were faced with the difficulty of consistently applying their state 
constitution (Williams 2003). Further, this date range ensures a wide variation in federal 
retrenchment. I only utilized cases from the even years of this range, however, because a long 
date range required trade-offs. Using alternating years allows for a larger sample of cases per 
year and thus reduces the likelihood of missing important developments. Alternating years 
provides the best compromise over completeness and an extended time period. Cases were 
identified through Westlaw searches of state high court opinions by state and year for any 
variation of “constitution.” While ideally it would be possible to search the legal briefs directly, 
as discussed below this is not possible because legal briefs are generally unavailable 
electronically. Thus I rely upon the final opinions for indications that constitutional arguments 
were made. This may miss some claims but even where a court does not decide a constitutional 
issue it frequently notes that one was made and explains why it is avoiding the claim.  
I then read the syllabus and head notes of the opinions to identify constitutional rights 
claims. I included nearly all rights claims where state and federal provisions were present—the 
discussion of each state below mentions where issues were excluded for lack of a state provision.  
Three substantive issue areas were excluded from consideration: speedy trial issues, challenges 
to public employment hearings, and police powers cases. The first two are excluded because they 
tend to involve interrelated issues of constitutional and statutory provisions with little clear 
distinction between the two. Further, the second and third are likely to be only vaguely presented 
as constitutional claims with the argument primarily aimed at the facts underlying the hearing or 
regulation. Other than these issues I included all claims involving the rights guaranteed by the 
Bill of Rights—except for the unincorporated provisions guaranteeing grand juries and civil jury 
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trials4—and the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. By 
including a broad set of rights issues I avoid problems of self-selecting only areas where state 
arguments were likely. Including a wide variety of issue areas ensures a significant variation of 
federal retrenchment across issue areas and also allows for surprising and unexpected findings.  
 
Case study selections 
My analysis draws upon a study of remand arguments and case studies of arguments 
made to four state high courts. This section explains why each was chosen for inclusion in this 
study—though the state specific chapters give greater details on each state’s practice—and the 
state specific exclusions of particular kinds of arguments, as well as the complications and 
limitations on each state sample. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 at the end of this chapter detail the number 
of briefs and arguments utilized for this study and Appendices A-F provides citations to all cases 
used by state and year.  
 
Remand 
Remand cases are used to explore the way that direct federal retrenchment affects the 
legal arguments. I examine cases where the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a state high court 
opinion on rights grounds. Two types of remand cases were used. First, reversal cases are where 
the U.S. Supreme Court decided the issue by full opinion reversing the state court. Second, 
consideration cases are where the Supreme Court vacated the state decision and remanded 
summarily with instructions to consider some recent decision. While not as directly negative as 
                                                
4 I did include right to bear arms issues. While it was unincorporated during my time frame, the 
issue was included out of curiosity of how the increasingly public movement for gun rights 
affected rights arguments. Regardless, only a handful of cases involved this issue.   
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reversal cases, consideration remands are most likely utilized where a significant number of the 
Supreme Court justices believe the state court decision is unlikely to withstand scrutiny under the 
new changes to federal constitutional doctrine. 
I identified remand cases by searching the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions, 1980-2006, 
for instances where the certiorari order was issued to a state high court. I then examined the 
syllabus of the decision to confirm that a rights claim was involved and that the state high court 
had supported that claim. I identified about 100 cases but it is not always clear from the Westlaw 
records whether briefing was heard on remand and in a number of cases there is no remand 
history at all. I focused primarily on cases where the state court issued a full decision on remand 
as those most likely to have briefing on the effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision. I 
estimate that about 60 cases should have briefs available from both stages and have collected 
briefs from 33 cases for both initial and remand stages, 24 reversal and 9 consideration cases. 
Briefs were obtained through correspondence with law libraries that had the case records and 
were willing to copy them; a small number of briefs were available on Westlaw.5 My current 
sample includes briefs from 14 states. Unfortunately, because of the cost associated with 
obtaining remand briefs, I had to focus on the states with a relatively high number of remand 
cases rather than a random sample of states or cases. Only the issue directly reviewed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court was included in my remand analysis.  
 
Ohio 
The Ohio Supreme Court was chosen to represent states that are resistant to state 
constitutional claims. While it is likely that all state high courts have had some occasion to 
                                                
5 For cases from New York and Washington I obtained the briefs myself from law libraries at 
Syracuse University and the University of Washington.  
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expand rights protection, few were as consistently resistant as Ohio and I chose it for this reason. 
Briefs from 1978-19906 were obtained from the Ohio Supreme Court Law Library in Columbus, 
Ohio. The library utilized two forms for records: microfilm and paper. While Table 2.1 shows a 
relatively strong percentage of the identified universe, the brief collections were less than 
complete. According to the library staff, the clerk’s office only sent cases that were orally argued 
to the library for archiving and thus it was likely that any other cases identified were decided in 
some form of summary motion; I was unable to locate an alternative source for these missing 
cases. I obtained copies of all briefs available in the library’s collections. For a small number of 
cases only jurisdictional memoranda were available and I utilized these as a second best source 
of constitutional rights arguments. There was one type of case that was systematically missing: 
death penalty cases before 1988 were not in the library’s collection. While 1988 and 1990 did 
have paper copies of death penalty briefs, limitations of time and resources forced me to skip 
these briefs and focus on rounding out the other issue areas.7 From 1992-2000, I obtained only 
the briefs I could obtain from Westlaw’s online archive. According to the staff at the Ohio 
Supreme Court Law Library, Westlaw scanned all of the library’s briefs and thus the online 
source should be coextensive with the libraries collection with the same problems, though the 
death penalty briefs were generally present.  
While Ohio does not have express due process or equal protection clauses, the Ohio 
Supreme Court has long treated various provisions of the Ohio Constitution as embracing these 
                                                
6 My sample begins with 1978 because of limitations on my resources that did not allow for a 
return trip to fill out the rest of my sample.  
7 Death penalty briefs can be anywhere from five to ten times the length of a brief in a standard 
case and thus it takes considerably longer to scan or copy them.  
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principles.8 Thus, I include those claims as parallel areas. Otherwise the Ohio Constitution has 
parallel provisions for all the rights provisions of the federal Bill of Rights. 
 
New York 
I chose the New York Court of Appeals as a representative of state high courts that 
approach state constitutional law in an ad hoc fashion without clear guidance through adoption of 
a particular approach. While it may have avoided a clear theory, New York has the added benefit 
of a single strong state constitutional doctrine allowing for examination of the influence of a 
limited internal encouragement. Briefs were located in microfilm and microfiche sets produced 
by the William S. Hein Company and contained in the collections of the Syracuse University 
College of Law Library (1970-1990) and the Onondaga County Supreme Court Law Library 
(1992-2000). I randomly selected 60% of the identified universe for each year with a minimum 
of 20 cases or the whole set if less than 20 were identified. Records are sometimes incomplete or 
withheld because of privacy issues (typically involving minors). Where a brief was missing, I 
replaced it with another randomly selected case where possible. Additionally, a small number of 
briefs were available from the 1990s on Westlaw and I obtained those whenever possible.  
New York does not have a constitutional right to a public trial so those issues were 
excluded. Additionally, while the state does have a Blaine Amendment forbidding public funding 
of sectarian education, New York does not have an establishment clause. I thus exclude all 
establishment issues rather than assume that connections to this limited provision might be 
possible. Finally, New York has an unusually liberal appeals law that requires mandatory appeals 
                                                
8 See, e.g., Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382 (1953); Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dayton, 
138 Ohio St. 540 (1941); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio.St.2d 6 (1980). 
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where the Appellate Division was divided.9 The Court of Appeals issues memorandum opinions 
in many of these cases that frequently do nothing more than issue a final order on the basis of a 
lower opinion (Meyer, Agata, and Agata 2006: 127). I excluded memorandum opinions 
assuming that the cases are those representing issues the Court of Appeals perceives as easy and 
unworthy of its time. Any error this exclusion may introduce is most likely to be in favor of 
under representing the dominance of federal claims because it is unlikely that the Court will 
regularly summarily decide cases posing novel state constitutional arguments.  
 
Washington  
I chose the Washington Supreme Court because it endorsed the criteria approach and 
reiterated it over time. While six or so state high courts endorsed some version of this approach 
(Williams 1997, 2009: 146-77), the Washington Court went further than most and stressed it as a 
mandatory element in briefing and thus presented a stronger degree of encouragement. I obtained 
the Washington briefs from collections at the Gallagher Law Library at the University of 
Washington and the Seattle University School of Law Library. From 1988-2000 the briefs were 
collected primarily in microfiches produced by the William S. Hein Company located in the 
Gallagher Law Library and the collections were relatively complete. A small number of briefs 
from 1992-2000 were also available on Westlaw and I obtained those when possible. However, 
from 1970-1986 the collections in both libraries were less than perfect. The Gallagher Library 
only had briefs in paper copies for that time period and a significant number were missing; from 
1970-1982 the Seattle University Law Library had some briefs in microfiche published in house. 
I obtained copies of all the identified briefs available for all years from both libraries. As Table 
                                                
9 Before 1986, any dissent triggered mandatory appeal, after it required two dissents. 
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2.1 shows, this lead to a sample with some wide variations between 1970-1986, ranging from 40-
70% with a single exception. Especially problematic was 1984 were only 14% of the identified 
briefs were available. Thus, the data from these years should be read with these limitations in 
mind.  
No substantive issue areas were excluded for Washington. But the Washington appeals 
process causes an oddity. While there is a normal appellate process through a petition of review 
from an appeals court, only a minority of cases reach the Supreme Court through this process. 
Most cases get to the court through direct review either from direct appeal from the trial court or, 
commonly, by transfer from one of the courts of appeals. Appellate courts are allowed to transfer 
the case to the high court, which it can refuse to accept, and the Supreme Court can also transfer 
a case on its own motion to reduce appellate caseloads (Wiggins 1986). The briefs collected are 
occasionally from the Court of Appeals filing, about a third of my sample for most years. While 
some cases showed later briefing solely to the Supreme Court, these were usually styled as 
supplemental and like supplemental briefs generally were aimed at expanding or clarifying the 
first brief; many cases had only these Court of Appeals briefs. In fact, the 1990s briefs available 
on Westlaw that were originally presented to a Court of Appeals were listed as presented to the 
Washington Supreme Court in the Westlaw text form of the briefs. I treated these briefs as the 
initial brief like any other case and similar to Oregon there is no obvious differences in quality of 
the arguments. Given the longer appellate window at times, I was careful to give attention to the 
dates of briefs for purposes of judging the effect of precedent. 
 
Oregon 
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I chose the Oregon Supreme Court because it firmly adopted the primacy approach, an 
approach that only two other states (Maine and New Hampshire) adopted.10 Oregon is the only 
court of these three with an intermediate appellate court, which helps filter out more routine 
appeals. Further, Oregon was chosen from among these because of the powerful influence for 
Justice Hans Linde, as discussed further in Chapter 7. No briefs were available electronically. All 
briefs were obtained from the John E. Jaqua Law Library at the University of Oregon. From 
1970-76 these briefs were available in paper form and all briefs contained in their collection 
were copied. From 1978-2000, the briefs were contained in microfilm produced by the 
Washington County, Oregon, Law Library. The briefs, however, turned out to be complicated. 
The rolls of film for Supreme Court briefs only included briefs that were filed on direct appeal 
from the trial court, usually death penalty cases or original actions. For all other cases, the 
microfilm roll started with an index that cross-referenced the microfilms for the Oregon Court of 
Appeals for the briefs on all cases that passed through them. The statement of intent11 for the 
microfilms stated that they contained the complete record of the case and that the originals were 
destroyed after confirming that the entire record was intact on the microfilm rolls. At this point, 
it is unclear exactly why only briefs from the Court of Appeals were available but likely is driven 
by the state’s appellate rules. The current rules require appellants to file a short Petition for 
Review with the Supreme Court limited to 5000 words12 but further briefing is optional with the 
Appellant allowed to rely upon briefs presented to the lower court.13 It is unclear at this time 
whether this rule was always optional or whether appellants were once required to rely solely on 
                                                
10 State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347 (N.H., 1983); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148 (Me., 1984). 
Occasionally Washington is listed as a primacy state but as discussed in Chapter 6 this ignores 
the clear preference for the supplemental approach.  
11 A sample of this statement is available from the author.  
12 Or. R. App. P. 9.05(3)(a).  
13 Or. R. App. P. 9.05(3)(a)(v).  
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the Court of Appeals briefs. Since the statement of intent clearly spells out that the records were 
complete as reproduced, I assume that the Court of Appeals brief was the only one utilized 
before the Supreme Court and used those briefs for my analysis. As with the Washington briefs, 
there is no reason to believe these briefs are substantively different than those presented to high 
courts in other states and after reviewing the briefs no major differences were apparent. The one 
complication that I had to be aware of though was the extended time line for evaluations of legal 
precedents as Court of Appeals briefs may have been filled a couple of years before the Supreme 
Court issued a final decision. I obtained all of the identified briefs that were available in the 
microfilm sets with the single exception of 1990 where a high percentage of cases identified 
were death penalty briefs and, as discussed below, I included only five of these briefs, all 
randomly selected.   
Oregon has an active initiative system that affects the Court’s docket. Between 1998 and 
2000 nearly one-fifth of the Court’s opinions dealt with questions of ballot titles and initiative 
wording and a staff attorney estimated that in March and April of 2000 alone the Court spent all 
of its time on ballot issues (Ellis 2002: 149). These cases are not considered for my study 
because the Court does not engage in substantive challenges to ballot initiatives before 
enactment (Ellis 2002: Ch. 6; Miller 2009: Ch. 4). I did a check of the Court’s docket for 1997 
and 1999 to see if general elections and the ballot initiatives therein crowded out other 
constitutional issues and I found no substantial difference because ballot issues were common in 
all years. The major substantive area excluded in Oregon was due process. Oregon has only a 
provision providing that “every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him 
in his person, property, or reputation.”14 Unlike in Ohio, the Oregon Supreme Court has 
                                                
14 Or. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10.  
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repeatedly held that this due course provision is not equivalent to the federal due process clause15 
and thus I exclude the subject area. While the state constitution does not have a clear equal 
protection clause, the Court had a long history of treating the Equal Privileges and Immunities 
Clause as equivalent to the federal provision (Schuman 1988).  
 
Coding rules 
Scholars have adopted a variety of approaches for how to utilize legal briefs. A number 
of scholars utilize only parts of the briefs. McGuire and Palmer (1995, 1996) argue that the best 
method is to use the “Questions Presented” section as litigants are expected to clearly summarize 
the points they present. Spriggs and Wahlbeck (1997) argue that the best method is to examine 
the point headings in the “Argument” section. Legal briefs are organized through separate point 
headings intended to summarize the following argument and thus the headings provide an 
indication of the claims offered. Comparato (2003) adopts a hybrid of these approaches by 
examining the table of contents (that usually includes the point headings), the summary of 
arguments section or questions presented, and the list of sources. Epstein, Segal, and Johnson 
(1996), however, argue that the whole brief is the proper basis for analysis because the entire 
body is part of the legal record. Given my focus on not only the presence of specific 
constitutional arguments but also on the way those arguments are made, I utilize a form of this 
approach. However, copying briefs is a costly procedure, especially for nearly 1200 briefs, and 
thus I utilized only portions. I copied, wherever present, the table of contents, questions 
presented/argument summary section, and elements of the argument section. I include the 
                                                
15 State v. Burrow, 293 Or. 691, 695 n.5 (1982).  
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complete point for any argument that clearly involved, or appeared to involve, a constitutional 
rights issue.  
Death penalty cases require special treatment, however. These cases are obviously 
important sources of rights litigation but they also pose a dramatic problem for my resources. 
Death penalty briefs can regularly run into the hundreds of pages, frequently ten times the length 
of briefs in regular cases. The problem is also complicated by a “kitchen sink” approach taken by 
many death penalty briefs where the claimants try and include every possible type of rights claim 
to preserve the issue for further appeals, as well as dressing up non-constitutional issues in 
constitutional language. Given these complications, I adopted special rules for death penalty 
cases. First, I limited the total number of death penalty cases to five per year, randomly selected. 
Second, I copied only arguments that were at least two pages or longer. Only Ohio and Oregon 
had significant numbers of death penalty cases.  
Coding constitutional arguments as either state or federal can be a complicated at times 
and I follow three basic rules. First, where the point heading or point clearly identifies the 
argument as either federal or state based alone then it is coded accordingly. This holds true even 
in arguments that are presented as solely state constitutional issues but rely heavily on federal 
cases and doctrines. Second, where the point cites both federal and state constitutional provisions 
I follow Farole’s (1998: 33) standard with the state citation treated as filler where it is simply 
presented as part of a string cite without any independent development or rationale. However, 
where the reference to a state provision is supported by some kind of supporting argument, even 
if vague, it is coded as a separate state argument even if it is not included in a separate point. 
Third, at times an argument fails to specify a constitutional basis for an argument. Instead, a 
point may simply refer generally to a “right to counsel,” for example, and I examine the 
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precedents offered to determine the coding. Where the precedent is dominated by federal cases, I 
code the argument as federal. Where the precedent points to state cases primarily, I follow 
Esler’s (1994) method of examining those decisions and if the precedents appeared to rely on 
independent analysis of the state constitution, I code the argument as state based. Given the 
assumption that federal law will tend to dominate constitutional claims, my rules are intended to 
err in favor of state coding where arguments are vaguely presented.  
I primarily rely upon a study of the legal discourse of these arguments to track how 
constitutional arguments shift across issue areas and over time in response to signals from state 
and federal courts. As part of this analysis, I provide a set of content measures to track the kinds 
of legal issues that claimants use to support state constitutional arguments. Using theories of 
state constitutional law as guidance, I code the presence or absence of nine arguments. Textual 
difference arguments are coded as present where the claimant notes some difference in state 
language versus the federal provision; I do not consider a simple citation to this language to be a 
difference argument but I code it as present if the brief discusses in some way the point that 
while the texts may be identical, that does not preclude a different finding. State constitutional 
history refers to mentions of the drafting process of the state constitution, preceding state 
constitutional experience, or history of changes since adoption. Prior state law is a broad 
category that includes use of prior state constitutional decisions on point as well as common or 
statutory law that relates to the argument. Home state judicial federalism refers to citations to 
example of the state court expanding constitutional protections in some other issue area. Other 
state law is coded similarly with other state on point being issues directly relating to the case 
being argued and other state judicial federalism to instances of expansion in other states on 
separate issues. Structural differences are arguments noting some differences in the institutional 
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power of the state or the general principle that states exercise plenary power except where 
limited by some clear constitutional restriction, while the federal government is one of delegated 
powers only and thus greater restrictions on state power are justified by the greater degree of that 
power. Matters of state or local concern are any claim about the facts in a state justifying a rule 
that the U.S. Supreme Court is unable or unwilling to apply nationally. Finally, public attitudes 
refers to indicia that the state’s citizens desire a different rule or result than federal law. All of 
these are coded as either present or absent, no attempt to weigh them is made. Totaling the 
number of factors referenced in an argument is used as a rough idea of the complexity of the 
legal claim. However, I make no claim that a certain number of these factors makes a “good” 
argument or that all are strictly “legal” but only as a measure of the non-policy attacks used by 
lawyers in state constitutional arguments. 
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Total briefs and arguments 
Year New York Ohio Oregon Washington Total 
1970 20 (67%) --- 4 (80%) 14 (70%) 38 
1972 20 (63%) --- 6 (86%) 13 (50%) 39 
1974 22 (63%)  --- 13 (76%) 18 (56%)  53 
1976 29 (64%)  --- 8 (62%) 21 (53%) 58 
1978 22 (67%)  14 (41%) 11 (85%)  27 (60%)  74 
1980 20 (67%) 27 (61%)  15 (83%)  22 (47%)  84 
1982 23 (62%) 15 (88%)  17 (85%)  19 (48%)  74 
1984 20 (100%) 19 (70%)  15 (100%)  6 (14%) 60 
1986 18 (100%) 23 (70%)  16 (94%)  17 (40%) 74 
1988 20 (95%)  23 (52%)  17 (71%) 28 (80%) 88 
1990 20 (65%)  23 (61%) 15 (68%) 24 (92%) 82 
1992 19 (95%) 28 (62%)  21 (72%) 23 (77%) 91 
1994 15 (68%)  22 (55%)  12 (92%) 31 (94%) 80 
1996 22 (76%) 26 (63%)  12 (100%) 36 (92%) 96 
1998 8 (67%)  24 (67%)  13 (93%) 25 (86%) 70 
2000 12 (80%) 23 (62%)  12 (100%)  15 (83%) 62 
Total 310 267 207 339 1123 
Table 2.1. Total briefs (percentage of identified universe) by year and state.  
 
Year New York Ohio Oregon Washington Total 
1970 35 --- 5 16 56 
1972 29 --- 7 13 49 
1974 39 --- 18 31 88 
1976 39 --- 8 36 83 
1978 35 29 14 42 120 
1980 33 36 18 38 125 
1982 41 23 26 32 122 
1984 39 23 19 19 100 
1986 31 32 22 36 121 
1988 32 30 34 53 149 
1990 29 33 47 47 156 
1992 29 59 42 41 171 
1994 20 28 22 61 131 
1996 30 64 23 77 194 
1998 10 67 24 44 145 
2000 20 62 33 27 142 
Total 491 486 362 613 1952 
Table 2.2. Number of arguments by year and state.  
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Chapter 3  
 
On Remand 
 
 
 
This chapter explores federal retrenchment in the clearest set of examples: instances 
where the U.S. Supreme Court directly reversed a rights protective decision on the ground that 
federal law offered no protection. While federal retrenchment in other cases may be open to 
question about how far exactly the Court has withdrawn protection, remand cases are clear and 
direct: federal law offers little protection in the exact case at hand, involving the same facts and 
usually the same lawyers—only three cases failed to have a lawyer common to both briefs. Thus, 
a clear picture of the effect of federal retrenchment can be achieved by examining the 
constitutional arguments at both stages of litigation. The effect of federal retrenchment is stark. 
Even though parallel arguments were presumably as valid prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
action, it is only after retrenchment that substantial attention is paid to state constitutional claims. 
Moreover, these arguments on remand are rarely more than an attack upon the Supreme Court’s 
retrenchment, arguing that the Court is misguided, inept, and unworthy of further deference. 
State constitutions become little more than a means of protecting older federal doctrine under the 
window dressing of state constitutional law. The story of George Upton demonstrates the gradual 
discovery of state constitutional law.  
 
The Story of George Upton 
 
On September 11, 1980, the Yarmouth, Massachusetts, Police Department received a call 
from an unidentified woman stating, “a motor home full of stolen stuff [is] parked behind … the 
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home of [George Upton] and his mother.”1 She described the general nature of these stolen 
goods, that she had seen them personally at some unspecified point, and location and that Upton 
was planning to move the motor home because he had purchased it from another man who’s 
home had just been raided by the police. The officer traveled to Upton’s home and observed that 
a motor home was located on the premises behind a fence. He sought and received a search 
warrant on the basis of this call and his observation. A variety of stolen items were discovered in 
the motor home and Upton was charged with burglary and related crimes. The trial court denied 
his motion to suppress the evidence. Upton was convicted and appealed directly to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). 
Before the SJC, Upton’s lawyers initially argued a fairly standard Fourth Amendment 
claim: that the officer lacked probable cause. Under Aguilar-Spinelli, anonymous informants 
must demonstrate both the basis for the knowledge and the veracity of the information.2 The 
brief argued that the informant failed to demonstrate a basis of knowledge because she failed to 
state when and where she saw these items. Further, there were no indicia of veracity in the 
statement when she refused to clearly identify herself (and thus no history of truthful assistance 
to the police) and provided no other evidence that her claims were accurate. The simple presence 
of a motor home on Upton’s property was innocent and thus could not provide any corroboration 
for a reasonable determination of probable cause.  
Shortly after this brief was filed, the United States Supreme Court decided Illinois v. 
Gates (1983).3 The rigid Aquilar-Spinelli test was jettisoned in favor of a more amorphous 
“totality of the circumstances” test where determinations of probable cause were subjected to a 
                                                
1 Com. v. Upton, 458 N.E.2d 717, 718 (Mass., 1983). I draw the following basic case facts from 
this decision. 
2 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
3 462 U.S. 213. 
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lighter deferential standard of review. The SJC ordered supplemental briefing on the effect of 
Gates. The defendant’s lawyers were forced to acknowledge that their original argument was 
now weakened but that the search affidavit still failed the new test because it lacked any 
substantial evidence to show that the anonymous information was valid. However, the 
supplemental brief pushed a previously unargued theory based on the state constitution. Despite 
the fact that the state constitution had only previously been mentioned in a string cite with no 
discussion, the claimant argued “[i]t is obviously the province and indeed, the obligation, of [the 
SJC] to interpret this state’s constitution.”4 While the claimant noted textual differences between 
the state and federal provision and the pre-Revolutionary history of the Massachusetts 
Constitution, the primary argument amounted to an attack upon Gates. It cited both Justice 
Brennan’s dissent and White’s concurrence to show how the Fourth Amendment was being 
“eviscerated”: “To allow informants to become the oracle of law enforcement agencies is to 
decimate the Fourth Amendment.”5 With such decimation becoming a reality at the federal level, 
the SJC must enforce the prior protective rule under the state provision. 
In a bizarre decision, the SJC held that Gates only minimally modified the Aquilar-
Spinelli test and that the warrant lacked probable cause under this test and thus violated the 
Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed in a short opinion based on the new Gates test, 
demonstrating annoyance at the SJC’s distortion of that decision.6 On remand to the SJC, the 
claimant fell back to the state argument. The brief immediately framed the issue as whether the 
SJC should “accept or reject two watershed Fourth Amendment decisions of the United States 
                                                
4 Com. v. Upton, 458 N.E.2d 717, Defendant’s Supplemental Brief at 25. 
5 Upton, Defendant’s Supplemental Brief at 32, 34-35. 
6 Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727 (1984). 
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Supreme Court . . . as the model for interpreting” the state search provision.7 The claimant 
discussed some of the same textual and historical differences as the supplemental brief, and in 
greater detail, but again the primary concern was with attacking the policy of Gates. Primary 
support for this attack came from Justice Brennan’s Gates dissent and law reviews attacking the 
new Fourth Amendment trend. In particular, the remand brief attacked the cost-benefit logic of 
Gates as both faulty and a poor basis for a constitutional rule. 
 
Aggregate trends 
 Federal Arguments State Arguments Total 
Initial Brief 32 (84%) 6 (16%) 38 
Remand Brief 10 (25%) 30 (75%)  40 
Total 42 36 78 
Table 3.1. Remand arguments at each stage. Only the arguments related to the issue heard by the 
U.S. Supreme Court are included.  
 
As Table 3.1 demonstrates, there is a clear separation between the two stages of appeal. 
The initial set of arguments is dominated by federal constitutional claims in the manner 
expected. Only six of the thirty-eight arguments presented at the initial stage were state based 
and of these only two state claims were presented as the primary issue with the other four being 
relatively short and secondary in nature. On remand, however, lawyers discovered a large 
number of state claims, arguments that were presumably as valid on initial appeal and yet were 
never pressed until after the U.S. Supreme Court retrenched protection. While a fairly diverse set 
of issues is present, two areas are dominant: speech (29%) and search and seizure (23%).  
 
Initial stage 
                                                
7 Com. v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass., 1985), Defendant’s brief on remand at 1. The second 
decision was United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), establishing the good faith exception to 
the exclusionary rule. 
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As Table 3.1 shows, federal claims were the norm at the initial stage. Given the 
inclination of lawyers to view rights issues in federal terms, this is unsurprising. Further, in most 
of the issues present, there was relatively limited federal retrenchment at the time of the initial 
appeal. Interestingly, of the thirty-two federal arguments presented on initial appeal, seventeen 
did cite the state constitution in some manner but the citation nearly always occurred in a string 
cite without any discussion or development. However, six state arguments were made on initial 
appeal.  
Three of these initial state claims were enticed by uncertainty in recent federal law. The 
clearest negative signals were present in Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie (1998)8 involving a city 
ordinance regulating nude dancing. While the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a similar law prior 
to this decision, it did so through a highly fractured set of opinions without a clear majority 
rationale.9 The claimant relied heavily upon the fractured nature of this precedent in arguing that 
the Erie ordinance was distinguishable from the prior law and fit within the more narrow 
rationale adopted by some of the federal justices. As a fallback argument, the claimant presented 
a claim that state courts are not bound by federal decisions and that this one was particularly 
subject to disapproval given the failure to reach a majority vote and stresses that it was Justice 
White’s dissenting opinion that actually garnered the largest number of votes. The claimant also 
stressed the fact that three other state supreme courts had rejected the muddled federal test. Two 
other state claims were in areas with unclear though somewhat negative federal precedent. In 
State v. Hershberger (1989)10 the claimant asserted that the application of a vehicle signs 
requirement infringed on the free exercise rights of the Amish. While the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                
8 719 A.2d 273.  
9 Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991).  
10 444 N.W.2d 282. 
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had not yet resolved the case that would dramatically limit federal protection,11 the claimant 
noted that it had recently affirmed a similar Amish religious exemption issue only by an equally 
divided vote, signaling a deep division on the issue.12 Similarly, in People v. Conyers (1980)13 
the claimant argued a supplementary state claim that impeachment use of silence was 
unconstitutional and while the U.S. Supreme Court had not ruled on these circumstances, it had 
shown approval for impeachment use of illegally obtained statements.  
Both federal retrenchment and state encouragement played a role in State v. Recuenco 
(2005).14 The case centered on whether violations of the right to have a jury determine all aspects 
of the charged crime can be harmless error. The U.S. Supreme court had shown a history of 
embracing harmless error analysis for various criminal procedure rights noting that “most 
constitutional errors can be harmless.”15 Further, the Washington Supreme Court had signaled 
broad interest in state constitutional law in general and had specific precedent detailing how the 
state jury provision grants broader protections in some areas.16 Influenced by these signals from 
the Washington Court, the claimant provided a well-developed independent state argument that 
stressed the textual differences between the state and federal provisions, the expansive 
Washington precedent, and structural differences to justify an independent state rule. Apparently 
the claimant was so confident that this original state argument was well developed and sufficient 
that on remand the claim was simply reasserted via reference to the initial appeal. 
                                                
11 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
12 Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985) affirming sub nom Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 
1121 (8th Cir. 1984).  
13 49 N.Y.2d 174.  
14 154 Wash.2d 156.  
15 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).  
16 Chapter 6 details these state signals.   
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Interestingly, two initial state arguments were solely state based and ultimately only 
ended up in federal court through the weaknesses of the state court’s decision. In Witers v. State, 
Commission for the Blind (1984),17 the state denied funding for a course of bible study. Instead 
of relying on the federal Lemon test,18 the state19 justified the decision based solely upon the state 
constitutional Blaine Amendment.20 The state relied heavily upon a number of Washington 
Supreme Court decisions imposing a strict prohibition of state aid to religious education under 
this provision even if such assistance was allowed under the First Amendment.21 Despite this 
fact, the Washington Supreme Court proceeded to base its decision on Lemon and upheld the 
denial under federal law. Similarly, in People v. Caballes (2003),22 the claimant carefully 
presented only a state claim that a dog sniff during a traffic stop was unconstitutional because the 
U.S. Supreme Court had rejected similar dog sniffs claims previously.23 Unlike Witters, 
however, the claimant did rely heavily on federal cases for the logic of the argument even though 
it was careful to avoid reliance on the Fourth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court failed to 
make any clear statement as to the constitutional basis for its decision and thus the U.S. Supreme 
                                                
17 102 Wash.2d 624. 
18 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The brief did make an oblique reference that 
sounded in this theme but primarily just as a rebuttal to the free exercise assault on the denial. 
There was no real discussion of Lemon or its progeny. 
19 Witters is an unusual case in that the issue revolved around competing constitutional 
limitations with the blind claimant asserting a free exercise argument and the state used the 
establishment clause to combat the issue. Because the U.S. Supreme Court only dealt with the 
later claim, I used the state’s establishment claim for this study as the state was arguing for a 
broader constitutional rule.  
20 Washington Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 11 reads in part: “Absolute freedom of conscience in all 
matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and 
no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion . . .No public 
money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or 
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” 
21 State Higher Educ. Assistance Auth. v. Graham, 84 Wash.2d 813 (1974); Weiss v. Bruno, 82 
Wash.2d 199 (1973). 
22 802 N.E.2d 202 (Illinois).  
23 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).  
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Court assumed jurisdiction. The experiences in these two cases highlights the fact that legal 
framing alone cannot control how state courts deal with the issue, even if it can influence those 
courts. 
The few state arguments presented at the initial stage demonstrate influences from either 
federal retrenchment or state court encouragement, or both. Apart from these limited arguments, 
the initial briefs show little attention for state claims until after the U.S. Supreme Court review 
the issue and rejected their federal argument.  
 
On Remand 
As Table 3.1 shows, federal arguments were still made on remand but at a much lower 
rate. Nearly all of these federal arguments came in consideration cases, which is expected given 
the order for remand to consider the effect of some recent change in federal constitutional law. 
These federal claims tend to be briefer than the state claims and simply aim to distinguish their 
specific case from that of the new precedent, oftentimes halfheartedly. Three claimants made no 
state argument on remand. One was a consideration case arguing that the new precedent had no 
effect on the previously decided issue.24 The other two were reversal cases with one relying on 
an argument based on the state code of evidence25 and the other abandoned the speech claim in 
favor of previously undecided federal issues despite the fact that the Virginia Supreme Court did 
not foreclose a state constitutional speech claim until two months after the brief was filed.26 
Every other case offered a state constitutional claim on remand.  
                                                
24 Desimone v. State, 996 P.2d 405 (Nev. 2000). 
25 Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106 (Del. 1986).  
26 Commonwealth v. Hicks, 596 S.E.2d 74 (Va. 2004); Elliot v. Commonwealth, 593 S.E.2d 263 
(Va. 2004) (declaring that the state constitution provided no greater protection for speech).  
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Figure 3.1. Number of remand state arguments noting each legal factor. N=30.  
Figure 3.1 shows the number of state arguments on remand noting each of the legal 
factors coded in my analysis. As with most state arguments, attention to many of these factors 
was limited. One claimant did note the attitudes of the state’s citizens who rejected a 
constitutional amendment to conform the state provision to federal law.27 Three claimants noted 
some subject of particular state interest and four pointed to some structural difference. While 
only five had some discussion of the state’s constitutional history, a relatively large number of 
claimants did discuss textual differences between the state and federal provisions. Interestingly, 
other state law received little attention with only six claimants pointing to either similar case law 
or examples of judicial federalism.  
The primary factors involved home state law. Interestingly, nearly half of the claimants 
discussed some examples of judicial federalism from the state court in some other context. By 
noting the state high court’s history of rejecting federal law, the claimants seek to reassure the 
justices that they will not be doing anything wrong this time. This is particularly true in states 
                                                
27 Witters v. State, Commission for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363 (1989), Respondent’s brief on 
remand. 
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where the courts had a history of resistance to judicial federalism. For example, all three Ohio 
remand briefs, where judicial federalism was rare (Tarr and Porter 1988: Ch.4; Williams 2009: 
197), noted a decision interpreting the state right to bear arms provision as an individual right.28 
In nearly two-thirds of the state arguments, claimants discussed some state law on point with the 
issue under review. In some cases this took the form of examples of judicial federalism in the 
legal area under dispute. For example, in Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski (1991)29 the issue 
involved constitutional limitations on libel law and the remand brief noted two specific examples 
where the New York Court of Appeals expanded state speech doctrine, one of which specifically 
related to libel law. Other claimants noted statutory or common law rules as means to 
demonstrate a state law commitment to the more protective rule. More often, the claimant 
attempts to concoct a controlling interpretation of the state constitutional provision by noting 
some prior state court decision that string cited the state provision in the middle of a decision 
based on federal law. One of the clearest examples of this is in Van Arsdall v. State (1987)30 on 
the issue of harmless error analysis from the violation of a defendant’s confrontation rights. The 
argument rested heavily on a precedent that rejected harmless error in a similar case on federal 
law grounds but that also string cited the state constitutional provision. The claimant presented 
this string cite as creating a controlling state precedent that harmless error was inappropriate 
regardless of any changes in federal law.  
                                                
28 Arnold v. City of Cleveland, 67 Ohio St.3d 35 (1993).  
29 77 N.Y.2d 235. 
30 524 A.2d 3 (Del. 1987).  
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Figure 3.2. Number of remand state arguments by total legal factors. N=30.  
Figure 3.2 shows the rough complexity of the state constitutional arguments by simply 
totally the number of legal factors used by each rights claimant. Two-thirds of the briefs noted 
two or fewer factors in their state constitutional arguments with the most common combinations 
looking to textual differences and state law claims along the lines noted above. Interestingly, of 
the five briefs to note four or more of the factors, three31 were cases with a state argument on 
initial appeal suggesting that those lawyers may have been better prepared to expand upon those 
arguments than lawyers who had to create a whole new argument from scratch. This data 
demonstrates that legal factors are certainly present in state constitutional arguments on remand, 
but most are utilized as a desperate attempt to shore up the state court’s initial decision. The 
clearest evidence for this claim is the fact that virtually all of this same legal evidence was 
available on initial appeal and yet twenty-four of the thirty arguments pressing state claims on 
remand were not mentioned on the initial appeal. Remand briefs are responding not to changes in 
                                                
31 People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 2006); State v. Recuenco, 163 Wash.2d 428 (2008); 
Witters v. State, Commission for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363 (1989). Part of the reason for more 
complex arguments may also be the fact that two of these cases were influenced by the 
Washington Supreme Court’s adherence to the criteria test discussed in Chapter 6.  
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state legal factors, but to changes in federal law and it is the policy underlying these changes that 
becomes the bulk of state constitutional analysis. 
While remand arguments may point to some of the legal factors discussed above, the bulk 
of the arguments were centered on either attacking the Supreme Court itself or the policy 
underlying the changes in federal law. Nine remand claimants (30%) attacked the Supreme Court 
as being reckless in its actions. Some are relatively gentle and complain of how the Supreme 
Court’s decision was a “radically changed approach” or that the Court’s decisions are “curiously 
inconsistent.”32 Other claimants are more dramatic in their attacks. In a search and seizure case, 
the claimant argued that recent federal decisions were “eviscerating the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection, culminating in last term’s two rulings leaving only tattered remains of the federal 
exclusionary rule.”33 A claimant in another search and seizure case stressed the progressive 
diminution of rights at the federal level and wondered, given the major federal retrenchment, 
“what liberty interest and privacy rights have survived under the Fourth Amendment. It is thus 
left to [the Ohio Supreme Court] to determine whether any meaningful protections for Ohio 
citizens shall remain.”34 The single strongest attack on the Supreme Court came in a speech case 
from New York:  
Over the past decades the Supreme Court of the United States has slowly retreated from 
the expanded frontiers of liberty so painstakingly established by the “Warren” Court. The 
Supreme Court has radically revised traditional notions about the meaning and purpose of 
our Bill of Rights. Widespread inhibition of human rights resulting from a systematic 
repression of individual liberty has been seen by many of our high state courts as 
alarming and intolerable. Consequently, today state courts across the country are 
construing their own constitutions as providing broader individual protections than once 
afforded by their federal counterparts.35 
                                                
32 State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1999), Appellant’s brief on remand at 6; People v. 
Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49 (1982), Appellants brief on remand at 5.  
33 Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 476 N.E.2d 541 (Mass. 1985), Appellant’s brief on remand at 16.  
34 State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997), Appellee’s brief on remand at 19.  
35 People v. Ferber, 57 N.Y.2d 256 (1982), Appellant’s brief on remand at 6.  
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Such claims add little to the weight of a legal argument and seem intended to undermine the 
natural deference towards the Supreme Court in matters of constitutional law. If the Supreme 
Court is acting in a reckless and dismissive manner, deference is undeserved and may actually be 
dangerous to the state’s citizens. State courts have a duty to aggressively defend their citizens 
against these irrational actions through their state constitutions. While these kinds of overt 
attacks on the Supreme Court’s legitimacy are less common, nearly every remand argument 
attacked the policy behind the changes in federal law. These policy attacks form the clearest and 
strongest argument in remand cases.  
Policy arguments drew heavily from the logic of the U.S. Supreme Court dissenters but 
also relied on criticism from law reviews and other state courts. The most extreme example of 
this policy dominance came in Commonwealth v. Sheppard (1985)36 involving the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. This argument was the only one that failed to refer to any of 
the legal factors discussed above. Instead the claimant stressed the deterrence rationale at the 
center of the exclusionary rule since Mapp v. Ohio (1961)37 and, relying heavily on Justice 
Brennan’s dissent, that deterrence is required for any abuse of constitutional rights regardless of 
whether the error was done by the courts or the police. Brennan’s dissenting opinions crop up in 
a number of other cases such as People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books (1986)38 where the 
claimant quoted his dissenting opinion extensively to demonstrate how the Burger Court doctrine 
was a “progressive denuding of First Amendment Rights” and how “sexually explicit but non-
obscene [speech] has lost all but the surface veneer of its First Amendment Protection.”39 Other 
                                                
36 476 N.E.2d 541 (Mass.).  
37 367 U.S. 643.  
38 68 N.Y.2d 296.  
39 68 N.Y.2d 553 (1986), Appellant’s brief on remand at 23, 24.  
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dissenting justices received similar attention. On remand in Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie (2002) the 
claimant stressed an earlier dissent from Justice White and that “Justice Stevens’ dissent [above] 
is also extremely well reasoned and appropriately critical of the Supreme Court’s plurality 
opinion” to demonstrate how the Supreme Court’s fractured rulings on regulation of nude 
dancing establishments were flawed and unpersuasive.40 A claimant in  a counsel case from 
Texas similarly utilized Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion from the reversal to show how the 
Supreme Court’s new decision, which the brief describes as a “[r]ejection of national consensus 
of court authority” on the Sixth Amendment, “would emasculate the protections of the guarantee 
of a ‘right to counsel.’”41 
Two search cases complained of trends in federal search law, but in opposite directions. 
In one case, the claimant complained that the Supreme Court’s decisions were based on “legal 
fictions” as opposed to the actual facts of the case “so as to better enable it to draw ‘bright 
lines.’”42 Another claimant, however, complained that the Supreme Court’s flexible totality of 
the circumstances test simply reinforced abusive practices and that the state court should adopt 
bright line tests to correct the disparity of power between police and citizens, and that such a 
bright line rule is easier for the police to comply with anyway.43 In a case on standing to 
challenge searches, another claimant noted that the Supreme Court had developed a standing 
doctrine that undermined the ability of defendant’s to challenge unconstitutional searches by 
                                                
40 Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591 (Pa. 2002), Appellant’s brief on remand at 16. 
41 Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), Appellant’s brief on remand at 10, 11. 
42 People v. Long, 359 N.W.2d 194 (Mich. 1984), Defendant’s brief on remand at 23.  
43 State v. Robinette, 685 N.W.2d 762 (Ohio 1997), Appellee’s brief on remand at 14-29. 
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harkening back to Katz v. United States (1968)44 and a treatise on federal search law to show that 
the state court’s original decision was the proper result.45 
Additionally, claimants utilized specific predictions of the consequences of the Supreme 
Court’s new direction for their home state. For example, the claimant in Haliburton v. State 
(1987)46 discussed the structural difference in Florida that gave broad latitude to prosecutors and 
how the federal rule on when counsel attached would permit prosecutors to time the filing of 
charges to avoid the presence of counsel during the criminal investigation. After the Supreme 
Court held that statements made to a probation officer were not subject to Miranda warnings, the 
claimant stressed the danger of this rule noting that “defense attorneys in Minnesota will 
understandably tell their probationer clients that whenever they even remotely suspect that 
information requested by their probation officers may be incriminating they should no longer 
discuss such information with the probation officer and demand to see their attorney at once.”47 
This unfortunate outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision would undermine the purpose of 
probation and complicate the duties of probation officers more than necessary, something the 
state court can easily correct. These policy consequences were presented as the consequence of 
the Supreme Court’s inability to understand local conditions.  
 
Conclusion 
Remand cases were utilized to explore how federal retrenchment alters the behavior of 
lawyers in how they argue state constitutional cases. While the case studies offered in subsequent 
chapters aim at this same signal, it is always possible that any variation in how arguments are 
                                                
44 389 U.S. 347, 
45 State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654 (Minn. 1999), Appellant’s brief on remand.  
46 514 So.2d 1088 (Fla.).  
47 State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. 1986), Appellant’s brief on remand at 30-31.  
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made is caused by different underlying facts between cases or simply better lawyers. But in 
remand cases the facts and lawyers remain stable and the effect of federal retrenchment can be 
seen starkly. As expected, at the initial stage arguments are dominated by federal claims with 
only a small number addressing parallel state claims and usually because of earlier negative 
federal precedents. After remand, the arguments shift dramatically as lawyers are forced to look 
for an alternative method of maintaining their initial victory. On remand they turn to state 
arguments not out of any particular sense that an independent state doctrine is legally required 
but more as a means of preserving an older set of federal doctrines recently limited or abandoned 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. This is why the strongest emphasis on remand is not on legal factors 
such as text, history, or precedent, but instead is on policy attacks on the new federal rationale 
and the policy consequences that follow. State constitutional provisions are deployed as little 
more than a mechanism to apply this older federal law. While remand arguments demonstrate the 
instrumental use of state constitutional law advocated by some (Brennan 1977; Gardner 2005), 
they hardly present a significant set of arguments to support the development of a truly 
independent body of state law. The next chapter examines federal retrenchment in a state where 
the high court resisted judicial federalism and generally refused to deviate from a lockstep 
approach.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Ohio: Lockstep in Action 
 
 
 
The Ohio Supreme Court generally resisted state constitutional arguments, preferring to 
adopt a lockstep approach of adopting federal law as the limit for state constitutional rights. 
Lawyers under this system received virtually zero encouragement to engage in state 
constitutional arguments and they responded with a relatively weak set of arguments. Left with 
no internal guidance, the lawyers focused on instances of federal retrenchment and on policy 
critiques of these limited rights. State constitutional rights arguments in Ohio primarily stressed 
an invitation to evade federal retrenchment.  
 
Judicial federalism in Ohio 
It is safe to say that all state high courts have issued some rights protective decision 
beyond the level set by the U.S. Supreme Court since the 1970s, but many state high courts are 
less than enthusiastic about judicial federalism. The Ohio Supreme Court represents such courts. 
While it has issued broader state protections in a few cases, the tendency of the Court has been a 
policy of “unreflective adoptionism” of or lockstep with U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the 
immediate application of federal law and doctrines without any discussion of even the possibility 
that state law may require some different rule of law (Latzer 1991b: 864; Williams 2009: 196-
197). The Ohio Court has followed this path consistently, despite some protestations to the 
contrary, and lawyers have replied with minimal attempts to push for state constitutional 
adjudication.  
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Historically the Ohio Court was controlled by “conservative, ‘old stock’ Republicans 
who fashioned the law to conform to the values and interests they shared with small town and 
rural Ohioans, with business and industry” (Tarr and Porter 1988: 127). Expressing this 
conservatism, in the area of individual rights, the Court in the 1960s was highly critical of the 
Warren Court revolution in criminal law and resisted it too some degree (Porter and Tarr 1984: 
152-54). In 1978, however, a Democratic majority1—initially a 4-3 majority but quickly 
expanding to 6-1—came to power and reoriented the Court so that “[v]irtually overnight the 
court became ‘pro-labor and highly urban’ in orientation” (Tarr and Porter 1988: 129). The Court 
exercised this orientation by dramatically altering the law in areas of torts, tenant rights, and 
workers rights. But this “quiet revolution” (Tarr and Porter 1988: 130) did not reach 
constitutional law. While this new Democratic majority dramatically changed the Court’s 
approach to various areas of common and statutory law, it showed no real interest in state 
constitutional rights. The traditional Republican dominance reemerged in 1986 and continued 
this apathetic view of state constitutional rights though a few justices expressed some support.  
Porter and Tarr (1984) discuss a number of cases in the late 1970s and early 1980s that 
were prime candidates for judicial federalism but in all the Court rejected the possibility, usually 
without any serious consideration. Even in the single instance where the Court declared that state 
law required a protective rule, it stressed that this protective rule was necessary to meet federal 
levels of protection.2 When faced with a school funding challenge that was successful in both the 
trial and appellate courts, the Court, with only a single dissent, rejected the challenge adopting 
                                                
1 While Ohio general elections for judges are nominally non-partisan, all candidates are 
nominated through partisan primary elections. This arrangement is unique among U.S. states.  
2 State v. Gallagher, 46 Ohio St.2d 225 (1976) 
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the deferential federal test.3 While other state high courts at this time may have been striving to 
establish themselves as constitutional innovators, the Ohio Court maintained its image as 
“neither an innovator nor an enthusiastic emulator, deferential toward other branches of state 
government, and anxious to avoid controversy" (Porter and Tarr 1984: 154). However, there was 
some halting movement away from this image in the 1990s.  
In Arnold v. Cleveland (1993),4 the Court issued an unusually detailed exploration of 
judicial federalism and interpreted its right to bear arms provision more broadly than the Second 
Amendment, though it ultimately upheld the challenged ban on assault weapons. The Court 
discussed the lengthy set of federal precedents recognizing the legitimacy of judicial federalism 
and briefly noted the experience in other states and scholarly commentary on the movement 
towards greater state constitutional activism. The Court approvingly quoted a Texas declaration 
that “[w]hen a state court interprets the constitution of the state merely as a restatement of the 
Federal Constitution, it both insults the dignity of the state charter and denies citizens the fullest 
protection of their rights.”5 In engaging with the state right to bear arms, the Court expressed an 
apparently enthusiastic endorsement of judicial federalism:  
In joining the growing trend in other states, we believe that the Ohio Constitution is a 
document of independent force. In the areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the 
United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, provides a floor below which 
state court decisions may not fall. As long as state courts provide at least as much 
protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided in its interpretation of the 
federal Bill of Rights, state courts are unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and 
protections to individuals and groups.6 
 
                                                
3 Board of Ed. of City School Dist of City of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368 (1979).  
4 67 Ohio St.3d 35.  
5 Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 12 (Tex., 1992).  
6 Arnold, 67 Ohio St.3d at 42.  
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While this may have been a ringing endorsement for judicial federalism, the actual 
practice of the Court differed only minimally (Bettman 2004). The approach to criminal rights 
issues was generally still to adopt the federal rule. The one prime exception was hardly a 
paradigm of independent state analysis. The Court focused solely on the federal decisions for 
search of vehicles before simply asserting a state basis just in case: “If [the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in] Belton does stand for the proposition that a police officer may conduct a detailed 
search of an automobile solely because he has arrested one of its occupants, on any charge, we 
decline to adopt its rule.”7 No discussion of the basis for this rejection occurred beyond a 
footnote noting that state courts can provide greater rights protection. In 2002, the Court reversed 
this decision concluding that there were insufficient “persuasive reasons to depart from the 
principle that [the state and federal provisions] should be harmonized whenever possible.”8 In 
other cases, the Court rather quickly retreated from the hint of an independent state constitutional 
basis for rights protective decisions. For example, in two remand cases, included in the analysis 
in Chapter 3, the Ohio Court issued protective decisions that simply asserted violations of both 
constitutions. One case involved a search and the other struck down the state’s hate crimes 
enhancement as violating free speech rights.9 On remand in the speech case, the Court simply 
summarily reversed its prior decision and upheld the law under both constitutions with no 
discussion.10 In the search case, the Court noted the lengthy history of state cases adopting a 
principle of “harmonizing” the meaning of federal and state search provisions.11 Justice Craig 
Wright dissented from the speech decision on remand complaining forcefully that the Court 
                                                
7 State v. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349, 352 (1992) (emphasis in original).  
8 State v. Murrell, 94 Ohio St.3d 489, 496 (2002).  
9 State v. Robinette, 73 Ohio St.3d 650 (1995) (search); State v. Wyant, 64 Ohio St.3d 566 (1992) 
(speech).  
10 State v. Wyant, 68 Ohio St.3d 162 (1994). 
11 State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234 (1997);  
 61 
should not simply conform its state decisions and Wright, joined occasionally by Justice Paul 
Pfieffer, would continue to advocate for at least some attention to the state constitution, though 
they were generally unsuccessful apart from a few decisions (Bettman 2004).  
The 1990s did see a small number of cases expanding rights protection. In 1997, a 
narrowly divided Court reversed its earlier decision and invalidated the school funding system.12 
In 2000, the Court rejected the limited federal protections for religious freedom.13 Finally, in 
1995, the Court held that it would continue to adhere to its earlier defamation cases after federal 
retrenchment on the proper standard for determining whether a statement is one of fact or 
constitutionally protected opinion.14 While these examples suggest a slightly increased 
willingness to consider state issues, the dominant trend was still to defer to federal law on rights 
issues through a continued lockstep approach, even if it was minimally more robust (Williams 
2004). As demonstrated in this chapter, the legal arguments in turn have focused on federal 
analysis with only minimal attention to state law.  
 
Aggregate trends  
                                                
12 DeRolph v. State, 78 Ohio St.3d 193 (1997).  
13 Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St.3d 62 (2000).  
14 Vail v. The Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 72 Ohio St.3d 279 (1995).  
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Figure 4.1. Percentage of arguments by year, Ohio 1978-2000. N=486.  
The aggregate image of rights arguments in Ohio demonstrates a clear dominance of 
federal law. Of 486 arguments examined, only 34 (7%) were state based. There is no real trend 
or change over time. Apart from spikes in 1986 and 1994 no year saw much more than 10% of 
the arguments as state based. The number of arguments dramatically increased after 1990 largely 
because of the death penalty cases, which were not present for the earlier years as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Figure 4.2 shows the breakdown of arguments by issue area and again the picture is 
one of minimal attention to state rights arguments. Of the four high volume areas, more than 50 
arguments, (equal protection, due process, search and seizure, and cruel and unusual punishment) 
none saw significant state constitutional arguments. Surprisingly, criminal rights issues generally 
saw a quite low degree of state constitutional litigation, but in terms of absolute number of 
arguments both criminal and civil issues saw roughly equally low levels of state constitutional 
arguments.  
 63 
 
Figure 4.2. Percentage of arguments by rights area, Ohio 1978-2000. N=486.  
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 provide details on the content of state constitutional arguments when 
offered. As with the other case studies, home state law was used relatively frequently; in Ohio 
this took the form most commonly of noting a precedent that applied solely federal law but string 
cited the state provision. Claimants attempted to utilize this as a backdoor, arguing that the 
federal rule was de facto adopted as an interpretation of the state provision. Interestingly, Ohio 
claimants discussed other state law relatively frequently; nearly a third of claimants pointed to 
examples of other state courts adopting a broader rule on the same issue. Totaling the factors 
discussed in each brief shows that the overwhelming majority (86%) cited two or fewer of these 
legal factors. As this chapter demonstrates, state arguments were generally weak and 
undeveloped, seeking little more than evasion of a particular instance of federal retrenchment. 
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Figure 4.3. Percentage of state arguments citing each legal factor. Ohio 1978-2000. N=34. 
 
Figure 4.4. Percentage of state arguments by total factors cited, Ohio 1978-2000. N=34.  
 
Lawyers under lockstep 
Examination of this small number of state constitutional claims demonstrates a clear 
tendency of federal retrenchment driving the arguments. Given the lack of internal 
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encouragement from the Ohio Supreme Court, this is as expected. With virtual zero guidance 
from the state high court, lawyers utilized state provisions to avoid negative trends in federal law 
and as we saw in the discussion of remand cases, the state arguments tend to attack the policy in 
federal law. A small number of arguments, however, are harder to classify but may be an artifact 
of my coding rules that err in favor of state coding where the arguments are unclear.  
The four speech claims represent this trend well. In Eastwood Mall v. Slanco (1994),15 
the Court considered whether individuals have a right to use privately owned shopping centers or 
malls to communicate their message. This was a common argument presented to state courts 
because the U.S. Supreme Court had clearly rejected such a right of access decades earlier but 
had later recognized that state courts are free to expand protection under their state constitution.16 
The claimant presented the most thorough state constitutional argument present in my Ohio 
sample. The claimant discussed the set of federal cases recognizing the legitimacy of judicial 
federalism and law reviews exploring the early development of state constitutional law arguing 
that while state courts must deal with federal law, where it falls short on individual rights 
protections state courts should look “to the state constitution as a potential supplement to the 
federal protections.”17 The claimant stressed the common argument of judicial federalists, that “if 
state courts construe their constitutions as merely redundant of the federal constitution, they 
allow their state charters to become lifeless and powerless.”18 After this long attempt to convince 
the Court that it can reach a different result from federal law, the claimant presented a thorough 
legal analysis that dissected the text and history of the speech provision. Having both a negative 
                                                
15 68 Ohio St.3d 221.  
16 Lloyd Corp., Limited v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 
447 U.S. 74 (1980).  
17 Eastwood Mall, 68 Ohio St.3d 221, Appellant’s brief at 7.  
18 Eastwood Mall, 68 Ohio St.3d 221, Appellant’s brief at 10.  
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and positive component to the text gave a firmer ground for the application of speech rights to 
private malls. The claimant went back to the state’s earliest history in the Northwest Ordinance 
and how the Virginia transplants into Ohio drafted the original constitution in the spirit of 
Thomas Jefferson stressing that “individual liberty permeated the 1802 document” and that 
“Ohio judges should be mindful of the libertarian spirit that animated its drafters.”19 While the 
claimant attempted to provide some Ohio precedent on point (just a few intermediate appellate 
decisions), it had little to work with and instead stressed the logic of other state high courts that 
rejected the federal rule. Finally, the claimant uses these state precedents to attack the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision because public malls operate as a quasi-public forum in modern, 
suburban America.  
In a case concerning the closure of an adult bookstore as a public nuisance, the claimant 
attacked a controlling federal precedent and expressly requested that the Court continue to apply 
earlier federal precedent.20 The claimant noted that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision was 
immediately rejected by the New York Court of Appeals21 on remand and described that 
rejection as “constru[ing] its state constitutional right of free speech as extending O’Brien22 
protection to the bookstore.”23 The claimant continues this theme of asserting that the state 
provision should be utilize to correctly protect federal rights:  
In conclusion, the Appellants can perceive no inherent reason why state constitutional 
provisions should remain inferior to the present U.S. Supreme Court’s delineation of First 
Amendment rights. Despite the Supreme Court’s rationale, it is submitted that most legal 
scholars would indeed recognize an impact upon First Amendment rights through closure 
                                                
19 Eastwood Mall, 68 Ohio St.3d 221, Appellant’s brief at 22.  
20 State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 63 Ohio St.3d 354 (1992).  
21 People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553 (1986) on remand from Arcara v. Cloud 
Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1986).  
22 U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
23 Rear Door, 63 Ohio St.3d 354, Appellant’s brief at 29.  
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and the State should be required to exhaust more moderate alternatives to control the 
problems of which it complains.24 
 
The final two speech cases are less clearly driven by a desire to evade federal retrenchment but 
the legal arguments are still only minimally developed. One claimant complained that her public 
employer violated her speech right to run for office when she was fired for that campaign.25 The 
claimant immediately disclaimed any reliance on federal law admitting that it did not support 
her, though there was no precedent directly from the U.S. Supreme Court. In terms of legal 
support, the claimant simply noted the declaration in Arnold that the state constitution should 
have independent force and then argued that the text obviously represented an absolute 
protection, “[i]n light of the broad crisp language of [the state provision] it would be impossible 
for any reasonable person” to find that running for elective office is not protected speech.26 
Stressing similar arguments for open access to governmental activities, another claimant argued 
that the state speech provision guaranteed press and public access to legislative sessions.27 Again 
the claimant expressly conceded that federal law was unsupportive as Congress had a long 
history of secret sessions,28 but argued that free speech principles, as drawn from federal 
precedents, have a purpose “to protect free discussion about governmental affairs and the 
performances of public officials.”29 Drawing on a federal precedent recognizing the right of 
public and press to access criminal trials, the claimant argued that a core element of free speech 
was the “[p]rotection of the ability to gather and receive information, particularly about the 
                                                
24 Rear Door, 63 Ohio St.3d 354, Appellant’s brief at 30. 
25 Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377 (1994).  
26 Painter, 70 Ohio St.3d 377, Plaintiff-Appellant’s brief at 9.  
27 State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Barnes, 38 Ohio St.3d 165 (1988).  
28 See Abood v. League of Women Voters of Alaska, 743 P.2d 333 (Alaska 1987).  
29 Plain Dealer, 38 Ohio St.3d 165, Appellant’s brief at 34. 
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operation of government.”30 In each of these free speech cases, Ohio claimants admitted a lack of 
federal support and sought to avoid these limitations, though with varying degrees of legal and 
policy arguments.  
Two cases in 2000 sought expanded protection for the free exercise of religion after the 
U.S. Supreme Court dramatically limited the First Amendment protections for free exercise of 
religion in Smith.31 In Henley v. Youngstown (2000) the claimants sought a building permit for 
church owned property.32 The claimant in Humphrey v. Lane (2000) was a Native American 
corrections officer complaining about disciplinary action for his hair length.33 The Henley 
claimants primarily relied on a federal claim seeking to utilize the limited protections still 
provided by federal law relying on a theory circulating in some federal courts, but closed with a 
state attack. The Humphrey claimant relied solely on a state claim, as his facts were virtually 
indistinguishable from Smith. The claimants in each case noted Ohio precedent applying the 
older federal law and string citing the state provision, arguing that these decisions should be 
maintained under the state provision, but the Ohio Court had never issued a clear independent 
ruling on the meaning of the state provision, though it did reserve the right to do so.34 The 
dominant trend in both arguments, and most fully developed in Humphrey, was an attack upon 
the logic and result of Smith noting the opposition from members of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
lower federal judges, the rejection by five state high courts, and the nearly unanimous decision 
by Congress to repudiate Smith. The claimants stressed the negative outcomes in various cases 
since Smith and how it would require reversal in classic free exercise cases concluding that 
                                                
30 Plain Dealer, 38 Ohio St.3d 165, Appellant’s brief at 34. 
31 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
32 90 Ohio St.3d 142.  
33 89 Ohio St.3d 62.  
34 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St.3d 1 (1999) (refusing at that point to go beyond 
federal establishment clause jurisprudence). 
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“Smith takes one of the most cherished constitutional values woven into the fabric of American 
society and reduces it to nothing more than a permissible political option, to be given or taken 
away based upon the contemporary wisdom or fears of legislative bodies.”35 This general and 
powerful spate of criticism meant “that this Court should not adopt it as the standard for religious 
freedom cases arising under the Ohio Constitution.”36 Left with no real guidance from the Ohio 
Court, claimants turned to the copious amount of materials attacking Smith as a means to 
convince the Court that the federal decision was poorly conceived and should be rejected.  
At times the claimant was faced with the situation where a similar case was under review 
before the U.S. Supreme Court and decided to hedge their case with parallel arguments. In one 
case the claimant challenged the use of witness testimony from a preliminary hearing at his 
criminal trial arguing that this violated his right to confront witnesses.37 The Ohio Supreme 
Court had recently accepted a similar confrontation claim but the case was under review before 
the U.S. Supreme Court.38 The claimant stressed the logic of the original Ohio precedent and the 
fact that cross-examination is limited for preliminary hearings and a ruling allowing such 
testimony would just encourage lawyers to abuse the hearings just in case a witness fails to 
appear at trial. With the issue “pending for review by the United States Supreme Court, 
defendant urges this court to interpret the Constitution of Ohio so that the fundamental rights of 
the people of this State will be applied in a manner that is consistent with the realities of [the] 
Ohio criminal justice system.”39 It would be best to ground this result on state constitutional 
                                                
35 Humphrey, 89 Ohio St.3d 62, Appellant’s brief at 22.  
36 Henley, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, Appellants St. Brendan Church and Beatitude House brief at 27. 
37 State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322 (1980).  
38 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) ultimately reversed the lower decision. This decision was 
issued two days before the date the brief was filed and there is no evidence that the claimant was 
aware of the decision.  
39 Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322, Appellant’s brief at 25 
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grounds to ensure the best rule for the system regardless of what the U.S. Supreme Court 
ultimately decided. Similarly, another claimant raised a confrontation challenge to the use of 
closed circuit television testimony of a child victim outside the defendant’s presence.40 The U.S. 
Supreme Court was in the process of reviewing a similar protection for child victims41 and the 
claimant noted this fact in making his state argument. The claimant stressed the textual 
difference requiring a “face to face”42 confrontation specifically and a general discussion in the 
1850 state convention that stressed the role of the judiciary in protecting individual liberties. The 
claimant presented this theory as a per se constitutional violation before turning to a balancing 
test approach it assumed would be required by the resolution of the U.S. Supreme Court’s case. 
Faced with uncertainty, and perhaps some intuition of the ultimate federal resolution, claimants 
used parallel arguments to try and head off the potential negative result.  
The paucity of state search and seizure claims is certainly surprising given the strong 
degree of federal retrenchment. In many cases the issues revolved around fairly standard and 
stable Fourth Amendment claims such as the Terry stop-and-frisk rule. But others cases involved 
issues where state claims may have been likely. For example, one claimant complained of a jail’s 
policy of strip searching newly arrested individuals and argued the issue as a matter of federal 
law only with no mention or citation even to the state provision43 despite the fact that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had upheld a similar policy.44 Only four state search claims were offered and 
none were particularly well-developed. In a brief supplemental point, one claimant clearly 
attacked the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment arguing that the “Court should reject 
                                                
40 State v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St.3d 307 (1988).  
41 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).  
42 Ohio Const. Art. I, Sec. 10: “the party accused shall be allowed … to meet the witnesses face 
to face.”  
43 Fricker v. Stokes, 22 Ohio St.3d 202 (1986), Appellee’s brief.  
44 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  
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the cost-benefit analysis utilized by the United States Supreme Court and adopt” the prior 
protective federal doctrine.45 Similarly, another claimant attacked a statute allowing warrantless 
inspection of pharmaceutical records primarily focusing on a lengthy federal argument 
distinguishing a negative federal precedent46 but closing with an assertion, unsupported by any 
significant argument, that the precedent should be evaded under state provision if the federal 
claim failed.47 The Court’s anemic statement of a state rule in Brown was used to support a 
similarly undeveloped assertion in a car stop case but with no discussion of the reasoning for a 
broader state rule48—though this may be unsurprising given that the Court in Brown did not 
provide any reasoning for its brief assertion either. Perhaps most bizarre is an argument that 
explicitly disclaimed any state basis. The claimant relied upon a 1984 Ohio precedent that was 
clearly based on federal law in the text but the syllabus described the holding as solely required 
by the state provision.49 In a nearly identical case, the claimant repeatedly disclaimed any intent 
to seek a broader degree of rights protection, arguing that federal law provided all the protection 
necessary.50 One claimant ultimately blamed the Court itself for the poor development of state 
search arguments complaining that while Arnold may have declared “the Ohio Constitution is a 
document of independent force,” it had recently disclaimed any broader protection under the 
state search provision holding that it “should be harmonized and exist co-extensively with the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment.”51 The Court’s consistent refusal to treat the state search 
                                                
45 State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251, Appellant’s brief at 9.  
46 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
47 Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156 (1992), Plaintiffs-Appellants’ brief at 10.  
48 State v. Droste, 83 Ohio St.3d 36 (1998), Appellee’s brief at 10.  
49 State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St.3d 205 (1984). No state argument was made in this case. 
50 State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 82 (1996), Appellee’s brief. It 
appears that the state’s brief was strongly critical of the Ohio Supreme Court’s original, messy 
decision.  
51 State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47, Appellant’s brief at 4-5.  
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provision independently gave lawyers no guidance in how to make such arguments or any 
indication that the Court wanted to hear such issues.   
While equal protection arguments were numerically the highest number of state 
arguments at seven, few of them were clear or distinct. Four cases involved fairly generalized 
arguments that were coded as state based primarily because of my generous rules for vague 
arguments, it is unlikely that any were intended as state based.52 Two other cases involved an 
interaction between equal protection and a provision requiring uniform taxation laws and rather 
old precedents interpreting this provision.53 The clearest and most extensive state equal 
protection argument challenged a state constitutional amendment that forbids the election of 
judges over 70.54 The claimant had to acknowledge a lengthy set of lower federal court decisions 
rejecting similar challenges to age limits for judicial elections under federal law but noted the 
extensive legal commentary on judicial federalism to show that state law need not be interpreted 
so narrowly.55 Other state courts had refused to follow federal retrenchment and the Ohio Court 
should follow suit.  
As the most active death penalty jurisdiction in this study, it is interesting to note the 
frequency of cruel and unusual punishment arguments. These claims were the second most 
common issue area in the Ohio sample. While federal law was in dramatic flux throughout the 
                                                
52 Hack v. Gillespie, 74 Ohio St.3d 362 (1996), Appellant’s brief; State ex rel. Hammond v. 
Industrial Commission of Ohio, 64 Ohio St.2d 237 (1980), Appellants’ brief; State ex rel. Smiddy 
v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ohio St.3d 473 (1992), Relator’s brief; Vorisek v. Village of North 
Randall, 64 Ohio St.2d 62 (1980), Appellant’s brief.  
53 Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 70 Ohio St.3d 73 (1994), Appellant’s 
amended brief; Dublin School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St.3d 604 (1994), Appellant 
Dublin School District’s brief.  
54 I usually exclude constitutional challenges to state constitutional provisions because an 
amendment is typically immune from prior state rights provisions. However, I include this case 
because the state argument was actually made.  
55 State ex rel. Keefe v. Eyrich, 22 Ohio St.3d 164 (1986), Relator’s brief on the merits.  
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1980s and early 1990s, only two state claims were offered.56 Overwhelmingly the claimants 
presented standard federal death penalty claims with frequent string citations to state 
constitutional provisions but virtually no independent discussion with only two exceptions. In 
State v. Rojas (1992)57 the claimant argued that the state cruel and unusual punishment clause 
forbids the execution of the “mentally retarded.”58 The U.S. Supreme Court had rejected such an 
argument three years earlier.59 Rather than present any coherent legal argument, the claimant 
attacked the moral implications of such executions. While “a majority of the justices of the 
Supreme Court of the United States might choose to dilute the precious protections afforded to 
all persons by the Bill of Rights and to facilitate the establishment of a more authoritarian 
system,” it cannot forbid a state court from protecting those rights.60 The U.S. Supreme Court is 
described as approving “the extermination of those retarded persons who have taken the life of 
another” and points to Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion arguing that the Ohio Court “should 
recognize … that there are limits beneath which a civilized society should not sink in the 
administration of the most severe punishment.”61 Without any supporting argument about the 
meaning of the state provision, the claimant asserted, “the Ohio Constitution absolutely forbids 
execution of the retarded.”62 In only one other case, in 2000, did a claimant attack the death 
penalty as inherently unconstitutional under the state constitution. The claimant argued that key 
Ohio death penalty precedents had “paid but lip service” to the idea of state constitutional 
                                                
56 As discussed in Chapter 2, the sample of death penalty briefs is incomplete. Virtually no briefs 
pre-1990 were available. It is possible that earlier briefs presented state claims but given the 
general trend in Ohio and the decisions of the Court this seems unlikely.  
57 64 Ohio St.3d 131.  
58 I use this term because it is the language adopted by the brief and the Court’s opinion.  
59 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).  
60 Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, Defendant-Appellant’s brief at 5.  
61 Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, Defendant-Appellant’s brief at 6, 7.  
62 Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131, Defendant-Appellant’s brief at 8.  
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protections in death penalty cases.63 The short argument simply notes the textual differences in 
many of the criminal rights provisions but only refers to earlier federal arguments to show the 
substantive failures of the state’s death penalty system. 
 
Conclusion  
The support structure for state constitutional activism in Ohio is quite weak. Few cases 
saw significant attention to state constitutional arguments and when they were made the 
arguments were driven by federal retrenchment. Arguments were focused on attacking the policy 
results of federal doctrine as a means of evading a trend of limiting federal protections. 
Interestingly, state arguments were not even particularly common in search and seizure cases, the 
area of greatest federal retrenchment. This may be the result of the nearly complete 
unwillingness of the Ohio Supreme Court to engage with state arguments across all issue areas. 
This lockstep approach gave no guidance or indication that the Court was interested in hearing 
state claims and lawyers responded with similarly anemic arguments. The next chapter looks at a 
state where the high court demonstrated a greater willingness to accept state constitutional claims 
but consistently refused to provide any clear guidance on how to argue state claims, instead 
engaging in an ad hoc application of the state constitution, with a single exception.  
                                                
63 State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593, Appellant’s brief at 182.  
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Chapter 5 
 
New York: Ad Hoc Engagement 
 
 
 
Unlike the Ohio Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals demonstrated some 
willingness to consider state constitutional claims but failed to offer any particular guidance on 
why some claims were accepted and others were not. This ad hoc approach gave little clear 
guidance to lawyers in how or when state constitutional arguments should be presented. 
However, the Court broke this pattern in one particular doctrine and offered a clear and 
consistent trend of decisions. Lawyers responded to the ad hoc approach with policy attacks on 
federal retrenchment similar to the Ohio experience, though state arguments were more common 
in New York. In the one area of consistent state constitutional doctrine, however, lawyers in New 
York gradually abandoned all concern for federal law for a focus on the internal logic of the state 
rule.  
 
Judicial Federalism in New York 
The New York Court of Appeals hinted that it might adopt a form of the criteria test in 
People v. P.J. Video (1986), 1 a case on remand from the U.S. Supreme Court (included in 
Chapter 3). The Court admitted it was bound by the reversal on federal grounds but noted that 
state law is solely in its discretion. The Court discussed the criteria test in the language of 
academics of the time period (see Ely 1980), as between interpretative and noninterpretive 
factors. Interpretative approaches pointed to the importance of text, history, and structure of the 
                                                
1 68 N.Y.2d 296 (1986).  
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state constitution where noninterpretive looks to state traditions, matters of particular local 
concern, or any distinctive attitudes of the citizenry.2 However the Court failed to seriously 
commit to this approach or any other. A few years later the Court openly admitted that it lacked 
consistency towards judicial federalism: “this Court has not wedded itself to any single 
methodology, recognizing that the proper approach may vary with the circumstances.”3 
Commentators and at least one former judge described the Court of Appeals’s approach as 
“primarily reactive and supplemental” approach to state law where “the dominant tendency has 
been for the court to wait until federal law is settled before deciding to provide adequate and 
independent state grounds for a rights sustaining decision” (Galie 1991: 236, 249; Hancock 1993).  
Thus, New York fits within the norm for most state courts where the court engages with 
state constitutional provisions in piecemeal fashion without giving a great deal of guidance to its 
bar. With one major exception, the Court of Appeals typically pushed independent analysis in 
areas only after the Supreme Court retrenched protections. This is dramatically illustrated by 
three 1986 cases where the Supreme Court reversed decisions7 by the Court of Appeals 
accepting a rights claimant’s federal argument.4 In an unusual demonstration of resistance, the 
Court of Appeals reinstated all three cases under state constitutional law echoing a previous 
statement that the Court “perceive[d] no reason to depart from our [prior] conclusion” simply 
because the Supreme Court rejected that conclusion.5 While not as dramatic, most of the 
examples of state constitutional activism followed a similar path of state expansion after federal 
                                                
2 P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 302-303.  
3 Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 251 (1991). 
4 People ex rel Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553 (1986); People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431 
(1986); People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296 (1986). These cases are part of the data discussed in 
Chapter 3.  
5 Bellanca v. New York State Liquor Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 228, 234 (1981). 
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retrenchment: the state action doctrine was expanded after the Supreme Court limited the 
doctrine6; it refused to follow the newly weakened federal test for anonymous informants in 
search cases7; and after an unusually vigorous and public dispute about the legitimacy of 
rejecting federal precedent, the Court of Appeals rejected both the open fields exception as well 
as the Supreme Court’s broad deference to administrative searches.8 
The major exception to this record is the New York counsel rule. Essentially this rule 
declares that where counsel represents a suspect, the suspect may not waive her rights against 
self-incrimination and give a statement unless her attorney is present. Only New York follows 
such a strict interpretation of self-incrimination (Latzer 1998a). In People v. Donovan (1963), 
three years before the Supreme Court decided Miranda, a time when the exact reach of federal 
constitutional protections in state criminal trials was in flux, the Court of Appeals declared, “we 
find it unnecessary to consider whether or not the Supreme Court of the United States would 
regard [use of defendant’s statement to be] a violation of defendant’s rights under the Federal 
Constitution” because “quite apart from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
this State’s constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the privilege against self 
incrimination and the right to counsel, not to mention our own guarantee of due process” requires 
suppression of statements when the defendant’s attorney was denied access.9 In People v. Arthur 
(1968) the Court strengthened this rule holding that “once the police know or have been apprised 
of the fact that the defendant is represented by counsel or that an attorney has communicated 
with the police for the purpose of representing the defendant, the accused’s right to counsel 
attaches” and cannot be waived without the presence of an attorney, even if not formally 
                                                
6 Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152 (1978). 
7 People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635 (1988).  
8 People v. Scott and Keta, 79 N.Y.2d 474 (1992). 
9 People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 151 (1963).  
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retained.10 The counsel rule fell into question in the early 1970s,11 but was forcefully 
reestablished in People v. Hobson (1976).12 In an elaborate investigation into the nature of stare 
decisis, the Court held that the rule was constitutionally required and that cases suggesting 
otherwise were not persuasive precedent—because of this I describe this as the Hobson rule. In 
People v. Cunningham (1980),13 the Court extended Hobson and declared that when a suspect 
invokes her right to counsel when she is unrepresented, the right attaches and cannot be 
subsequently waived unless in the presence of counsel. Again the Court stressed that any federal 
analysis was irrelevant because “the issue presented here may be resolved by application of 
principles that are firmly rooted in our State's constitutional and statutory guarantees of due 
process of law, the privilege against self incrimination and the right to the assistance of 
counsel.”14 As discussed below, the Hobson rule was a major source of litigation during the 
1980s but was largely settled by 1990 when the Court overruled the derivative counsel version of 
the rule but maintained the core holding of Hobson.15 The Hobson rule represents the best 
example of true independent constitutional development in New York; a clear internal signal sent 
by the Court of Appeals to its lawyers. The rule was established in a period where federal law 
was unclear and in rapid flux; the state constitution provided a more steady foundation for the 
rule and it was followed even after Miranda dramatically extended federal involvement in state 
                                                
10 People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 329 (1968).  
11 People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155, 158 (1970) (the Donovan rule is “merely a theoretical 
statement of the rule. This dogmatic claim is not the New York law” and a voluntary waiver of 
rights is legitimate).  
12 39 N.Y.2d 479.  
13 49 N.Y.2d 203.  
14 People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d at 207.  
15 In People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981) the Court established the derivative counsel 
rule holding that where the police had reason to believe a suspect was represented on another 
unrelated charge, her right to counsel still attached and could not be waived without the 
attorney’s presence. This was overruled in People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990).  
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criminal trials. It is true that Hobson was decided at a time where the Supreme Court’s view of 
Miranda was becoming less supportive of suspect’s rights, but it was only in 1981 that the 
Supreme Court made clear that the federal rule was less supportive.16 
By the mid-1990s the state constitutional activism of the Court of Appeals crested and 
slowed dramatically. In 1995, Governor George Pataki led a backlash against the Court, publicly 
criticizing it as enforcing constitutional rules that are wildly out of step with the opinion of other 
state courts; "The target of the sharpest criticisms against the court was  . . . [its history of] 
independent state constitutional decision making" (Bonventre 2003: 75). A study of sixteen areas 
where the Court had rejected federal rules found that while it was mostly in the norm of other 
states, in nearly a third it was part of a significant minority—especially the Hobson rule where 
only New York followed such a strict rule (Latzer 1998a). Vincent Bonventre (2003: Ch. 3) 
presents a strong case that Pataki’s criticism pushed Chief Judge Judith Kaye—one of the 
strongest voices for liberal use of judicial federalism in the 1980s—to be less supportive of state 
constitutional claims in general, and criminal procedure rights in particular. This coupled with a 
number of more conservative Pataki appointments resulted in a bench less willing to entertain 
innovative rights claims by 2000. 
 
Aggregate Trends 
                                                
16 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that after invocation of her rights a 
defendant may initiate contact with police and give a statement).  
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Figure 5.1. Percentage of arguments by year, New York 1970-2000. N=491 arguments.  
I examined 491 arguments and state arguments accounted for 13% (66) of all rights 
arguments. Figure 5.1 shows the breakdown of federal and state arguments by year. State claims 
were relatively uncommon in the 1970s but increased during the 1980s. As discussed below, this 
increase tracks with federal retrenchment and the engagement with the Hobson rule. The trend in 
state arguments drops off in the 1990s as the Court of Appeals stopped hearing Hobson cases and 
the Pataki attack pushed the Court in a more modest direction. Figure 5.2 shows that state claims 
were more frequently presented in criminal process cases. Slightly more than a quarter of the 
state arguments occurred in self-incrimination cases, almost all of which are accounted for by the 
Hobson rule. Similarly, search and seizure claims represent about a quarter of state arguments 
and this is unsurprising given the fact that federal retrenchment was strongest in search cases. 
The next largest total came from due process cases, about half of which involved privacy claims. 
Few or no state arguments appeared in cases involving free exercise of religion, effective 
assistance of counsel, confrontation, cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy, or takings. 
No free exercise claims appear in my sample after 1990, when the Supreme Court significantly 
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limited meaningful federal protection. While the death penalty was a major source of cruel and 
unusual punishment arguments in other states (though not necessarily based in state law), New 
York lacked the death penalty for much of this period and thus it was rarely invoked.17 The 
remaining rarely invoked rights claims are areas where federal law remained relatively stable or 
actually expanded protection, such as takings, and thus lawyers had little incentive to push 
separate state arguments. 
 
Figure 5.2. Percentage of arguments by rights area, New York 1970-2000. N=491 arguments.  
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the content measure results. Of the 66 state constitutional 
arguments, 91% cited two or fewer of these factors. Turning to Figure 5.4, clearly New York 
state law represented the dominant factor discussed. Nearly 75% of the state arguments cited 
either prior state constitutional rules, in particular Hobson and related cases, or state common 
                                                
17 After the Supreme Court temporarily stalled capital punishment in the mid-1970s, New York 
Governors Carey and Cuomo repeatedly vetoed attempts to reestablish capital punishment. It 
was reestablished finally in 1995 with Governor Pataki’s signature but was struck down in 2004. 
The Court of Appeals held that the provision regarding jury deadlock instructions violated the 
state constitution. People v. LaVelle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (2004). The law remains unenforceable 
because legislative attempts to amend the provision have failed. 
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and statutory law. About a quarter of state arguments also discussed prior examples of judicial 
federalism in New York as an example of the Court ignoring federal decisions in other areas and 
urging it to do so again. Few arguments cited the remaining factors. While infrequent, textual 
difference arguments may be misleading because the text of most of the New York constitutional 
criminal procedure provisions is substantially similar to the federal provisions. The nearly 
complete failure to offer state constitutional history arguments likely relates to the fact that case 
law rarely discusses it and primary source research is time consuming and difficult. Arguments 
rarely utilized issues of state or local interests or public attitudes to justify expanded state 
protection and none used structural arguments. As will be shown below, arguments made 
primarily in response to federal retrenchment typically rely on undermining the logic of the 
Supreme Court’s new direction rather than on these kinds of legal factors and those made in 
response to prior state court engagement typically cite to that prior history alone with the 
remaining factors being unnecessary. 
 
Figure 5.3. Percentage of state arguments by total factors cited, New York 1970-2000. N=66.   
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Figure 5.4. Percentage of state arguments citing each factor. N=66.  
 
Federal retrenchment  
While both signals are present in the patterns of state constitutional arguments in New 
York, federal retrenchment was the most frequent influence leading to state rights arguments. A 
particularly clear example of this dynamic is Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac (1978).18 The case 
involved a garageman’s lien statute that allowed sale of vehicles when the bill for service was 
not paid without providing any opportunity for the owner to seek a hearing or review. The legal 
dispute centered on whether state action was present as the failure to allow any review was a 
fairly clear due process violation. While the Warren Court had widened the federal definition of 
state action to apply to various types of private action, the Burger Court was moving in a more 
restrictive direction. In the claimant’s initial brief, the state argument was clearly secondary in 
nature amounting to a short five-page analysis preceded by twenty-two pages of federal analysis. 
                                                
18 45 N.Y.2d 152. 
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The state argument noted that many state courts had rejected federal law (though not on the state 
action issue), that the Court of Appeals could follow a similar path, and that the state due process 
clause lacked any clear state action language.19 Shortly after the submission of this brief, 
however, the Supreme Court upheld a related New York law ruling that state action was not 
present.20 This left virtually no federal support for the claimant’s position in Sharrock and the 
Court of Appeals specifically instructed supplemental briefing on the effect of this decision. The 
supplemental brief reversed the prior attention to federal and state arguments: after a perfunctory 
five-page attempt to distinguish the Supreme Court’s recent decision, it provided a twenty-two 
page state argument. Some of the material was repeated from the initial brief, such as the textual 
difference, but now it emphasized the importance of state constitutions in general as primary 
protections of rights and sources for local variations on national themes. Of course, this primary 
place of state constitutions was not mentioned initially and the close of the supplemental brief 
places the emphasis not on the logics of federalism but on the irresponsibility of the Supreme 
Court’s change in the law, which it noted was by a narrow 5-3 vote. The Supreme Court’s 
decision was “neither legally nor logically sound” and resulted “in a total denial of any 
Fourteenth Amendment protection” by sanctioning summary creditor actions.21 After discussing 
the weaknesses of the Supreme Court opinion, the argument closed by pointing to Justice 
Stevens’s dissent as more persuasive: the “strength of Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, 
particularly when contrasted with the unsoundness of the majority opinion, should lead this 
                                                
19 “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” N.Y. 
Const. Art. I, Sec. 6. This lacks the Fourteenth Amendment’s “nor shall any State deprive” 
language.  
20 Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).  
21 Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d 152, plaintiff’s supplemental brief at 27, 25.  
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Court to reject the [Supreme Court’s decision] in construing its own constitution.”22 Thus, as the 
uncertain federal terrain became clearly hostile, the claimant’s brief emphasized the central 
importance of state constitutions in protecting rights but still framed around the logic of the 
federal rule. 
Examples in education, abortion funding, and search and seizure demonstrate similar 
dynamics. In 1973, the Supreme Court rejected federal constitutional challenges to fiscal 
inequalities in school funding holding that education is not a fundamental right and that wealth 
classifications are not suspect.23 This decision initiated the single most important area of state 
constitutional activism where litigants turned to state constitutions and often won major policy 
changes. While these suits emphasized state constitutional education clauses primarily—and 
because these are unique provisions with no federal parallel they are not discussed here—
litigants also offered equal protection arguments. In Board of Education v. Nyquist (1982),24 the 
claimants argued extensively that New York’s funding scheme that resulted in wide disparities 
between districts violated the state equal protection clause, but they did so utilizing the federal 
tiers-of-scrutiny test. While the equal protection clauses are identical in language, the brief 
stressed that the education clause supported treating education as fundamental under the state 
provision and that wealth should be treated as a suspect classification. Again, the constitutional 
logic was primarily drawn from federal cases with the thrust of the brief being that the Supreme 
Court was wrong to discount the importance of education. Similarly, in Hope v. Perales (1994), 
claimants stressed that the Supreme Court’s decision to allow states to prohibit funding for low-
                                                
22 Ibid. at 28.  
23 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).  
24 57 N.Y.2d 27. 
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income women to receive abortions was reckless and irresponsible.25 The brief described federal 
reproductive privacy as “now-eroded federal principles” and stated that “the federal right of 
reproductive choice is both insufficient to afford relief in this case and increasingly unsure in 
general.”26 Unlike Nyquist, here claimants had some New York precedent to draw upon because 
the Court of Appeals had issued decisions striking down criminalization of sodomy (though on 
federal grounds as the brief admits) and recognizing a due process liberty interest in controlling 
personal medical treatments.27 The strongest reliance was placed on the six state courts that had 
struck down similar statutes by refusing to follow the weakened federal test, instead applying the 
older strict scrutiny of abortion restrictions. 
Search and seizure law provides a number of examples of state arguments deployed only 
when federal law has abandoned any reasonable support. For example, in a case involving 
warrantless inventory searches of the possessions of arrestees, the claimant stressed, “we 
strongly believe that the Supreme Court has given undue attention to ‘consideration[s] of orderly 
police administration’ at the expense of an arrestee’s legitimate privacy interest.”28 The claimant 
went on to note both prior examples of judicial federalism from New York as well as a number 
of other state supreme courts rejecting the expansion of inventory searches utilizing the logic of 
Supreme Court dissenters. In People v. Griminger (1988),29 the Court was asked to reject the 
Supreme Court’s “totality of the circumstances” standard for judging the sufficiency of hearsay 
                                                
25 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).  
26 Hope, 83 N.Y.2d 563, Plantiffs-Respondents brief at 23, 33.  
27 People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980) (criminal consensual sodomy law violates federal 
constitution); Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485 (1986) (holding that state law regarding forced 
medication of medication failed to meet standards of due process under state constitution). See 
also, Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69 (1979) (holding that pretrial detainees were entitled to 
reasonable visitation under state but not federal constitution).  
28 People v. Gonzalez, 62 N.Y.2d 386 (1984), Appellant’s brief at 13 (internal citations omitted). 
The complained of decision was Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).  
29 71 N.Y.2d 635.  
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evidence for warrant applications in favor of the now discarded Aguilar-Spinelli rule.30 The 
claimant’s argument stressed at length another speech from Justice Brennan calling for state 
action where his own court was busy cutting back protections, specifically citing the Fourth 
Amendment. The claimant stroked the state justices’ egos by noting the prior examples of their 
engagement with judicial federalism as demonstrating that “this Court has been in the vanguard 
of singularly emphasizing the primacy of the New York State Constitution in the protection of 
individual rights.”31 The claimant was forthright in his demand that the Court of Appeals simply 
adopt the prior federal logic through the state provision. A similar dynamic is evident with the 
open fields exception where the Supreme Court held that in land outside of the curtilage of the 
house governmental officials do not need warrants regardless of whether the land was fenced or 
otherwise marked.32 In a 1988 case the Court of Appeals rejected a state constitutional challenge 
regarding unmarked land but reserved the question of whether marking or fencing may be 
protected.33 In People v. Scott (1992)34 this issue was squarely presented to the Court. The 
claimant’s argument stressed the dissenting opinions of Brennan and Marshall attacking the open 
fields exception. Further reliance was placed on the fact that in New York the incursion into 
property clearly marked is criminal trespass and thus the state has a history of respecting 
expectations of privacy in such remote land. In a case decided jointly with Scott, People v. Keta 
(1992), the claimant noted that an administrative search law had been invalidated by the Court of 
Appeals in 1986 but was reversed by the Supreme Court and the case was dismissed as moot 
before it had a chance to be heard on remand. The claimant stressed that the Court of Appeal’s 
                                                
30 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) overruled the more protective standard from Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).  
31 Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, Repondent-Appellant’s brief at 23.  
32 Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984).  
33 People v. Reynolds, 71 N.Y.2d 552 (1988).  
34 79 N.Y.2d 474.  
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original logic was still sound and criticized the Supreme Court for breaking with its long line of 
precedents limiting the nature of administrative searches.  
 These examples from state action, abortion, education financing, and search and seizure 
demonstrate a fairly clear convergence on state constitutional law only after the Supreme Court 
demonstrated a strong degree of retrenchment. Claimants turned to state provisions as a final 
effort to preserve the federal protections now abandoned by the U.S. Supreme Court. The state 
arguments were used as an alternative path through which claimants could push the continued 
reliance on now discarded federal precedents.   
The Supreme Court’s signals, of course, are not always as clear as the above cases. In 
some areas the legal trends are in flux and uncertain. In such a situation state constitutional 
arguments may appear to be viable supplemental arguments, treated essentially as a fallback 
position for a primarily federal claim. Two privacy cases from 1980 illustrate this dynamic of 
underdeveloped state arguments as supplements to primary federal claims. While the Supreme 
Court had found an implied right to privacy during the 1960s that culminated in Roe v. Wade 
(1973), by the late 1970s the Court’s signals about the reach and meaning of privacy and 
substantive due process was less clear.35 Each case pushed novel claims centered primarily on 
the Warren Court era due process decisions. In People v. Shepard (1980),36 the claimant argued 
that criminalization of marijuana use was unconstitutional. People v. Onofre (1980)37 attacked 
the criminalization of consensual sodomy. In each case claimants prepared multiple federal 
                                                
35 In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld state funding that provided 
Medicaid benefits for poor women who gave birth but not for abortions. In Harris v. McRae 
(1980) a congressional ban on any federal money to elective abortions was upheld. In Moore v. 
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) the Court was heavily divided, 4-4-1, over whether 
substantive due process encompassed the decision for closely related people to live together. 
36 50 N.Y.2d 640.  
37 51 N.Y.2d 476.  
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claims attacking the laws but presented only parallel state privacy claims. In Shepard, the federal 
privacy claim was detailed and extensively analyzed the ways in which marijuana 
criminalization implicated personal autonomy, particularly stressing personal use in the home 
and the state argument, in contrast, consisted primarily of a lengthy laundry list of examples 
where the Court of Appeals applied a stricter standard than federal courts (none of which had 
significant bearing on privacy or substantive due process) and a general statement that the Court 
of Appeals is free to apply a stronger standard. Interestingly, the brief did not raise the single 
most powerful case—a decision from Alaska recognizing that possession of small amounts of 
marijuana at home is protected by the state constitution38—in favor of its state argument but 
presented it in the federal analysis section implying a different basis for the decision than it 
clearly declared.39 
In Onofre, the federal claim began by noting some negative implications from a few 
federal courts but stressed that it was unsettled and engaged in an extensive analysis of the ways 
in which criminalization of consensual sexual relations implicated privacy, autonomy, and the 
ability to seek self-fulfillment in personal relations. This level of detail and analysis was absent 
in the state claim. While admitting that the Court of Appeals had never found an implied state 
constitutional right to privacy, the claimant asserted that it could do so because the same 
constitutional provisions that were the basis for the federal penumbral right to privacy are present 
at the state level. In terms of the substantive content of such a right, the claimant simply pointed 
to the federal substantive due process cases leading up to Roe: such decisions should be viewed 
“as good advice from the nation’s highest court, regarding fundamental principles of liberty, and 
                                                
38 Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975).  
39 The brief describes Ravin as a “unanimous decision finding that criminalization of the 
possession of marijuana in the privacy of the home violates the constitutional right to privacy.” 
People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640 (1980), Appellant’s brief at 23 (emphasis added).  
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they could well be adapted intact as interpretations of New York’s own Constitution.”40 This is 
an unusually explicit statement of what is typically left implicit: a call for the Court of Appeals 
to read recently abandoned (or weakened) federal law into the state constitution. 
Claimants followed a standard path in federal retrenchment cases. With the initial 
weakening of federal protections, claimants turn to state arguments as an underdeveloped 
supplementary claim. Claimants rely heavily on federal law attempting to distinguish the 
negative cases with the state argument presented as an emergency out should the Court of 
Appeals not be persuaded on federal grounds, used as a way to note a work around should the 
Court of Appeals be unhappy with the federal result. As federal law moved to a more complete 
retrenchment, claimants presented solely state claims but still relied upon the now discarded 
federal decisions. The state arguments are essentially invitations for evasions, reminding the 
Court of Appeals that it need not following unpalatable changes in federal law.  
 
Internal encouragement 
The Hobson rule demonstrates the most powerful example of internal signaling in New 
York. Where the Court was willing to give guidance and leadership to its bar, the legal 
arguments shifted in response. Through repeated statement and clarification from the Court, by 
the mid-1980s the contours of the rule were reasonably clear to lawyers and utilized frequently 
with little attempt to resort to federal logics because lawyers had been given greater guidance. 
Hobson cases represent a quarter (17) of the state arguments in my New York sample.  
Early briefs demonstrated a great deal of confusion over the basis for the earlier Donovan 
and Arthur cases discussed above. In People v. Robles (1970), the claimant presented these cases 
                                                
40 People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476 (1980), Respondent’s brief at 36.  
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as solely federal, describing them as involving the violation of the “Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments”41 despite the clear statement in Donovan that it was not reaching this question. No 
mention was made of the state basis for the rule and the state constitution was not even cited. 
When the Court of Appeals strongly reasserted the rule in Hobson in 1976, it did so with no 
assistance from the legal arguments presented. The claimant’s argument amounted to a few 
citations to the state cases with no citation to, or indication of, the constitutional basis for the 
rule; this provided virtually no support for the Court’s eventual detailed analysis of stare decisis 
and reinvigoration of the rule. Another argument from 1976 described only vaguely the “law in 
this state” and how the police actions violated both constitutions’ counsel provisions.42 While the 
briefs provided little in terms of substance, the Court decided on its own to develop and clarify 
the basis for such a strong counsel rule, unique among American jurisdictions. 
This guidance from the Court did not immediately eliminate the incorrect statements of 
the rule. In People v. Settles (1978), the claimant noted the clarification of the rule in Hobson but 
dramatically misstated its legal basis: Hobson “stands for the proposition that an in custody 
interrogation, after indictment, and without waiver of counsel in the presence of counsel is a 
violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution of the United States.”43 The state constitution is never cited and the incorrect 
attribution as a federal rule is restated at a number of points. Again the Court took the 
opportunity to clarify and express the rule as one of solely state law.44 While some briefs cited 
                                                
41 People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155 (1970), Appellant’s brief at 39, 49.  
42 People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97 (1976), Defendant-Appellant’s brief at 14, 13.  
43 People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154 (1978), Appellant’s brief at 15.  
44 People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d at 162-163 (after a lengthy restatement of the state constitutional 
rule, “we take this opportunity to make explicit that which was implicit in Hobson: a criminal 
defendant under indictment and in custody may not waive his right to counsel unless he does so 
in the presence of an attorney”). 
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both constitutional provisions after Settles, none again misstated the rule in such a manner. 
Instead the string citation of federal provisions appears to parallel the practice common in federal 
arguments of including a state citation in a string of others without any development; it is 
included as little more than an afterthought. After 1982, none of the arguments still included 
citations to the federal provisions. Instead, claimants relied extensively upon the precedent the 
Court of Appeals had developed and reiterated, though occasionally with federal cases utilized to 
supplement this primary argument. By the mid-1980s the core of the Hobson rule appears 
relatively stable with the arguments focused on applying it to unusual situations. Examples 
include the use of statements made in federal court in subsequent state prosecutions,45 an 
instance where the authorities intentionally delayed arresting suspects until pending charges were 
completed and the legal representation ended so as to avoid the derivative counsel rule,46 and 
whether representation on an unrelated charge in another state invoked the state rule.47 After 
1990, Hobson cases disappear from my sample completely and it seems that the Court had 
sufficiently specified the contours of the rule and had less need to regularly police the work of 
lower courts. Here, the internal signals were strong and reiterated frequently so that the bar 
eventually grasped the state logic and discarded any reliance on federal law. 
Of course, internal signals are not always clear. Drug testing challenges demonstrate how 
weak internal signals offered little clear guidance to lawyers. The subject of random drug testing 
was unsettled during the 1980s and it was an open question whether individualized suspicion was 
a necessary element under the Fourth Amendment. Until the Supreme Court upheld random drug 
                                                
45 People v. Velasquez, 68 N.Y.2d 533 (1986).  
46 People v. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689 (1988).  
47 People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990).  
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testing in some contexts in 1989,48 federal law was unclear. In Patchogue-Medford (1987)49 the 
Court of Appeals held that random drug testing of probationary teachers was an unconstitutional 
search under both constitutions. Interestingly the teachers did not present a state constitutional 
claim, as a vigorous concurring opinion stressed. While the Court justified its decision by noting 
that the petition for review plead a general violation of the right against unreasonable search and 
seizure without a specific constitutional reference, this ignored the fact that the claimant’s brief 
relied solely on federal law; the claimants failed to even cite the state provision, instead 
repeatedly asserting a violation of only the Fourth Amendment. Additionally the Court noted that 
an amicus brief did raise the state issue but as the concurrence argued, accepting this claim was 
highly unusual because “amicus cannot define the issues presented to the court.” By reaching 
such a state claim essentially sua sponte the Court was “function[ing] as an advocate for the 
prevailing side rather than as a court.”50 The Court’s decision to reach the state issue 
demonstrated a clear interest in the subject, but the opinion was hardly a clear statement of state 
constitutional law. Instead, it essentially declared that because this search violated the Fourth 
Amendment, it certainly violated the state provision also. The analysis did not follow Long’s 
clear statement rule and instead presented only vague signals about what the independent 
provision may actually mean. 
                                                
48 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assoc., 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (suspicionless drug testing 
of railroad employees involved in accidents was reasonable); National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (upholding suspicionless testing where customs 
employees sought to work in drug interdiction areas).  
49 Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Bd. of Educ. of Patchogue-Medford, 70 N.Y.2d 
57 (1987).  
50 Patchogue-Medford, 70 N.Y.2d at 71 (Simons, J., concurring).  
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A year later the Court was asked to review another drug testing program, this time 
involving police officers in a specialized drug unit.51 The claimant relied heavily on Patchogue–
Medford but despite, or perhaps because of, the Court’s tepid statement of a state search basis 
framed the argument solely in terms of federal constitutional law. Neither the majority, which 
upheld the search because of the special circumstances involved in drug enforcement, nor the 
dissent sought to clarify the constitutional logic of the rule or whether the state constitution 
provided any greater protection than federal law. Despite the lack of any clarifying guidance 
from the Court, the claimant’s brief in Seelig v. Koehler (1990)52 contained a clear state 
constitutional analysis with only secondary reliance on the Fourth Amendment. The claimant 
was candid about the reason for this style of argument: “Even if, as [the state] argue, the recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions upholding suspicionless random drug testing rendering 
the Fourth Amendment a hollow precept, [the state provision] affords a more protective standard 
with regard to privacy rights found to be highly intrusive.”53 Thus, it was the recent decision of 
the Supreme Court to uphold similar drug searches rather than the Court of Appeals weak signal 
that drove the decision to present the claim. The argument stressed previous examples of judicial 
federalism in New York, the fact that high courts in both New Jersey and Massachusetts had 
recently refused to follow the Supreme Court’s lead, and the logic of Patchogue-Medford. On 
this last point the brief was particularly strong in desiring a clear statement that the rule was one 
of state constitutional law so as to eliminate the ambiguous nature of the earlier decisions.54 In 
                                                
51 Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432 (1988).  
52 76 N.Y.2d 87.  
53 Seelig, 76 N.Y.2d 87, Petitioners-Appellants brief at 13. Similarly the brief notes, at 15, that 
two other state courts “consider[ed] the ‘dismantling’ of the Fourth Amendment to be so 
invidious that they have based their decisions regarding random drug testing solely on their 
states’ constitutions.”  
54 Seelig, 76 N.Y.2d 87, Petitioners-Appellants brief at 19.  
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addition to rejecting the claim, the Court again failed to clarify the rule and the final drug test 
argument in my sample presented the case in federal terms without any mention beyond a string 
cite of the state provision.55 With only a weak signal from the Court of Appeals, litigants did not 
significantly focus on state constitutional arguments until after the Supreme Court acted and the 
refusal to strengthen its prior signals led litigants to ultimately abandon the claim. 
Where the Court of Appeals clearly, explicitly, and repeatedly emphasized a state 
constitutional rule, as it did in Hobson cases, the claimant’s arguments eventually shifted and 
followed the state rule. Through clear instructions in this one doctrinal area, the Court of Appeals 
altered the way that these claims were argued so that they focused less and less on federal legal 
changes and more on the internal logic of the state rule itself. In contrast, the decision in 
Patchogue-Medford presented a muddled signal, at best. The Court made little more than a bare 
assertion without any discussion of the basis for any independent state rule and lawyers only 
turned to this state argument after the Supreme Court demonstrated a deferential standard of 
review for drug testing. Without a clear commitment to the state rule, lawyers simply did not  
evidence great interest in the alternative argument.  
 
An anomaly  
While the above discussion demonstrates that signals help induce a greater frequency of 
state arguments, anomalies do exist. This is expected in part simply because at times the degree 
of support for a legal claim may be a matter of judgment and a rights restricting decision may be 
unclear as to how far it reaches in other situations. Yet in one case a state argument was made in 
clear contradiction of my argument. In fact, signals from both the Supreme Court and the Court 
                                                
55 Delaraba v. Nassau County Police Dept., 83 N.Y.2d 367 (1994).  
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of Appeals weighed against any state constitutional claim. The issue involved prosecutorial use 
of peremptory challenges to exclude racial minorities. In 1965, the Supreme Court largely 
insulated the practice from constitutional review by requiring a nearly impossible standard of 
proof from defendants.56 While a lower New York court had found that racially motivated use of 
peremptory challenges violated the state constitution,57 the Court of Appeals rejected the 
argument in People v. McCray (1982) holding that the state constitution’s protection was coequal 
to the federal level.58 In Batson v. Kentucky (1986),59 the Supreme Court overruled its former 
decision by significantly lowering the defendant’s burden of proof to call peremptory challenges 
into question and thus expanded the degree of federal protection. Thus, neither internal nor 
external signals were favorable to state constitutional arguments. In People v. Hernandez 
(1990),60 however, the claimant did stress a well-developed state constitutional argument after a 
Batson claim; in fact this argument cited the largest number of factors, five, of my New York 
sample. The argument began with strategic use of the linkage between the state and federal 
provisions in McCray, stressing that if they are coequal then the state provision must now offer 
protection at the same level as the newer federal test. In further support of a state rule, the history 
of New York’s statutory prohibition of discrimination in jury selection and the constitutional 
history of the adoption of the state equal protection provision in 1938 were each addressed, in 
addition to the other examples of judicial federalism from the Court of Appeals. While ultimately 
                                                
56 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).  
57 People v. Thompson, 435 N.Y.S.2d 739 (App. Div. 1981).  
58 57 N.Y.2d 542. Oddly, the brief failed to make a state constitutional argument in this case. It 
referred obliquely to the state constitution only once and failed to note the basis for Thomspon; 
instead relying primarily on various aspects of modern federal equal protection analysis to attack 
the process. Of course, it may be the case that a clear state argument was presented in subsequent 
briefs.  
59 476 U.S. 79. 
60 75 N.Y.2d 350.  
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unsuccessful,61 the most reasonable explanation for this unusual argument is the attorney’s 
strategic and long term strategy of establishing a state rule should the Supreme Court abandon 
Batson in the near future. 
 
Conclusion  
In the aggregate, the experience in New York is broadly similar to Ohio. Lawyers 
primarily rely on federal arguments and turn to state claims where federal retrenchment 
undermines their case. These arguments stress policy attacks on federal doctrine, seeking to 
evade retrenchment by inviting the Court to apply newly weakened or discarded federal 
precedents under the window dressing of state constitutional provisions. However, in the Hobson 
cases, lawyers developed a more coherent, independent analysis focused on the internal logic of 
the state doctrine. Lawyers in these cases abandoned nearly all consideration of federal law in 
favor of focusing on the case law provided by the Court of Appeals. This is suggestive of the 
power of internal encouragement. As the Court of Appeals reiterated the Hobson rule as a 
requirement of the state constitution alone, lawyers adapted to this new precedent and altered 
their arguments. The next two chapters explore how broader signals, state high court declarations 
of the criteria and primacy approaches, alter litigant behavior on a broader level than found in the 
narrower doctrinal encouragement from New York.  
                                                
61 Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d at 358: “Our analysis of the record and issues of this case on the merits 
would produce the same result under the Federal and State equal protection right, as no 
justification for breaking new ground as to this clause by differentiating between this dually 
protected constitutional right is sufficiently advanced.”  
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Chapter 6 
 
Washington: Arguing Gunwall 
 
 
 
Where the New York Court of Appeals resisted any clear guidance on how to approach 
state constitutional law, and the Ohio Supreme Court resisted the very concept of independent 
analysis, the Washington Supreme Court not only actively engaged with its constitution but 
issued broad and clear requirements as to how state arguments were to be offered. Not only did 
the Court adopt the criteria test requiring lawyers to brief and discuss six different legal criteria 
to justify an independent interpretation, but also it consistently refused to recognize any state 
claim that failed to abide by these rules. This strict adherence to the criteria test lead to 
significant shifts in how lawyers made constitutional arguments. While the arguments continued 
to focus in areas of retrenchment, they rarely focused on the kinds of policy criticisms seen in 
Ohio and New York. Lawyers may not have consistently complied with the criteria approach, but 
the substantive arguments shifted dramatically by offering these legal criteria arguments to 
support an independent state constitutional doctrine.  
 
Adopting the criteria test 
As with most state high courts, state constitutional issues became increasingly important 
to the Washington Supreme Court in the late 1970s and ‘80s. Unlike most other courts, however, 
it responded by expressing a clear state constitutional theory to guide how lawyers were expected 
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to argue such claims. Under the influence of Justice Robert Utter,1 who published widely on state 
constitutional theory and its application in Washington (Utter 1984, 1985, 1988, 1992; Utter and 
Larson 1988; Utter and Pitler 1987; Utter and Spitzer 2002), the Court adopted a strong 
preference for hearing state constitutional claims but only when they were properly presented. 
While initially flirting with a quasi-primacy approach, the Court ultimately settled on the 
supplementary, criteria test.  
The first attempt at clarity came in State v. Coe (1984)2 where Justice Utter wrote for the 
Court declaring that the constitutional challenge to a judicial order forbidding broadcasting of 
trial evidence should first be examined under the state constitution. The Court offered a number 
of reasons for this approach. The very nature of the federal system and differences between the 
constitutions along with the histories of both “clearly demonstrate that the protection of the 
fundamental rights of Washington citizens was intended to be and remains a separate and 
important function of our state constitution and courts that is closely associated with our 
sovereignty.” Moreover, regular engagement with the state constitution allows the Court to 
“develop a body of independent jurisprudence that will assist this court and the bar of our state in 
understanding how that constitution will be applied.” This body of law will be more legitimate 
because it “will not appear to have been constructed to meet the whim of the moment.” Finally, it 
is simply illogical to apply federal law where narrower state law, whether common, statutory, or 
                                                
1 A 1980 survey of Washington law professors rated Utter as the most influential member of the 
Court. Perhaps not surprisingly given the correlation of ideology and support for judicial 
federalism, a 1980 survey of former law clerks and appellate attorneys found Utter to be the most 
liberal justice as well as the one most willing to actively use the Court’s power. This liberal 
reputation led to an unsuccessful challenge in the 1980 election after two prior uncontested 
elections (Sheldon 1988: 327, 321, 182).  
2 101 Wash.2d 364.  
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constitutional, would have been sufficient.3 Despite this preference for state constitutional 
resolution, the Court maintained it should also resolve the federal issues even after it found the 
prior restraint to violate the absolute state right to publish and broadcast legally obtained 
information. Utter (1985) justified this approach as maintaining participation in the national 
debate. 
Two years later, in State v. Gunwall (1986),4 the Court revisited this issue by specifying a 
clear preference for the criteria approach to state constitutional law in a case about whether a 
warrant is required to obtain phone records or to attach a pen register to a phone line. The Court 
expressed concern with the legitimacy of judicial federalism noting that  
[m]any of the courts now resorting to state constitutions rather than to analogous 
provisions of the United States Constitution simply announce that their decision is based 
on the state constitution but do not further explain it. The difficulty with such decisions is 
that they establish no principled basis for repudiating federal precedent and thus furnish 
little or no rational basis for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law.5  
 
Gunwall established six “nonexclusive neutral criteria” that are necessary for demonstrating 
whether “the Washington State Constitution should be considered as extending broader rights to 
its citizens than the United States Constitution: (1) the textual language; (2) differences in the 
texts; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences; and (6) 
matters of particular state or local concern.”6 These criteria were specifically aimed at guiding 
counsel in arguing state constitutional issues as well as ensuring that any expansive state 
constitutional holding is based on “well founded legal reasons and not by merely substituting our 
notion of justice for that of duly elected legislative bodies or the United States Supreme Court.”7 
                                                
3 Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 373-74.  
4 106 Wash.2d 54.  
5 Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 60.  
6 Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 58.  
7 Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 62-63.  
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After Gunwall’s guidance proved less than effective, as discussed below, the Court 
strengthened the test. In State v. Wethered (1988),8 the Court declared that the Gunwall factors 
were not optional and that “[b]y failing to discuss at a minimum the six criteria mentioned in 
Gunwall, [claimant] requests us to develop without benefit of argument or citation of authority 
the ‘adequate and independent state grounds’ to support his assertions. We decline to do so 
consistent with our policy not to consider matters neither timely nor sufficiently argued by the 
parties.” While other courts may have decided to expand Miranda-type protections, “we will not 
consider that question until the issue is adequately presented and argued to us.”9 Subsequent 
cases consistently reiterated this rule requiring full Gunwall briefings before the Court will 
consider the issue. Hugh Spitzer (1998:1197) examined the 108 instances where the Court 
discussed Gunwall through 1997 finding that in nearly 60% of cases it refused to consider the 
issue solely because of inadequate briefing. Later cases also encouraged early complete briefing, 
refusing to consider issues where Gunwall analysis was made only in late reply or supplemental 
briefs.10 As the cases accumulated and developed a strong and clear body of law, the Court 
became less strict holding that “[n]o Gunwall analysis is necessary in this case because we apply 
established principles of state constitutional jurisprudence” but warning that “Gunwall analysis is 
nevertheless required in cases where the legal principles are not firmly established.”11 As 
discussed below, only cases involving search and seizure likely fit into this exception. A later 
analysis by Spitzer (2006) found that while Gunwall was primarily used to block claims in its 
                                                
8 110 Wash.2d 466.  
9 Wethered, 110 Wash.2d at 472, 473 (internal citations omitted).  
10 See State v. Hudson, 124 Wash.2d 107, 120 (1994) (“To allow Hudson to engage in a full 
Gunwall analysis so late in the appeal would encourage parties to save their state constitutional 
claims for the reply brief and would lead to unbalanced and incomplete development of the 
issues for review”).  
11 State v. White, 135 Wash.2d 761, 769 n.7 (1998).  
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early years, through consistent reiteration it became less about whether to interpret the state 
constitution and more about how to interpret those provisions.  
 
Aggregate trends 
 
Figure 6.1. Percentage of arguments by year, Washington. N=613 
I examined 613 constitutional rights arguments in Washington, finding that 79% (482) 
were federally based and 21% (131) were based on state constitutional law. Figure 7.1 tracks the 
percentages of each argument over time. With the exception of 1986, which is skewed by the fact 
that Gunwall itself represents three of the thirteenth state arguments, the trends show a generally 
increasing degree of state constitutional arguments and, unlike New York, there is no indication 
of a drop off in attention in the 1990s. This trend is at least suggestive that lawyers became 
increasingly attentive to the Court’s guidance and its continued reliance on and reiteration of 
state constitutional law.  
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Figure 6.2. Percentage of arguments by year, Washington 1970-2000. N=613.  
Figure 7.2 illustrates the percentage of rights arguments by various issue areas. Search 
and seizure cases represent the single largest number of state arguments, an unsurprising fact 
given the U.S. Supreme Court’s retrenchment and that Gunwall was a search case. The finding 
that 21% of equal protection claims were state based is unexpected given the generally limited 
attention that equal protection receives in other states (Williams 2009: 209; see Fino 1987a), but 
is partly explained by the state’s equal rights amendment and potentially by Gunwall as 
discussed below. Only jury issues showed a greater proportion of state than federal arguments 
and is due in part to major changes to the state’s trial procedure but also reflects a trend in many 
states where jury rights saw some independent interpretation despite limited federal retrenchment 
(Cauthen 2000). The nearly equal split in takings issues is more surprising giving the fact that the 
U.S. Supreme Court was expanding the reach of federal law during much of this time. 
 
Before Gunwall  
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Prior to the clear constitutional theory adopted in Gunwall and reinforced in Wethered, 
state arguments largely appeared in reaction to federal retrenchment and expressed the limited 
reasoning criticized so heavily by the Washington Court in later years. However, there was also 
some degree of internal doctrinal encouragement prior to Gunwall.  
An interesting example of federal retrenchment came in the common area of school 
funding. Following the Supreme Court’s rejection of school funding suits in 1973, claimants in 
Northside School District No. 417 v. Kinnear (1974)12 attacked the state’s policy under the state 
constitution on both education clause and equality grounds, though I only consider the equality 
issue due to the lack of a parallel federal education guarantee. Interestingly, the claimants did not 
argue for a different state test, instead stressing prior Washington precedents holding that the 
federal and state provisions were identical in application. Instead of rejecting the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision, the claimants sought to apply that test, stressing that because of the state’s 
education clause, “[t]here can be no doubt, therefore, under the principles of Rodriguez, that 
education is a fundamental interest under the Washington Constitution.”13 As a fundamental 
interest, strict scrutiny applies to the state’s system and even the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision 
admitted that state funding schemes could not survive strict scrutiny.14 
One of the clearest examples of response to retrenchment is Gunwall itself. The primary 
arguments revolved around warrantless access to telephone records and attachment of a pen 
                                                
12 84 Wash.2d 685.  
13 Northside School, 84 Wash.2d 685, Plaintiff-Petitioners brief at 31 (emphasis in original).  
14 The Washington Supreme Court rejected both the education and equality arguments but 
reversed itself a few years later in Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash.2d 476 (1978) but 
this case is not included in my study because the claimants pressed only an education clause 
argument and dropped the equality issue.  
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register to record the numbers called from a home.15 The U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the 
warrantless use of pen registers and the logic left little room for protecting telephone records.16 
In Gunwall, the claimant noted that the text of the state provision was dramatically different: “No 
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”17 
It also went on to note some recent examples where the Court rejected recent federal search law 
changes. But the strongest reliance was placed on attacking the policy underlying the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision. Specifically the claimant noted that three state high courts had 
recently rejected this specific decision, stressing that “each of the courts which has dealt with the 
question of the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy in a person’s financial or telephone 
records has noted the tremendous potential for abuse” under federal law. Quoting to the 
dominant treatise on search and seizure law, the decision is “a mockery of the Fourth 
Amendment” that opens intimate private details to indiscriminate police rummaging.18 The 
claimant closed with an invitation for evasion: “This Court should reject the narrow and 
outmoded interpretation of a reasonable expectation in phone records … [and follow the other 
state courts] which place the judiciary in its proper [role] as the guardian of privacy interests 
against unwarranted invasions by the police.”19 
In a number of other instances attempts were made to distinguish negative federal law 
with state arguments used as a last ditch effort. In Federated Publications (1980),20 the claimants 
                                                
15 There was also a third state search argument to the effect that even if those things were 
permissible, the subsequent warrant obtained was constitutionally invalid under State v. Jackson, 
102 Wash.2d 432 (1984) where the Court rejected the totality of the circumstances test for 
judging informant reliability and credibility.  
16 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).  
17 Wash. Const. Art. I, Sec. 7.  
18 Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, Appellant’s brief at 12 (quoting LaFave 1984 edition).  
19 Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, Appellant’s brief at 13.  
20 Federated Publications, Inc v. Kurtz, 94 Wash.2d 51.  
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were newspapers attacking an order barring the public from a pretrial hearing. While the U.S. 
Supreme Court had recently rejected a nearly identical argument, the claimant stressed that the 
deciding vote only rejected the claim under the Sixth Amendment but reserved any First 
Amendment consideration and that this was still an open question. The state argument stressed 
that the state constitution also provided for a right to public trial but also a separate provision 
specifically guaranteed, “Justice in all cases shall be administered openly”21 and that some state 
courts had relied on similar provisions to limit courtroom closures. In State v. Hehman (1978) 
claimant argued that an arrest for a minor traffic offense was unconstitutional in the face of two 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions to the contrary by noting some factual distinctions.22 The 
argument then turned to a state issue noting that two state courts had invalidated arrests in similar 
situations but placed great reliance on a lengthy quote from a critical law review showing that the 
federal decisions “are not well received in all quarters.”23 A similar dynamic is shown in State v. 
Basson (1986) involving successive confessions where unwarned incriminating statements were 
repeated after Miranda warnings were provided. The bulk of the argument sought to demonstrate 
that this case still fit into the weaker federal protections,24 but it closed with an invitation for bald 
evasion of this federal restriction: “Under the state constitution, prior [federal] caselaw may be 
used as a guidance to determine that there is a bright line presumption” that subsequent warnings 
do not cure the initial constitutional defect.25 Similarly, the claimant in State v. Barkland (1976) 
attempted to distinguish a recent negative federal precedent and deployed a limited state claim 
                                                
21 Wash. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10.  
22 U.S. v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
23 Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45, Respondent’s brief at 9.  
24 The Supreme Court upheld the use of post-warning incriminating statements so long as the 
initial statement was voluntary, even where it did not comply with Miranda. Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298 (1985).  
25 Basson, 105 Wash.2d 314, Respondent’s brief at 45.  
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that an earlier Washington precedent should control despite the fact that “the language of the 
opinion is not clear” as to whether it was based on the state provision.26 These examples show a 
common trend of treating state provisions as a means to maintain a weakening federal standard. 
As noted above, criminal jury issues had a large number of state arguments. Most of 
these dealt with petty offenses where even prior to incorporation of the federal jury provision 
against the states, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a jury was not required for petty offenses 
carrying less than six months of potential jail time.27 Prior to 1980 this decision had no real effect 
in Washington because petty offenses tried in courts of limited jurisdiction where a jury trial was 
not permitted had an absolute right of appeal to the Superior Court where a jury trial could be 
held de novo; this arrangement was upheld in 1950.28 In 1980, the legislature altered these rules 
to significantly limit the ability to seek a trial de novo and this faced immediate court challenges; 
in fact, four of the twelve state jury arguments, and three in 1982 alone,29 involved this statute. 
The claimants stressed the state language providing that the “right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate.”30 These words were clear and unambiguous “and provide for no restriction or 
limitation.”31 Two of the three 1982 claimants focused a great deal of attention on the 
constitutional history of juries as well as case law stressing the paramount role they play in 
Washington. Perhaps of more interest than what the claimants argued in these cases is what they 
did not argue: none cited the federal provision or any federal case law. The U.S. Supreme Court 
refused this claim early in the rights revolution and, thus, there was no history of favorable 
                                                
26 State v. Barkland, 87 Wash.2d 814, Appellant’s brief at 7.  
27 Cheff v. Schanackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).  
28 Bellingham v. Hite, 37 Wash.2d 652 (1950). However, the Washington Supreme Court later 
noted that this decision was likely incorrect, Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87, 89 (1982). 
29 Pasco v. Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87 (1982); Seattle v. Crumine, 98 Wash.2d 62 (1982); Seattle v. 
Filson, 98 Wash.2d 66 (1982).  
30 Wash. Const. Art. I, Sec. 21.  
31 Mace, 98 Wash.2d 87, Petitioner’s brief at 10.  
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federal law to rely upon and the claimants were forced to develop their arguments without this 
reference.  
Turning to internal signals, the expression of interest in state constitutional law in Coe 
had some influence; a small number of claimants’ briefs included vague statements that the state 
constitutions may be a basis for decision. For example, an argument about due process 
restrictions on parole decisions stated, “it has been suggested that state courts should consider 
state constitutional protections before turning to the federal constitution to avoid ruling on 
constitutional issues when a case can be resolved on lesser grounds.”32 Another brief asserted 
that at a minimum the state search provision should provide the same protection as a recent 
federal case and that one recent state search case “make it extremely likely that the State 
constitution provides even more protection.”33 Neither claimant made any clear argument beyond 
simply noting the existence of the state option. In a speech challenge to restrictions on abortion 
protests, the claimant’s state claim became somewhat more distinct. After a lengthy federal 
argument, the claimant noted both Coe and a case about speech on private property34 to show 
that speech rights under the Washington Constitution should prevail in any balancing test against 
other rights.35 In Kitsap County v. Kev, Inc. (1986)36 the state speech argument became 
increasingly distinct in large part because the case fit into the result of Coe more clearly. The 
claimant challenged a permanent injunction declaring an “erotic dance studio” to be a public 
nuisance and stressed the text of the state provision and the logic of Coe as creating a per se rule 
                                                
32 Petition of Ayers, 105 Wash.2d 161 (1986), Petitioner’s brief at 15. I did not code this or the 
following assertion as a state argument given the lack of any development beyond simply noting 
the state provision exists.  
33 State v. Terrovona, 105 Wash.2d 632 (1986), Appellant’s brief at 21 (a state argument was 
explicitly made on another issue in this case).  
34 Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council, 96 Wash.2d 230 (1981).  
35 Bering v. SHARE, 106 Wash.2d 212 (1986), Appellants brief at 19.  
36 106 Wash.2d 135.  
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against prior restraints arguing that the county could only punish the studio for abuses after they 
occurred. Federal law was not particularly hostile in either of these cases, but they at least began 
to suggest state arguments to supplement the primary federal claims. However, the arguments 
were hardly well developed and likely contributed to the frustration expressed in Gunwall. 
Gender equality provides a strong example of a clear state based doctrine. In 1972, 
Washington voters approved an Equal Rights Amendment to the state constitution and the Court 
applied this provision strictly.37 In Darrin v. Gould (1975), the Court interpreted the ERA to 
forbid gender discrimination even if it might have satisfied the strict scrutiny test.38 Six gender 
discrimination arguments are present in my sample for all years—this helps explain the relatively 
large number of state equal protection arguments—and two prior to Gunwall, both in 1978. In 
Marchioro v. Chaney (1978)39 the claimant attacked a statute requiring gender diversity in 
representatives to party conventions as violating this absolute bar against gender classifications. 
In Seattle v. Buchanan (1978),40 the claimant challenged a city ordinance defining exposure of 
female breasts alone as lewd conduct. The claimant argued that such a law “develops from a 
tradition that seems to indicate that there is something wrong, abnormal or incorrect about 
having been born as a woman” but that under the ERA, “our courts and legislatures may no 
longer consider femaleness to be an aberration of maleness, subject to unique restrictions, 
                                                
37 Wash. Const. Art. XXXI: “Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged on account of sex.”  
38 85 Wash.2d 859 (“Any other view would mean the people intended to accomplish no change 
in the existing constitutional law governing sex discrimination, except possibly to make the 
validity of a classification based on sex come within the suspect class under Const. art. 1, s 12 … 
Had such a limited purpose been intended, there would have been no necessity to resort to the 
broad, sweeping, mandatory language of the Equal Rights Amendment.”). 
39 90 Wash.2d 298.  
40 90 Wash.2d 584.  
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disabilities or preferences.”41 Neither brief bothered with a discussion of federal law, despite the 
increasing protection under federal law, instead relying solely on the state equality argument as 
expressed in Darrin. 
This image of state constitutional arguments largely tracks with broader experience. 
Lawyers offer state constitutional arguments primarily where federal law either lacks support for 
their claim or is increasingly unsure. These arguments were the kind complained of in Gunwall: 
they presented fairly vague assertions and tended to simply invite evasion of recent federal 
changes in favor of older federal law. In a smaller set of cases, we do see some limited influence 
of Coe but even in those arguments the state claim was weakly developed and primarily served 
as an addendum to a federal argument. Gunwall was clearly intended to correct this problem by 
providing guidance about how state arguments should be briefed. I now turn to how successful 
this guidance has been. 
 
After Gunwall  
There was no immediate response to Gunwall. Of the nine state arguments offered in 
1988, none complied by briefing the six criteria. The greatest number of the Gunwall criteria 
cited was three by two claimants. Three of these arguments involved search and seizure issues, 
two of which cited specifically to Gunwall but none of them complied with or even showed 
interest in the criteria established there; instead, Gunwall was noted only for the substantive 
expansion of state search law. The most egregious example was in Wethered where the claimant 
simply cites to a single state constitutional precedent and then asserts that the claimant was 
                                                
41 Buchanan, 90 Wash.2d 584, Appellants brief at 14, 15.  
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coerced into consenting into a search under the state constitution. It is understandable that the 
Washington Supreme Court utilized this case to clarify that the Gunwall criteria were mandatory. 
Despite the failure to comply with Gunwall, the other two 1988 search cases may suggest 
that Gunwall and other search cases were having some effect because in both federal law was 
still uncertain and yet state arguments were either dominant or at least on par with the federal 
claims. In a random drug testing case, the claimant began with a state challenge that cited to 
recent expansive search cases as well as the textual differences between the constitutions but 
rested most of the state argument on Washington cases applying federal law; arguing in essence 
that these strong declarations requiring individualized suspicion under Fourth Amendment law 
should be carried over. The brief then proceeded to argue a Fourth Amendment claim 
specifically as a secondary issue: “The Fourth Amendment, which provides less protection of 
privacy than” the state provision still prohibits random, suspicionless drug testing.42 It is 
interesting to note that in New York, such state arguments were not made until after the U.S. 
Supreme Court clearly rejected drug testing challenges even though the state high court had 
expressed some support for a state claim.43 A similar dynamic is illustrated in Seattle v. Messiani 
(1988), only more dramatically. The claimant attacked the constitutionality of sobriety 
checkpoints and did so nearly exclusively based on state grounds despite the fact that the U.S. 
Supreme Court had already struck down some uses of checkpoints and only conclusively upheld 
sobriety checks in 1990.44 The claimant noted textual differences, state constitutional history, 
and recent state search precedent, in particular a case expressing discomfort with the federal 
                                                
42 Alverado v. Washington Public Power Supply System, 111 Wash.2d 424 (1988), Appellants’ 
brief at 11.  
43 Discussed in Chapter 5.  
44 Deleware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (stopping vehicles to check license and registration 
unconstitutional); Michigan Dept. of Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints 
constitutional).  
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automobile exception,45 but primarily stressed cases from other states rejecting sobriety 
checkpoints. The brief admitted that most were based on federal law but used the logic of those 
decisions to support the state argument. Interestingly the federal claim is relegated to a bare 
assertion, reversing the trend observed in many other state constitutional arguments. The 
claimant simply cited to one supportive federal precedent and concludes, sobriety checkpoints 
“are clearly in violation of [the state provision] and many states find these roadblocks violate the 
Fourth Amendment as well.”46 While neither claimant complied fully with Gunwall despite 
clearly being aware of it, the fact that they rested primarily on state claims in areas where federal 
law was potentially supportive suggests that the repeated interest in the state search provision at 
least was having an effect on the Washington bar. 
A significant conflict over obscenity occurred in two related 1988 cases, argued by the 
same lawyer, that demonstrate confusion over the relation between Gunwall and Coe even 
though a fairly complicated state argument resulted. The cases involved a company selling 
bondage films. One attacked the search in large part aimed at recovering all of the products 
seized that were not used as direct evidence at trial. After an extensive analysis of the Fourth 
Amendment and its application to the seizure of protected materials, especially trying to 
distinguish recent negative precedent, the brief turned to a state speech argument and not a state 
seizure argument. The claimant blamed the Washington Supreme Court for causing this problem 
because while Coe instructed consideration of state constitutional provisions first, “it has not 
consistently done so” and thus reliance is on federal search law “primarily because there is a 
reasonably well-developed body of federal constitutional law … that seems quite clearly 
dispositive, while there is no existing body of state case law considering the validity of seizures 
                                                
45 State v. Ringer, 100 Wash.2d 686 (1983).  
46 Messiani, 110 Wash.2d 454, Respondents’ brief at 39.  
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of publications” under the state constitution.47 Despite the fact that there was some strong 
negative federal precedent and that at least one state high court had rejected that precedent,48 and 
a small but significant number of state search cases, the claimant presented only a brief argument 
using Coe’s prohibition on prior restraints. This minor argument was the dominant claim made in 
State v. Reece (1988)49 where the claimant attacked the federal obscenity test, arguing that there 
should be no exception for obscenity under the state speech provision. While the federal 
obscenity test was settled in 197350 and remained fairly stable after that, a few state courts began 
to show discomfort with that test in the late 1980s (Farole 1998: 133, 143). The claimant stressed 
both Coe and the abortion protest case discussed above for the history of the state provision as 
well as the absolutist language providing, “[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on 
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”51 The claimant argued that this 
language does not express an exception for obscenity; all speech is protected subject only to 
abuse after the fact. The claimant noted a few dissenting justices from Maine and Massachusetts 
who wished to adopt this rule, as well as an Oregon appellate decision invalidating Oregon’s 
obscenity statute; in fact, the Oregon Supreme Court would eventually be the only state high 
court to accept this argument and find obscenity to be fully protected speech, but after the brief 
in Reece was filed.52 After this extensive speech analysis, the claimant used a state based 
vagueness challenge to assault the Supreme Court’s test itself, relying heavily on Justice 
                                                
47 State v. J.R. Distributors, Inc., 111 Wash.2d 764 (1988), Respondent’s brief at 55, 56. 
48 New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868 (1986) held that no greater probable cause standard 
is required for presumptively protected speech materials. On remand the New York Court of 
Appeals specifically rejected this holding and adhered to its prior decision under the state 
constitution, People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296 (1986). This decision was issued more 
than a year before the brief in J.R. Distributors was filed.  
49 110 Wash.2d 766.  
50 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).  
51 Wash. Const. Art. I, Sec. 5.  
52 State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510 (1987).  
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Brennan’s dissent, as so inherently subjective that consistent application was impossible. Thus 
we see some evidence that Coe had influence within the speech context, but still no Gunwall 
compliance. 
Given these arguments immediately following Gunwall, it is unsurprising that the Court 
reiterated and strengthened the criteria test in Weathered by requiring criteria briefing before the 
Court would consider the issue. Of the 79 state constitutional arguments offered from 1990 to 
2000, 28 (35%) complied completely with Gunwall. Given Spitzer’s (1998) findings that the 
Washington Supreme Court regularly dismissed state claims for Gunwall failures, this is not 
surprising. Figure 7.3 shows the percentages of Gunwall compliant state arguments. While none 
of the years have a majority of briefs complying, there is an increasing, if uneven trend. An 
initial question is whether Gunwall may have induced a significant number of state constitutional 
arguments that we might not have expected otherwise. 
 
Figure 6.3. Percentage of Gunwall compliance, Washington 1990-2000. Briefs were considered 
compliant if they discussed all the factors, or gave a reason for why one was not discussed (such 
as no textual difference), or if it noted that full briefing was not necessary because the Court had 
already settled the issue. N=79.  
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More than a third (28) of the 79 state constitutional arguments offered, 1990-2000, 
involved search and seizure issues. Eleven of these arguments presented complete Gunwall 
briefing. A large proportion of these arguments sought to build upon the earlier state precedents 
such as the Court’s rejection of the totality of the circumstances test for informant reliability. 
Many other cases sought to extend the result in Gunwall to different areas of electronic or high 
tech privacy. A number of these examples attacked wiretapping or the disclosure of personal 
records much in the same vein as the factual setting in Gunwall. A few pressed the boundaries 
further. For example, State v. Young (1994)53 argued that warrantless use of thermal imaging 
devices violated the private affairs of the suspects well before the U.S. Supreme Court accepted 
the same argument.54 Others had a more mixed influence as the U.S. Supreme Court retrenched 
in specific issue areas. For example, in State v. Boland (1990) the claimant argued that 
Washingtonians have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their garbage after the U.S. Supreme 
Court rejected the same argument.55 Similarly, another claimant attacked the Hodari D. standard 
that a person who flees from a show of police authority is not seized under the Fourth 
Amendment.56 In this area, given both federal retrenchment as well as the Washington Court’s 
history of engagement with the state provision in recent years, it is not surprising to see 
dominance of state search issues. 
Speech cases demonstrate a similar dynamic, offering state arguments largely centered on 
Coe; none of the five speech arguments offered complete Gunwall briefing. One of these did 
come in an area where we might not otherwise expect: commercial speech. Commercial speech 
saw a general expansion of federal protection since the 1970s and while the primary reliance was 
                                                
53 123 Wash.2d 173. 
54 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).  
55 State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571 (1990). California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).  
56 State v. Young, 135 Wash.2d 498; California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).  
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on this law, one claimant did assert a state claim. However, it was little more than an 
afterthought without more development than to simply note that Coe and other cases have 
recognized greater speech protections.57 The expansion of federal protection had an interesting 
effect in Soundgarden v. Eikenberry (1994).58 The case involved a statute limiting the 
availability of sexually explicit music to minors. The claimant began with a federal argument 
centered on the recent expansion of federal speech law in R.A.V. where the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that while some speech is commonly described as unprotected, the state cannot discriminate 
within that class of speech based on content.59 When the claimant turned to the state argument, it 
sought to use R.A.V. to correct an aspect of Coe where the Court suggested that the ban on prior 
restraints did not apply to unprotected speech such as obscenity.60 The claimant stressed the 
underlying federal legal rule assumed in Coe: “Coe’s statement rested on the premise that the 
First Amendment affords no protection to obscenity and, therefore, neither does Article I, 
Section 5. This premise is invalid in light of R.A.V.” and should be discarded so that the strict 
prior restraint rule should apply.61 Even though federal law had expanded somewhat, the 
claimants still offered state arguments seeking to utilize the strict rule from Coe though ignoring 
the Gunwall criteria. 
While my entire sample includes only ten free exercise claims, it is interesting to note 
that pre-Gunwall all seven arguments were federal and all three post-Gunwall cases included 
state claims. This was in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s significant retrenchment in 
                                                
57 National Federation of Retired Persons v. Insurance Commissioner, 120 Wash.2d 101 (1992).  
58 123 Wash.2d 750.  
59 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
60 Coe, 101 Wash.2d at 375 (“However, we have expressly rejected an absolute bar against prior 
restraints on speech which is not constitutionally protected”) (emphasis in original).  
61 Soundgarden, 123 Wash.2d 750, Respondents/Cross-Appellants brief at 25-26, n.15.  
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1990.62 In Barnett v. Hicks (1990),63 argued before the federal case was resolved, the claimant 
stressed the absolute nature of the state provision as well as a recent law review stressing the 
strong history of religious protection in Washington.64 The Washington Supreme Court would 
later accept this argument and reject the newly weakened federal test.65 In the two subsequent 
cases66 claimants relied upon this rejection to argue a state claim and none of the three presented 
full Gunwall briefing. The federal legal change led to an increase in state constitutional activity. 
A similar dynamic is also present in the two confrontation arguments where full Gunwall 
arguments were made in cases where federal law was fairly negative. One argued that full 
confrontation rights applied to sentencing hearings in the face of law at least implying that 
federal confrontation rights do not apply and the other objecting to closed circuit testimony by a 
child victim after the U.S. Supreme Court upheld similar alternatives.67 While the above areas do 
not show any clear evidence that embracing the criteria approach led to state arguments than 
might not have been made otherwise, in two areas the post-Gunwall arguments show unexpected 
state constitutional activism: equal protection and takings.  
State courts commonly lockstep with federal equal protection doctrine, despite at times 
quite different language and history (Williams 2009: 209; see Fino 1987a). While the text of the 
                                                
62 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
63 114 Wash.2d 879.  
64 Wash. Const. Art. I, Sec. 11 (“Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious 
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be 
molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion”).  
65 First Covenant Church of Seattle v. Seattle, 120 Wash.2d 203 (1992). This case is included in 
the analysis in Chapter 3.  
66 First United Methodist Chuch of Seattle v. Hearing Examiner for Seattle, 129 Wash.2d 238 
(1996); Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 U.S. 143 (2000).  
67 State v. Foster, 135 Wash.2d 441 (1998); State v. Strauss, 119 Wash.2d 401 (1992).  
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Washington provision is quite distinct from the Fourteenth Amendment,68 the Washington 
Supreme Court generally followed this path of treating the provision as substantially identical to 
federal law, though at times it did state in dicta that a separate analysis may be possible (Bindas 
et al 2011).69 Thirteen state equal protection arguments were offered post-Gunwall. Three of 
these were ERA cases relying on the law discussed above and a few others were vague assertions 
but some presented well-developed state arguments with full Gunwall briefing, though 
admittedly in areas where federal law offered little hope of victory. In Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett 
(1990)70 the claimant attacked the state’s lemon law statute that placed conditions on the right of 
auto dealers to appeal but not on the rights of the owner. The claimant stressed Justice Utter’s 
(1984) guidance on the importance of state constitutional law as well as the prior examples of 
judicial federalism in Washington. Turning to the state’s history, the claimant discussed how the 
Washington convention failed to even consider the federal language in favor of Oregon’s 
provision and the earliest state case law did not consider the federal doctrine but that through 
“force of inertia” the two became conflated despite the fact that the Court “has never articulated 
a basis for adopting such a position” of uniform treatment.71 The claimant proceeded to invoke 
the historical connection to Oregon and its test (Schuman 1988), arguing that the lemon law 
could not survive this test even if it passed the federal rational basis review. While the Court did 
not give this claim serious attention, the next year Justice Utter adopted substantially identical 
                                                
68 Wash. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 12: “No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, 
or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall 
not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations.” 
69 American Network, Inc. v. Washington Utilities and Transp. Com’n, 113 Wash.2d 59, 77 
(1989) (the state and federal provisions “are substantially identical and have been considered by 
this court as one issue”); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash.2d 636, 640-642 (1989).  
70 115 Wash.2d 556. 
71 Barrett, 115 Wash.2d 556, Petitioner/Appellant’s brief at 31.  
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arguments through his own Gunwall analysis in a concurring opinion.72 A claimant attacking the 
punishment of first time drug offenders more harshly than other first time offenders relied 
heavily on Utter’s opinion. Both the federal tiers of scrutiny and Oregon tests were proposed as 
valid tests.73 In a challenge to the state’s inheritance laws for blocking the ability of illegitimate 
children to reopen a settled estate, the claimant stressed again Utter’s rationale in favor of a 
stronger state rule over any federal protections.74 In these equal protection arguments it seems 
Gunwall may have triggered some interest in an area where state arguments are uncommon and 
this interest was buoyed by Utter’s strong support even though it received little attention from 
the rest of the Court. 
Takings law, similarly, saw relatively little support from judicial federalism as well, 
largely because federal law was slowly expanding protection (Tarr 1998a). Despite this fact, five 
of the post-Gunwall state arguments involved takings of property, though only one presented a 
full Gunwall analysis. Two of these arguments were public use cases where the U.S. Supreme 
Court gave broad deference to legislative determination of public use.75 Both arguments76 
stressed the explicit state language, shared by only three other states, making the determination 
of a public use a judicial question with no weight to any legislative determination.77 While the 
remaining three arguments all stressed state regulatory takings issues, only one offered complete 
Gunwall briefing noting the Washington Court’s refusal to consider the same issue because of 
                                                
72 State v. Smith, 117 Wash.2d 263, 282 (1991) (Utter, J. concurring).  
73 State v. Clark, 129 Wash.2d 211 (1996), Appellant Clark’s brief.  
74 Pitzer v. Union Bank of California, 141 Wash.2d 539, Appellants brief.  
75 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).  
76 Robinson v. Seattle, 119 Wash.2d 34 (1992); State ex rel. Washington State Coonvention and 
Trade Center v. Evans, 136 Wash.2d 811 (1998). 
77 Wash. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 16: “Whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use 
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a 
judicial question, and determined as such, without regard to any legislative assertion that the use 
is public.” 
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Gunwall failure.78 In Manufactured Housing (2000)79 the claimant placed strong reliance on the 
state provision’s language specifically prohibiting property from being “taken or damaged”80 to 
attack a statute limiting the ability to sell property. This was in addition to a federal argument 
stressing the increasing protection offered in recent decisions. 
While equal protection and takings cases may demonstrate that the Court’s increased 
interest in state law induced some claims we might not have expected otherwise, generally state 
arguments were still primarily offered in areas where federal law was weakening or in specific 
doctrinal areas where the Washington Court had already increased protection. This finding is 
understandable because the Washington Court never issued a requirement that lawyers brief state 
issues in all cases. The only requirement of Gunwall and its progeny was that for the Court to 
consider an issue, the briefing must follow the requirements of the criteria test.  
 
Did the Gunwall test provide anything useful?  
 
                                                
78 Gulmont v. Clarke, 121 Wash.2d 586, 604 (1993). 
79 Manufactured Housing Communities v. State, 142 Wash.2d 347 (2000).  
80 Wash. Const. Art. 1, Sec. 16.  
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Figure 6.4. Percentage of total factors, pre- and post-Gunwall. N=131.  
 
Figure 6.5. Percentage of state arguments citing each legal factor, pre- and post-Gunwall. N=131. 
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 illustrate the effect of Gunwall upon the content of state constitutional 
arguments. Each shows significant changes in these content issues. For all five of the Gunwall 
criteria (text, constitutional history, WA state law, structure, and state interests)81 there is a 
sizable increase in the percentage of arguments discussing each factor. Figure 7.4 shows how the 
rough complexity, measured by totaling the number of factors discussed in each brief, increased 
after Gunwall. Prior to Gunwall, 81% of state arguments noted two or fewer of these factors; 
after Gunwall, this dropped to 53%. There was a sizable move towards more complex arguments 
with 41% noting four or more factors. This finding suggests that Gunwall had at least part of its 
intended effect even though full compliance was not achieved. As discussed below, these criteria 
were not always substantively compelling, but the strong preference for the criteria test nearly 
                                                
81 While Gunwall includes the language of the state provision as a separate criterion, lawyers and 
justices tended to conflate this with textual difference. I did not code the simple citation to state 
language without any greater discussion as a separate legal factor.  
 
 
122 
eliminated state arguments that were nothing more than attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decisions.  
While present in about 40% of the post-Gunwall arguments, neither structural nor state 
and local interest arguments amount to much beyond a bare quotation or paraphrasing from the 
Gunwall opinion itself. This is most clear in the context of structural arguments where nearly 
every argument to employ it used the direct language from Gunwall. There the Court discussed 
the plenary versus delegated power distinction; the federal government is restricted both by the 
doctrine of delegated powers and specific rights restrictions, but state governments possess 
plenary power to legislate on all issues unless their power is limited by some explicit 
constitutional provision.82 The Court itself eventually acknowledged that the structural factor 
“favors an independent state interpretation in every Gunwall analysis”83 simply because the 
structural difference is constant and thus a broader restriction can be justified because of the 
greater degree of state power. Given this it is unsurprising that claimants did not stress more than 
a simple assertion. Similarly, the most common argument in the state or local interest category 
tended to simply note that whatever aspect of law is a matter of state law and thus should be 
judged by local and not national standards. A few of these arguments did note that the U.S. 
Supreme Court specifically relies upon the difficulty of fashioning rules for a large diverse 
country as reason for limiting constitutional protections: “Federal courts must remain responsive 
to concerns of federalism and local autonomy and, ultimately, the need to formulate standards of 
conduct that may be enforced nationwide” and that the state high court is in a better position to 
consider local needs.84 An interesting example of local interest is a garbage search case where 
                                                
82 Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d at 66-67.  
83 State v. Russell, 125 Wash.2d 24, 61 (1994).  
84 State v. Williams, 142 Wash.2d 17 (2000), Respondent’s brief at 21.  
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the claimant discussed the recent public outcry concerning individuals who illegally stole the 
garbage of Seattle’s mayor.85 While these two factors received little development, the remaining 
factors did show some greater degree of development and substance. 
Textual difference arguments were relatively common. Many of these involved search 
claims that understandably relied upon the extensive set of search precedents for discussion of 
the textual differences. A number of others noted significant differences in regards to the equal 
protection, bail, and self-incrimination provisions. In a challenge to the use of closed circuit 
television for child witnesses the claimant stressed how the state provision explicitly guarantees 
the right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face”86 but went further to note the 
significant differences in many of the other criminal procedure rights. The absence of textual 
differences, however, did not stop some claimants. While admitting that there were no relevant 
textual differences, three claimants expressly cited Utter (1984) for the argument that textual 
differences are not a requirement for a different state constitutional rule; one going so far as to 
argue that “[e]ven identically-worded provisions should be interpreted independently unless a 
very good historical justification for assuming that the framers intended an identical meaning can 
be found.”87 
Constitutional history was the least frequently argued, but only marginally so. This is 
perhaps understandable given the difficulty in primary source research where case law is sparse. 
As with most factors, search cases saw a large amount of history discussion because Gunwall 
and its progeny laid a foundation that was easy to draw upon. A few claimants did a thorough job 
                                                
85 State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571 (1990), Respondent’s brief at 21.  
86 Wash. Const. Art. I, Sec. 22. State v. Foster, 135 Wash.2d 441 (1998), Appellant’s brief.  
87 State v. Hanna, 123 Wash.2d 704 (1994), Appellant’s brief at 31; State v. Strauss, 119 
Wash.2d 401 (1992), Appellant’s brief; State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244 (1996), Appellant’s 
brief.  
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of digging up obscure history even going so far as to note the territorial laws that existed in 
regards to bail that colored the Washington convention’s debates.88 Similarly in the equal 
protection context, even before Justice Utter’s concurring opinion discussed above, one claimant 
stressed the intentional adoption of the Oregon language out of an “egalitarian concern” not met 
by the application of the federal provision.89 Another claimant linked the history and text issues 
arguing that it “must be presumed that the makers of the state constitution knew the language of 
the United States Constitution and with that knowledge deliberately made the state constitutional 
provision more detailed” and protective of individual rights.90 In a few cases, the claimant 
explicitly admitted that the state convention had failed to debate the issue as a means of at least 
showing an attempt to comply with the Gunwall briefing requirement.91 While a third of 
arguments briefing this issue may seem small, it is significantly higher than other states. For 
example, in New York only about 3% of arguments discussed any state constitutional history.  
The high percentage of arguments citing some form of Washington law on point is 
unsurprising. Judicial precedent is the natural source for constitutional claims and as the 
Washington Supreme Court engaged with state constitutional law it built a set of state based 
precedents for lawyers to utilize. Search and speech related issues naturally had a fair amount of 
state precedent to work with. Other cases stressed common and statutory law related to the issue 
as a means of showing a basis for a different constitutional standard. Still others sought to take a 
prior Washington decision based on federal law and maintain its result and logic under the state 
                                                
88 Westerman v. Cary, 125 Wash.2d 277 (1994), Appellant’s brief at 17.  
89 Ford Motor Co., 115 Wash.2d 556 (1990), Petition/Appellant’s brief at 33.  
90 Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. State, 142 Wash.2d 347 (2000), 
Appellant’s brief at 17.  
91 Strauss, 119 Wash.2d 401 (1992), Appellant’s brief; Hanna, 123 Wash.2d 704 (1994), 
Appellant’s brief; State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244 (1996), Appellant’s brief.  
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provision. For example two claimants92 sought to maintain a 1983 decision holding that 
negligent destruction of evidence was a due process violate after the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that only bad faith destruction of evidence is a constitutional violation,93 arguing that the prior 
logic was fundamentally correct and should be maintained. At least one claimant sought to place 
responsibility for the lack of precedent on the Court itself: “the court may wish to consider 
whether, in light of the actual history of state constitutional adjudication, these two factors tend 
to preclude any finding that the state constitution provides greater protection to individual 
liberties” because it wasn’t until 198394 that lawyers became generally aware of state 
constitutions and “[c]onsequently, the case law demanded by Gunwall … just does not exist, in 
most cases, for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the state constitutional 
claim.”95 Aside from this, most claimants had little difficulty composing some kind of state law 
argument. 
Perhaps a greater measure of Gunwall’s effect is the reduction in the number of policy 
attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court. As discussed in other chapters, a common element of state 
constitutional arguments has been for the claimant to “merely argue that the Supreme Court 
majority ‘got it wrong,’ the dissent ‘got it right,’ and therefore, [state] courts should follow the 
                                                
92 Hanna, 123 Wash.2d 704 (1994), Appellant’s brief; State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244 
(1996), Appellant’s brief. 
93 State v. Vaster, 99 Wash.2d 44 (1983); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988). In State v. 
Ortiz, 119 Wash.2d 294 (1992) the Court split evenly over whether to reject Youngblood with the 
deciding vote refusing to decide and ultimately the claim was rejected in State v. Wittenbarger, 
124 Wash.2d 467 (1994).  
94 This refers to Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) where the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that only state decisions that included a plain statement that it was based solely on state law 
would be protected from federal review under the independent and adequate state grounds 
doctrine. 
95 State v. Manussier, 129 Wash.2d 652 (1996), Appellant’s brief at 22-23, n.4.  
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dissent rather than the Supreme Court majority on this constitutional issue.”96 Few of these 
attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court were present in post-Gunwall arguments. And even where 
they are used, they typically come after the discussion of legal factors. For example, in one of the 
evidence destruction cases, the claimant develops a full Gunwall analysis before closing by 
noting that the federal rule would be impossible for a defendant to win under and this would 
necessarily remove any incentive for the state to adequately preserve evidence.97 A search case 
offered a minimal Gunwall brief but stressed a dissenting opinion from the U.S. Supreme Court 
as the primary aspect of the argument.98  
This evidence suggests that the Washington Supreme Court’s effort in Gunwall was 
successful to a degree. Even though most state constitutional arguments did not comply with 
Gunwall, claimants moved away from simply attacking the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions and, 
instead, they demonstrated a greater degree of interest in the legal criteria. While it may not have 
greatly increased the number of state constitutional arguments offered, Gunwall did help to 
correct the weak briefing the Court sought to eliminate.  
 
Conclusion 
Unlike the Ohio Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court was open to the 
possibility of judicial federalism. And unlike the New York Court of Appeals, it took the extra 
step in providing broad guidance in how it expected constitutional rights cases to be presented 
and argued. The strong criteria rule, reiterated over time, ensured a greater complexity of legal 
arguments and, even where compliance was imperfect, ended the practice of state arguments as 
                                                
96 Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.3d 258, 267 (Tex. Crim. App., 2002).  
97 Hanna, 123 Wash.2d 704 (1994), Appellant’s brief at 34.  
98 Kandoranian by Peach v. Bellingham Police Dept., 119 Wash.2d 178 (1992), Appellant’s 
brief.  
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nothing more than bald evasion of the U.S. Supreme Court. Claimants abandoned the kinds of 
policy attacks on federal legal doctrine in favor of more independent attention to the legal 
factors. This greater attention to legal arguments to support their state claims may be one reason 
why Spitzer (2006) found that the Washington Court eventually stopped using Gunwall as a gate 
keeping mechanism and, in the early 2000s, began to more consistently use it to build an 
independent set of state law. The criteria approach, however, is still a supplemental approach. It 
treats federal law as the norm with state law only applying where federal law fails to resolve the 
issue (Williams 1997). In contrast, the primacy approach asserts that state constitutional 
arguments should be the primary claims in all rights disputes and the next chapter examines the 
primacy experience in Oregon.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Oregon: The Normalization of State Constitutional 
Law  
 
 
 
 In Oregon we see the effect of a strong endorsement of primacy from a Court lead by the 
leading state constitutional law theorist. Unlike the Washington Supreme Court, the Oregon 
Supreme Court had no particular qualm against building the initial state precedent without 
significant input from its lawyers. The Court built an early set of state constitutional precedents 
while instructing the bar that state claims should be the primary means of protecting individual 
rights. This lead to a normalization of state constitutional law with the subject treated as 
essentially identical to any other legal claim. As the body of state law accumulated, lawyers 
demonstrated little discomfort with the subject and deployed state claims in a variety of areas, 
some where federal retrenchment was significant and others where it was not, and did so with 
little attention to or concern with federal developments. While it may be true that primacy was 
not perfectly realized in all areas, it is clear that state constitutional law received the most 
consistent and thorough examination in Oregon of any of the states included in this study.  
 
The adoption of primacy  
The experience of state constitutional law in Oregon is wrapped up heavily in the 
leadership of Justice Hans Linde. Linde has been described as the “godfather of state 
constitutional law” (Toobin 1985: 11). One prominent legal scholar stated, "along with Benjamin 
Nathan Cardozo and Roger Traynor, [Linde] is easily one of the three most important state court 
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judges in this century" (Levinson 1992: 746). While most academics and judges became interested 
in state constitutional law primarily as a reaction to the retrenchment of federal protections 
(Brennan 1977; Maltz 1988), Linde’s interest pre-dated that shift and rested on a sincere 
appreciation of state constitutions as documents of truly independent force deserving of 
attention without regard for federal law. Over time his early academic theories came to dominate 
his court and in turn drew lawyers into the debate.  
In 1970, Linde, then a professor at the University of Oregon School of Law, published an 
early call for the primacy of state constitutions. Bothered by the Oregon Supreme Court’s trend 
of treating state law in lockstep with federal jurisprudence, Linde argues that the Court’s 
approach was backwards because the “logic of constitutional law demands that nonconstitutional 
issues be disposed of first, state constitutional issues second, and federal constitutional issues 
last" (Linde 1970b: 182). This is required because federal jurisdiction depends upon the state 
depriving a person of some interest and, given that courts are a constitutive element of the state, a 
state court decision that some action violated state law eliminates the need for federal review: 
“By the action of the state court under the state constitution, the state has accorded the claimant 
the due process and equal protection commanded by the fourteenth amendment, not denied it" 
(Linde 1970b: 133). Thus, state and federal constitutional claims “are not cumulative but 
alternative” and “[c]laims raised under the state constitution should always be dealt with and 
disposed of before reaching a Fourteenth Amendment claim of deprivation of due process or 
equal protection” (Linde 1970b: 134, 135). Primacy “obliges counsel and court to give 
independent professional attention to the text, history, and function of state constitutional 
provisions" rather than simply borrow concepts and doctrines wholesale from federal doctrine 
 130 
(Linde 1970b: 182). Linde continued to advocate this position while on the bench (Linde 1980, 
1984, 1991).  
Linde brought his primacy approach to the bench when he was appointed in 1977. In 
State v. Flores (1977), Linde had his first opportunity to attempt a change in the Court’s 
approach. The case concerned consent to search and whether police are required give notification 
of the right to refuse consent. The majority relied upon Fourth Amendment law to reject the 
claim and noted that while “we are at liberty to adopt a stricter test under our own constitution 
… we see no persuasive reason to do so.”1 The Court noted a history of treating the search 
provisions as identical and that there was no reason to alter this relationship. In dissent, Linde 
commended the majority on its willingness to even mention, however briefly, the state provision, 
but criticized it for asking the wrong question: “The question is not whether article I, section 9 
was meant to embody the same principle as the federal fourth amendment … Of course it was. It 
may equally be pointed out that the fourth amendment meant to embody that principle from the 
state constitutions that preceded the federal Bill of Rights.” Instead the question is “what 
safeguards this principle … extends to the people of Oregon. That question … cannot be 
answered by the Supreme Court of the United States but only by this court.”2  
Even where he achieved some measure of victory in this debate, Linde faced strong 
criticism from a court divided over the legitimacy of judicial federalism. In another 1977 case, 
Linde wrote for the Court holding that a person accused of minor traffic offenses is entitled to 
                                                
1 State v. Flores, 280 Or. 273, 279 (1977).  
2 Flores, 280 Or. at 284, 285 (Linde, J., dissenting).  
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legal representation.3 Linde focused on the state provisions with only scant attention to federal 
law, eliciting a concurring opinon complaining of reliance on the state constitution because “[i]n 
my opinion the same result is required by [the federal Constitution] and is not foreclosed by 
decisions of the Supreme court of the United States, as I read those decisions.”4 In another 1977 
case, a dissent criticized Linde’s emphasis on state law by relying on stare decisis, pointing out 
that as recently as 1976 the Court had treated parallel state and federal provisions as identical 
“[i]n the absence of some important policy reason for giving a broader interpretation” to the 
Oregon Constitution.5 
Slowly, however, Linde’s views took control of his court. This change was helped by the 
retirement of some critics, such as Justice Howell in 1980, as well as his success at convincing 
colleagues as to the propriety of his views (McIntosh and Cates 1997: Ch. 4). In 1981, Linde 
succeeded in writing primacy into Oregon Law: “The proper sequence is to analyze the state’s 
law, including its constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is 
required not for the sake either of parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny 
any right claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully 
met by state law.”6 Linde solidified the primacy approach in State v. Kennedy (1983). He used 
“Kennedy’s meandering procedural history” to finally convince his Court of the propriety of his 
approach (McIntosh and Cates 1997: 72). The meandering history began when the Oregon Court 
of Appeals issued a cryptic opinion that failed to clearly express the legal basis and, after the 
                                                
3 Brown v. Multnomah County Dist. Court, 280 Or. 95 (1977).  
4 Brown, 280 Or. at 111 (Tongue, J., specially concurring).  
5 State ex rel. Johnson v. Woodrich, 279 Or. 31, 42 n.1 (Howell, J., dissenting).  
6 Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 614 (1981).  
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Oregon Supreme Court denied review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. After the Court of 
Appeals reversed its earlier decision, the Oregon Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Linde 
argued that the “history of this case demonstrates the practical importance of the rule … that all 
questions of state law be considered and disposed of before reaching a claim that this state’s law 
falls short of a standard imposed by the federal constitution on all states.”7 By simply forgoing 
consideration of decisive Oregon state law, the Court of Appeals caused a waste of time and 
“needlessly spur[ed] pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court on constitutional 
issues of national importance in a case to whose decision these may be irrelevant.”8 Had the 
Court of Appeals followed the correct approach of treating state law first, the criminal 
defendant’s claim would have been easily dismissed and saved the time and expense of an 
irrelevant judgment from the U.S. Supreme Court. In Kennedy, Linde spoke for a unanimous 
majority apparently convinced of the logical and practical value of primacy in constitutional 
rights disputes. 
Other members of the Oregon Supreme Court became enthusiastic advocates of primacy. 
Justice Wallace Carson (1983) wrote an article, based on a speech to the Oregon Criminal 
Defense Lawyers Association, extolling the virtues of primacy and instructing lawyers in how 
they should approach the subject of constitutional rights arguments. Justice Robert Jones echoed 
a similar view with a more strict warning to lawyers: “Any defense lawyer who fails to raise an 
Oregon Constitution violation and relies solely on parallel provisions under the federal 
                                                
7 State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262 (1983).  
8 Kennedy, 295 Or. at 264-265.  
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constitution, except to exert federal limitations, should be guilty of malpractice.”9 Even critics of 
early primacy seemed to shift their positions. In 1986, Justice W. Michael Gillette was elevated 
from the Court of Appeals. While on the Court of Appeals, Gillette had issued biting criticism of 
the primacy movement and especially how it left the lower courts to build precedent completely 
anew,10 but as a justice he adopted the primacy view of the Oregon Constitution even though he 
disputed the substantive meaning at times. For example, in State v. Owens (1986) the Court was 
deeply fractured over how far a state search precedent went in limiting police action. Even though 
Linde was in dissent on the substantive issue of the case, one commentator (and former Linde law 
clerk) argues that Owens was a Linde victory because “the opinions in the case are purely Oregon 
Constitutional law” (Schuman 1996: 1742). Justice Gillete’s concurrence suggests he agreed with 
this assessment: “I should like to think that the Oregon Constitutional Revolution has been 
accomplished. The primacy of our state's constitution, so long neglected, is now accepted by all. 
It remains to go forward on a new road, a road which will—like most roads under construction—
involve an occasional detour.”11 The disagreement shifted from whether the state constitution 
deserved independent interpretation to how such interpretation should proceed.  
Unlike the Washington Supreme Court, the Oregon Court showed relatively little concern 
for the form of arguments. It did not issue broad guidance beyond statements to look at the 
state’s text, history, and precedent. The Court continued an earlier policy of accepting claims of 
unconstitutional invasion of rights when first made on appeal.12 In Sterling v. Cupp (1981), the 
Court noted that it still discouraged generalized constitutional attacks with only string cites to 
                                                
9 State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 365 (1983) (Jones, J., specially concurring).  
10 State v. Flores, 68 Or. App. 617, 626 (1984).  
11 State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 208 (1986) (Gillette, J., concurring).  
12 See State v. O’Neill, 274 Or. 59 (1976).  
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constitutional provisions, but adopted a deferential standard: “plaintiffs did at least cite relevant 
sections of the Oregon Constitution to the trial court, although they developed their argument 
under [the state provision] only in response to this court’s inquiry, perhaps because counsel 
commonly tend to search for sources in case law.”13 Thus poor briefing is more indicative of the 
weak jurisprudence the Court has given so far and less a criticism of the lawyers. In her memoir, 
Justice Betty Roberts admitted that Linde “convinced me that we should rely on Article I Section 
20 of the Oregon Constitution" in a major gender rights case rather than the claimant’s brief 
(Roberts 2008: 241). As discussed further below, these early foundational primacy cases saw 
little input or help from the legal briefs, instead it seems that Linde, who tended to take these 
major primacy cases himself, took it upon himself to develop the jurisprudence for lawyers to 
rely upon.  
This revolution in Oregon constitutional law was not hidden away solely in the 
courtroom either. Instead, the public became increasingly aware of these constitutional debates 
and active participants in them. Oregon was a pioneering state for direct democracy, especially 
the initiative constitutional amendment, and since 1970 has seen the second highest number of 
initiatives only behind California (Miller 2009: 52; see also Ellis 2002). When the Court 
unanimously invalidated the state’s death penalty statute on jury rights grounds,14 the people 
amended the Constitution to exempt the death penalty from certain state constitutional 
provisions.15 Similarly, after the Court declared obscenity to be constitutionally protected speech 
                                                
13 Sterling, 290 Or. at 614, n.1. In State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225 (1980), the Court actually sua 
sponte altered the terms of the case from First Amendment to Section 8 free speech rights and 
openly admitted doing so.  
14 State v. Quinn, 290 Or. 383 (1981).  
15 Oregon Const. Art. I, Sec. 40: “Notwithstanding sections 15 and 16 of this Article, the penalty 
for aggravated murder as defined by law shall be death upon unanimous affirmative jury findings 
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in Oregon, two attempts were made to override this decision, though both failed.16 Most dramatic 
for my purposes, however, was Measure 40, which passed by 58.9% of the vote in 1996. 
Measure 40, sold as a victim rights bill, aimed to significantly alter the criminal justice system 
and struck directly at the independent criminal rights that Linde established by creating a forced-
linkage to the U.S. Constitution, providing that the state provisions on search and seizure, double 
jeopardy, and self-incrimination “shall not be construed more broadly than the United States 
Constitution.”17 After the Oregon Supreme Court struck this amendment down on the grounds 
that it violated the constitutional requirement that constitutional amendments be voted on 
separately, the legislative backers broke Measure 40 into seven different amendments and sent 
them to the voters, three of which were rejected (Ellis 2002: 146). Interestingly, the forced 
linkage provision was dropped and replaced with a simple declaration that “[n]othing in this 
section reduces a criminal defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United States.”18 
Additionally, Linde’s advocacy led to a strong challenge in his 1984 reelection campaign after he 
ran unopposed in 1978. A young, conservative prosecutor attacked Linde for his views about 
judicial federalism, complaining that “[t]he keystone of his judicial career has been his tinkering 
with the Oregon Constitution by inventing previously unknown rights for criminal defendants. 
Searches that are absolutely legal under our federal bill of rights now run afoul of mysterious new 
rules created by Linde" (Collins 1991: 760). Linde ultimately prevailed—though this may be one 
reason why he choose to retire in 1990 rather than seek another tough reelection—but the 
                                                                                                                                                       
as provided by law and otherwise shall be life imprisonment with minimum sentence as provided 
by law.” 
16 State v. Henry, 302 Or. 510 (1987). The National Conference of State Legislatures Ballot 
Measures Database (http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-elections/elections/ballot-measures-
database.aspx) reports that Measure 20 in 1994 received 45.7% of the vote and Measure 31 in 
1996 received 47.2%.  
17 As quoted in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 293 (1998).  
18 Oregon Const., Art. I, Sec. 42(2).  
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challenge demonstrated the degree to which the Oregon Court’s experience with state 
constitutional law was known and discussed. Both legal elites and the broader public were aware 
of, and debated the merits of the Oregon primacy revolution.  
Linde established the primacy model and lead his Court in adopting it more fully than 
any other. However, as I discuss below, the Court achieved this change with little initial 
assistance from its lawyers. Linde and his closest allies were willing to carry the workload in 
some cases to help break with the established federally dominated model of constitutional law. 
As this law became established, state constitutional law became normalized to a significant 
degree. The arguments from claimants over time came to rely upon state constitutional decisions 
without any evidence of discomfort with this new area of law. They treated state constitutional 
law as simply another standard set of legal arguments to a greater extent than any of the other 
states included in this study  
 
Aggregate trends 
 
Figure 7.1. Percentage of arguments by year, Oregon 1970-2000. N=362.  
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I analyzed a total of 362 arguments with 57% being federally based and 43% state based. 
Figure 7.1 shows the trends over time. With the exception of 1970 and ’72, which are skewed by 
the small number of arguments heard, the pre-Linde years look similar to the experience in other 
states. Constitutional rights arguments tended to focus on federal law. However, with Linde’s 
battle to change the Court’s orientation towards state constitutional law, the arguments begin to 
shift towards greater reliance on state arguments. After 1984, there is a surprising degree of 
parity with arguments hovering around an equal percentage of federal and state claims. This 
early, consistent trend clearly defies the experience seen in Ohio, New York, and Washington. It 
is unclear whether the dip in state arguments in 2000 is the start of a trend or the effect of death 
penalty litigation discussed below. Figure 7.2 shows the variations in issue areas. As with most 
states, criminal procedure rights see a great deal of interest but at quite high levels, especially 
search and seizure where the arguments are equally split, but there is significant state attention to 
each of the areas. As with most states there are few cases dealing with religious freedom or 
establishment, and takings claims were fairly rare. But both free speech and equal protection saw 
dramatic attention to state constitutional law, attention that has little to do with federal 
retrenchment and was driven by the development of separate state constitutional doctrines.  
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Figure 7.2. Percentage of arguments by rights area, Oregon 1970-2000. N=362.  
 
The pre-Linde years 
Of the 52 arguments from 1970-78,19 only 8 (15%) were state based. Apart from two 
equal protection cases coded as state based because of my generous coding rules rather than a 
clear expression, these early arguments appear relatively similar to the experience in other states. 
The state arguments come in areas of either clear federal retrenchment or at least uncertain 
federal law, with perhaps one exception.  
As with most states, school funding provides a particularly clear example of federal 
retrenchment. In Olsen v. State (1976)20 education reformers presented a state constitutional 
challenge broadly similar in structure to the Washington reformers discussed in chapter 6. The 
claimants stressed the federal test as laid out in Rodriquez and noted that the Oregon Supreme 
Court had long held the state privileges and immunities clause to be “functionally equivalent” to 
                                                
19 While Linde joined the Court in 1977, I include 1978 as a prior year because of the 
complications of Oregon briefing described in Chapter 2.  
20 276 Or. 9.  
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federal equal protection; however, the claimants did note Linde’s (1970b) criticism of this 
practice and argument that the state provision more clearly singled out special advantages with 
the claimants noting that skewed funding amounts to just such a special advantage for privileged 
students.21 The claimants also noted California’s similar experience of applying parallel 
constructions of the state and federal provisions but ultimately rejecting Rodriquez. The 
claimants in Olsen argued for a similar path: continue to apply the federal tiers of scrutiny test 
under state law, but reject the specific holding of Rodriquez because the state constitution 
explicitly provides a right to education. As with the claimants in Washington, here they quoted 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s declaration in Rodriquez that even the state conceded the education 
funding system could not survive if strict scrutiny was applied. While the Court ultimately 
rejected this argument, a claimant in 1978 unsuccessfully attempted to argue that Olsen did apply 
a more biting balancing test and that this should invalidate a limitation on mobile homes as 
wealth discrimination.22 
Free speech rights on public property demonstrate a similar trend of federal retrenchment 
affecting state constitutional claims. In Lenrich Associates v. Heyda (1972),23 the claimants were 
members of a religious group who distributed magazines and chanted in a private shopping mall. 
The trial court denied an injunction sought by the mall owners, holding that private shopping 
malls are quasi-public spaces and the religious group has the First Amendment right to express 
themselves. While the case was on appeal, however, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a nearly 
identical decision from Oregon holding that the First Amendment does not require access to 
                                                
21 Olsen, 276 Or. 9, Appellants’ brief at 33.  
22 Clackamas County v. Dunham, 282 Or. 419 (1978).  
23 264 Or. 122.  
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private shopping malls.24 The initial section of the claimants argument, apparently in response to 
the mall owner’s claim, sought to convince the Court that it was not bound to follow this 
decision pointing to instances of judicial federalism, most of which where fairly anemic 
examples, and stressing Linde’s (1970b) push for the primacy of state rights and ending the 
automatic deference to the U.S. Supreme Court. The bulk of the argument though was aimed at 
discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence prior to Tanner, arguing that the “Tanner 
majority ignores the reasoning of its earlier decisions” that should be ignored because Tanner 
was “a retreat from a long line of cases which have expanded the scope of free speech in an 
effort to maintain its viability in an ever growing and increasingly suburbanized society.”25 As 
the federal dissenters demonstrated, the U.S. Supreme Court’s new direction ignored the 
changing social realities that make a private shopping mall akin to a modern day open town 
square. While the Court rejected this argument, it did note that it had the power to issue a more 
protective rule and a claimant in a libel case in 1974 used this brief assertion as a short tacked on 
point that the state provision could be the basis for reversing a libel judgment as well.26 While 
the state claim was poorly developed and amounted to little more than an assertion, it is an 
outlier to a degree given the relatively stable federal libel protections and the refusal of the 
Oregon Court to issue a more protective state doctrine.  
The final significant issue unexpectedly involved double jeopardy. In State v. Fair (1972) 
the claimant noted that the federal definition of jeopardy was in flux and primarily relied upon 
federal law, arguing that “[w]hile it is true that the United States Supreme Court has as yet not 
adopted the ‘same transaction’ test to determine when jeopardy rears its head, defendant submits 
                                                
24 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).  
25 Lenrich Associates, 264 Or. 122, Respondents brief at 23, 25.  
26 Post v. Oregonian Publishing Company, 268 Or. 214 (1974).  
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the trend is in that direction.”27 But the claimant added that if this trend is not sufficient, the 
Oregon Court should reject the older “same proof” test under the state constitution as bad legal 
policy, noting a few other states that recently made this change. In a related case the same year, 
the Oregon Supreme Court adopted this argument—despite the fact that the claimant in that case 
did not argue a state violation—holding that the stronger test is required under the state 
constitution regardless of the ultimate resolution of the federal test.28 A claimant in 1974 relied 
upon this higher bar when arguing that his plea to reckless driving forbade the state from trying 
him for manslaughter arising out of the same event.29 This early set of cases is the reason that 
double jeopardy claims are dominated by state arguments, as shown in Figure 7.2.  
The pre-Linde years show a now common theme. Federal arguments dominate rights 
issues. Where the federal law is uncertain or unproductive, state claims start to pop up but are 
relatively underdeveloped. These state arguments tended to focus on importing federal doctrines 
and criticizing the policy rationale underlying changers thereto.  
 
The transition years, 1980-84 
As discussed above, Linde spent his first years on the Court trying to convince his 
colleagues to change their mindset regarding the relationship of federal and state constitutional 
law. As Linde gradually succeeded in selling his ideas to his Court (McIntosh and Cates 1997), 
lawyers should have started to respond by offering an increasing number of state constitutional 
arguments both in response to continued federal retrenchment but also to the increased 
development of Oregon constitutional law. From 1980-84, 23 (37%) of the 63 arguments were 
                                                
27 State v. Fair, 263 Or. 383 (1972), Appellant’s brief at 22.  
28 State v. Brown, 262 Or. 442 (1972).  
29 State v. Leverich, 269 Or. 45.  
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state based, clearly a significant increase from the 1970s. However, this period still looks broadly 
similar to prior years with federal retrenchment driving state arguments.  
A significant example of federal retrenchment came in another somewhat frequent area 
for judicial federalism: abortion funding. A state agency promulgated a rule limiting the use of 
state funds for abortions and claimants attacked the rule on privacy,30 equal protection, and 
religious freedom grounds.31 Despite the Oregon Supreme Court’s earlier expression of 
discomfort with the idea of a state based right to privacy,32 the claimants dug up some interesting 
history of the natural rights debate in Indiana (the state Oregon borrowed much of its 
constitutional language from) as a way to incorporate privacy into some of the more vague 
provisions of the Oregon bill of rights. Then, claimants turned to lengthy discussion of decisions 
from California and Massachusetts rejecting similar restrictions on abortion funding, describing 
these courts as “follow[ing] the rational of Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade” rather than 
the newer, narrower constructions of reproductive privacy.33 A similar argument was made 
regarding equal protection, noting that both state courts had looked at this restriction harshly as 
both an act of gender and wealth discrimination. Similarly, after the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the Sixth Amendment provides a public trial right only to the accused and not the media,34 
                                                
30 Admittedly, this argument runs on the edge of my rule limiting consideration to issues with 
parallel state and federal provisions because, as discussed in Chapter 2, Oregon does not have a 
due process clause. I decided to still include this privacy argument because of the attempt to 
justify a penumbral right to privacy similar to the early federal expression.  
31 Planned Parenthood Ass’n, Inc. v. Dept. of Human Resources of the State of Oregon, 297 Or. 
562 (1984).  
32 Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611 (1981).  
33 Planned Parenthood, 297 Or. 562, Petitioners’ brief at 19.  
34 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).  
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press claimants argued that the state constitution’s strong language favoring open courts required 
the Court to ignore the federal restrictions.35 Other areas see a more mixed set of signals.  
Free speech law is an interesting example of high state constitutional activity in Oregon, 
as seen in Figure 7.2, and that trend began in this transition period. One rather clear example of 
federal retrenchment is a commercial speech argument asserting that the Oregon Bar’s rejection 
of trade names was unconstitutional.36 While it is true that the U.S. Supreme Court had recently 
begun expanding protections for commercial speech, it had explicitly rejected this exact 
argument.37 The claimant noted the absolutist language of the state speech provision38 arguing 
that there is no basis for treating commercial speech to a less protective standard, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court did, “because the Oregon Constitution does not distinguish between commercial 
and non-commercial speech.”39 The claimant then turned to the policy of the federal decision, 
noting that trade names pose no harm to the public and in fact help build a trusted brand for 
public consumption; abuse may occur but “[a]ny advertising is subject to abuse but the 
preferable solution is a fuller disclosure and not a banning of the statement,” citing heavily to the 
federal dissenting opinion’s logic to support this point.40 While the Court avoided this issue by 
resolving the claim on statutory grounds, a more significant trend involved the relationship of 
speech and criminal law.  
                                                
35 State ex rel. Oregonian Pub. Co. v. Deiz, 289 Or. 277 (1980). After this claim was successful, 
a later criminal defendant used it to supplement his public trial argument, State v. Blake, 292 Or. 
486.  
36 In re Conduct of Shannon, 292 Or. 339 (1982).  
37 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).  
38 Oregon Const. Art. I, Sec. 8: “No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of 
opinion, or restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but every 
person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.” 
39 Shannon, 292 Or. 339, Accused’s brief at 22.  
40 Shannon, 292 Or. 339, Accused’s brief at 23.  
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Where speech acts were criminalized, there is some influence from doctrinal shifts from 
the Oregon Court. In State v. Spencer (1980), the Court invalidated a disorderly conduct statute 
for criminalizing too much speech. Interestingly, the Court openly admitted that the parties 
argued the case as a First Amendment issue, but sua sponte decided to reach a state 
constitutional resolution itself.41 In State v. Huie (1982), the claimant utilized this precedent in 
arguing that the state’s solicitation statute was unconstitutional because it criminalized the actual 
speech of soliciting a prostitute without any requirement of intent (an argument the Court easily 
dismissed). In State v. Robertson (1982),42 however, the Court again reiterated this rule when it 
invalidated a coercion statute as vague and overbroad because it criminalized a wide degree of 
pure speech without a requirement that it be connected to any actually illegal conduct. Similar to 
Spencer, the Court reached this decision with minimal assistance from the claimant’s argument, 
which simply presented a single citation to an Oregon decision holding that libel damages cannot 
be used to punish the speaker.43 After this effort from the Court, claimants began to more clearly 
develop their state speech attacks on criminal statutes. For example, a 1984 claimant attacked the 
state’s menacing statute utilizing Robertson’s logic and expressed disdain at the state’s argument 
for relying on federal decisions to defend the law rather than the state doctrine.44 This line of 
cases became a significant source of state constitutional activism.  
 
The normalization of state constitutional law, 1986-2000 
                                                
41 State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 228 (1980). Unfortunately, no records from this case were 
available.  
42 293 Or. 402.  
43 Wheller v. Green, 286 Or. 99 (1979) (compensatory damages for libel are constitutional, but 
punitive are not).  
44 State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688 (1984), Defendants-Respondents brief.  
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With the establishment of primacy, state constitutional law in Oregon became normalized 
to a significant extent. Lawyers turned to state constitutional law in a wide variety of cases—
from 1986-2000, 125 (51%) of 247 total arguments were based on state law—and demonstrated 
little discomfort with this new branch of law. As Figure 7.3 shows, there was minimal attention 
to nearly all of the legal factors that many commentators and other courts saw as the legitimate 
means of making state constitutional arguments. But this finding does not mean that Oregon 
lawyers offered weak arguments. On the contrary, they argued state cases in generally the same 
way they would argue any other case: by parsing the deepening body of state law with less 
attention to issues of text or history. Lawyers arguing fairly standard issues, say a Fourth 
Amendment probable cause claim, rarely have a need to dig into the founding era history or 
carry out primary historical research because they were trained to argue the issues from case law 
and the case law is generally sufficient. Ultimately, that is what occurred in Oregon. The Court 
rapidly built a wide set of state constitutional doctrines and lawyers adapted rather quickly. 
Federal rights arguments remained important issues, but in a wide set of cases they became 
supplementary to, or replaced with, alternative state arguments. The issue areas varied from areas 
of relatively clear federal retrenchment to areas where federal law was relatively stable or even 
expanding.   
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Figure 7.3. Percentage of state arguments citing each factor, Oregon 1970-2000. N=156.  
Search and seizure   
As Figure 7.2 demonstrates, search and seizure issues were the single most common area 
of constitutional rights disputes in Oregon. From 1986-2000, 43 (72%) of 60 search and seizure 
claims were state based. While some claimants continued to push federal issues, and a small 
number only presented federal issues, state search claims dominated. As the Court built an 
extended set of search precedents, lawyers argued the issues as they would any “normal” Fourth 
Amendment claim, with extensive reference to that developing state doctrine. Claimants gave 
little serious attention to any changes in federal law.  
As with other prominent state doctrines, the Oregon Court drove the development of state 
search law initially with little assistance from lawyers. While the claimant did not press a clear 
state argument in State v. Caraher (1982),45 some notice of the Linde push for primacy was 
made. The Court argued that its history of linking state and federal search provisions to simplify 
the law had failed; instead, the “goal of simplification is, in our view, better served by relying on 
                                                
45 293 Or. 741.  
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article I, section 9 … to formulate an independent rule consistent with our past decisions than by 
hypothesizing how the U.S. Supreme Court would consider this case.”46 The Court held that 
searches incident to an arrest were allowed for office safety and to seize evidence relevant to the 
crime “so long as it is reasonable in light of all the facts.”47 In State v. Lowry (1983) the Court 
expanded upon this test holding that police are allowed to seize materials that are apparently 
contraband for a short time to obtain a warrant for testing but that testing without the warrant 
extends beyond the search incident to arrest exception.48 From these foundational cases, the 
Court built an extensive set of state search precedents for lawyers to utilize. 
This distinctive approach begins at the very purpose of the exclusionary rule and who has 
standing to challenge a search. The Court held that “[u]nlike the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule, which has been predicated in recent years on deterrence of police misconduct 
… the exclusionary rule of Section 9 is predicated on the personal right of a criminal defendant 
to be free from an ‘unreasonable search, or seizure.’”49 Thus, exclusion of evidence is the proper 
remedy regardless of whether it would deter police misconduct, the right is personal and 
invasions always require remedy. In terms of whom may challenge a search, the Court held that a 
“criminal defendant always has standing to challenge the admission of evidence introduced by 
the state” and what matters is his rights in an item regardless of where it is located.50 In State v. 
Turner, the Court applied these rules to exclude evidence found during an admittedly illegal 
search of a third-party pawnshop even though the items seized were stolen. A person still had a 
right against the illegal seizure of effects that he used as collateral even if he had no legal right to 
                                                
46 Caraher, 293 Or. at 750.  
47 Caraher, 293 Or. at 759.  
48 State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337 (1983). This decision was overruled by State v. Owens, 302 Or. 
196 (1986) discussed above.  
49 State v. Turner, 304 Or. 312, 315 (1987).  
50 Tanner, 304 Or. at 316.  
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those effects. A number of claimants utilized these broad rules of standing and exclusion without 
any apparent concern with shifting federal law. In a case on a search of an open field, a third 
party non-owner asserted the right to challenge the fruits of a search because his work on the 
area gave him privacy interests that were violated and while the claimant made some reference to 
federal law, he was careful to clarify it was used solely for persuasive effect and that the only 
issue was application of Turner and other state search law.51 Generally standing issues after 1990 
did not refer to federal law to any significant degree and simply sought to apply Turner and its 
progeny to various facts such as a passenger in a car, a driver of mother’s car, and a person 
holding a container.52 In one case there was a lengthy federal argument in addition to the state 
claim but this was caused by a complicated fact pattern. In State v. Davis (1992),53 the claimant 
was arrested in Mississippi by local police on a fugitive warrant for crimes in Oregon; the local 
police entered his mother’s home without a search warrant and claimant claimed in both state 
and federal arguments that this entry was illegitimate and thus evidence seized must be excluded. 
The state argument is a fairly simply application of Turner that as a house guest he has a privacy 
interest against invasion by police. The federal argument is longer in large part because, as the 
claimant noted, federal law is less protective and thus more effort had to be exerted to distinguish 
this negative federal law, and it closed with a policy critique that deferring to the police, as the 
U.S. Supreme Court so frequently did, only encouraged more misbehavior.54 This argument was 
clearly offered because of the complicated situation of an out-of-state arrest by non-Oregon law 
enforcement; in fact the claimant’s argument was begun with a long argument that Oregon law 
                                                
51 State v. Dixson, 307 Or. 195, Appellants’ brief 
52 State v. Buchholz, 309 Or. 442 (1990), Appellant’s brief; State v. Morton, 326 Or. 466 (1998), 
Respondents’ brief; State v. Tucker, 330 Or. 85 (2000), Appellant’s brief. 
53 313 Or. 246.  
54 Davis, 313 Or. 246, Respondent’s brief at 26-33. 
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should apply.55 But if that claim failed, then the federal issue was the only remaining issue so the 
claimant had little choice but to detail the weaker federal analysis. 
The search incident rules established by Caraher and Lowry were the source of continued 
contestation in 1986. One pair of cases dealt with searches of automobiles incident to arrest, 
specifically with searches of items in the trunk. In one the legal basis was vague at best, failing to 
cite to either constitutional provision and only referring to unspecific “Oregon law” at a few 
points with a heavy inter-mix of federal law.56 The claimant in State v. Bennett (1986) offered a 
more confusing argument, apparently motivated in part by the state’s formulation of the case.57 It 
appears that the state relied upon Caraher’s statement that a search incident is allowed as long as 
reasonable in all respects to mean that such a search could go beyond the immediate area of the 
arrestee, to extend to closed items within a car trunk. The claimant accepted this formultion of 
Caraher and argued that “the formulation of the appropriate rule under the Oregon Constitution 
is probably a mistake” because it relied upon older Oregon cases that in turn rested on Fourth 
Amendment law overruled in the late 1960s.58 In essence, the claimant argued that this rule could 
not be allowed because the state constitution cannot give less protection than federal law. This 
complicated set of arguments appears to have been caused by the fact that the Oregon Court had 
resisted a general automobile exception to the state rule so the state was forced to fall back to a 
broad interpretation of the search incident rule; ultimately, the Court settled this dispute by 
recognizing a form of the automobile exception that a vehicle stopped in transit was subject to a 
complete, warrantless search where the police had probable cause to believe evidence was 
                                                
55 In fact, I usually exclude this kind of case because of the complications of applying state law 
to out-of-state actors. I included this argument only because the state claim was made.   
56 State v. Brown, 301 Or. 268 (1986), Appellant’s brief.  
57 301 Or. 299. Unfortunately, this is one of those cases where the state’s brief would be of great 
assistance but I rely upon the implicit presentation in Respondent’s brief.  
58 Bennett, 301 Or. 299, Respondent’s brief at 4.  
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within.59 In a related case, however, a claimant successfully asserted a clear state constitutional 
argument that a search of a stationary automobile without even probable cause, even if allowed 
under federal law, still violated Caraher.60 
In another pair of 1986 cases, the reach of Lowry was disputed. The cases involved the 
seizure of vials of powder suspected of being cocaine, one claimant was arrested on a theft 
charge and the vials were discovered in her purse and the other was the subject of a search 
warrant for marijuana and the police found the vials while executing the warrant.61 Both 
claimants presented clear state arguments without discussion of federal law. They simply sought 
to apply the Lowry holding that a warrant is required for further inspection of legitimately 
discovered closed containers. Even after the Court reversed itself on this issue, but still 
maintaining a distinct state rule as discussed above, claimants still continued to apply the state 
search incident rule that searches incident to an arrest can only be justified for ensuring no 
danger to the arresting officer or to find evidence relating to the crime. Thus, searches of wallets 
were challenged on the grounds that the police either had all the evidence necessary for arrest or 
that there was no possibility of a weapon in the small wallet compartments.62 Even with the 
limitations on the state rule in Owens, claimants maintained solely state claims and simply 
sought to distinguish Owens on the grounds that their cases were not about simply testing 
materials to confirm the substance but whether the initial seizure itself was limited. 
In a number of other search areas where federal retrenchment was clear and at times 
dramatic, claimants still maintained arguments that were focused on the development of the 
                                                
59 Brown, 301 Or. 268.  
60 State v. Kock, 302 Or. 29 (1986).  
61 State v. Forseth, 302 Or. 233 (1986); State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196 (1986).  
62 State v. Hoshkinson, 320 Or. 83 (1994), Appellant’s brief; State v. Noble, 314 Or. 624 (1992), 
Appellant’s brief.  
 151 
internal logic of the state search precedents and not the attacks on the U.S. Supreme Court seen 
in other states. For example, despite the federal rule that police dog sniffs do not amount to a 
search,63 one claimant presented dual arguments attempting to, first, distinguish the federal case 
law, and, second, that Caraher and its progeny recognized a privacy interest in a storage locker 
that cannot be invaded by police action whatever its form.64 Ten years after the Court accepted 
that search because the dog was not taken to the area with the intention to discover evidence, 
another claimant raised a state challenge to a dog sniff but this time a purposeful one. The 
claimant made an extensive argument on the limited facts of the first decision, the decade of 
search cases since developing search doctrine specifically as it relates to enhancement of senses, 
and the rejection of the federal position in five other states with only a perfunctory attempt to 
discuss federal law.65 Similarly, a claimant attacked the use of a beeper placed upon his car 
without a warrant developed a detailed argument discussing the requirement of primacy, state 
precedent on expectations of privacy, and the reasoning of other state high courts applying 
warrant requirements to electronic tracking.66 The claimant did make a brief federal claim 
attempting to distinguish a contrary case67 but without much development and with no attention 
to the policy implications of that doctrine.  
The open fields doctrine presents another example. In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a search in an open field outside of the curtilage of the home—the property immediately 
adjacent to the home or other building—did not require a warrant.68 In two 1988 cases, claimants 
argued that state law protected personal property regardless of the proximity to a person’s home 
                                                
63 U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).  
64 State v. Slowikowski, 307 Or. 19 (1988), Appellant’s brief.  
65 State v. Smith, 327 Or. 366 (1998), Appellant’s brief 17-36.  
66 State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157 (1988), Appellant’s brief.  
67 U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).  
68 Oliver v. U.S., 466 U.S. 170 (1984).  
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and again without any serious discussion of federal law.69 In fact, one claimant criticized the trial 
court judge for failing to following the primacy instructions and instead simply upholding the 
search on the basis of federal law; the claimant argued that an older Oregon precedent rejected a 
similar open fields search and argued that even if it was based on a mixture of federal and state 
law, Caraher held that the state basis should still survive a change in federal law.70  
While the search and seizure area is one of the strongest areas of federal retrenchment, 
we see little evidence of the kind of policy attacks on federal doctrine exhibited in other states. 
Perhaps the clearest example of a policy attack involved a case where police executed an arrest 
warrant and remained on the premises for hours detaining people; the claimant noted that the 
U.S. Supreme Court had upheld a similar action71 and argued that “[e]ven for a court which 
seems more interested in legislating tha[n] in judicial decision making, this is an extraordinary 
philosophy. Clearly, recent pronouncements by [the U.S. Supreme Court] are result oriented.”72 
But even this claimant followed the trend discussed above in developing an alternative state 
claim through a detailed analysis of the large body of state search law built by the Oregon 
Supreme Court. 
 
Free speech  
Free speech law saw a significant degree of state constitutional activity in Oregon in part 
influenced by the adoption of some of Linde’s academic writings pushing for a more absolutist 
position on free speech (Linde 1970a; West 2000). Building on Robertson, the Court held that 
                                                
69 State v. Andreason, 307 Or. 190 (1988), Appellants’ brief; State v. Dixson, 307 Or. 195 (1988), 
Appellants’ brief. 
70 Dixson, 307 Or. 195, Appellant’s brief.  
71 Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796 (1984).  
72 State v. Sargent, 323 Or. 455 (1996), Respondent’s brief at 11.  
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Section 8 protects all speech unless the state can demonstrate that the restriction comes within 
some historical exception that existed in 1857 (when the Oregon Constitution was drafted) and 
that Section 8 was not intended to supplement. In practice, the Court demonstrated a degree of 
hostility to these justifications. Most dramatically, in State v. Henry (1987)73 it held that 
obscenity is fully protected speech because the territorial laws only prohibited obscenity in 
regards to certain groups and thus it did not amount to a restriction on obscenity between adults. 
The Court did make clear that while the speech itself is absolutely protected, the effects of that 
speech are still open to punishment as Section 8 specifically allows liability for abuse of the 
right.  
Many of the state speech arguments occurred in areas where reasonable federal and state 
claims existed and lawyers deployed both issues as equally viable alternatives. In a case about 
whether a news agency can be sued for airing a report of a traffic accident by one of the 
participants claiming invasion of privacy and airing of private facts, the claimant argued that the 
U.S. Supreme Court had rejected a similar kind of private action suit more than a decade before 
because of the chilling effect that it would have on news coverage and, regardless, these legal 
actions were not firmly established when Section 8 was drafted and thus the speech is 
protected.74 Similarly, another set of cases attacked limitations upon political campaigning and 
lobbying utilizing generally parallel state and federal claims, attacking a restriction on parties 
from encouraging absentee voting, a state rule requiring 5% of the prior vote for automatic party 
access to the ballot, and a registration fee for those who lobbied the state legislature.75 Similarly, 
                                                
73 302 Or. 510.  
74 Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 300 Or. 452 (1986).  
75 Oregon Republican Party v. State, 301 Or. 437 (1986); Libertarian Party of Oregon v. 
Roberts, 305 Or. 238; Fidanque v. State ex rel. Oregon Government Standards and Practices 
Com’n, 328 Or. 1 (1998).  
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another claimant sought to expand protections to commercial speech arguing that under 
Robertson and Henry, commercial speech did not qualify as an historical exception and thus 
deserves the absolute protections given to all other speech while still presenting a limited 
analysis of the more moderate federal test.76 Another claimant mobilized parallel claims to attack 
a court order enjoining a publication of trade secrets as a prior restraint under federal law and a 
content restriction unjustified by historical exception under state law.77 Two judges argued that 
restrictions on their ability to fundraise and comment on cases also amounted to violations of the 
more protective state rule as well as the less absolute federal test.78 These cases saw generally 
strong state arguments paired with sometimes equally viable federal claims. Interestingly, they 
are treated for the most part as completely alternative, independent arguments.  
Two other areas, hate crimes and sexually explicit speech, saw a greater shift away from 
federal law even where it was still an open question. In two 1992 cases the Court was asked to 
strike down Oregon’s hate crimes enhancement statute for punishing the beliefs and speech of 
criminal defendants.79 The claimants presented an interesting analysis that not only was racist 
speech not an historical exception to Section 8, but that the Oregon Constitution as originally 
drafted was full of overtly racist pronouncements (see Schuman 1995) and thus the speech was 
clearly protected. Further, the law was not aimed at any effects of speech, as it only required 
evidence of racist speech to justify the enhancement. Interestingly, even though the U.S. 
                                                
76 City of Hillsboro v. Purcell, 306 Or. 547 (1988).  
77 State ex rel. Sports Management News v. Nachtigal, 324 Or. 80 (1996).  
78 In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548 (1990) (personal solicitation of election funds); In re Conduct of 
Schenck, 318 Or. 402 (comment on cases).  
79 State v. Hendrix, 314 Or. 170 (1992); State v. Plowman, 314 Or. 157 (1992).  
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Supreme Court did not reject this argument until the following year,80 the claimants made only a 
brief, perfunctory federal argument. Sexually explicit speech is the one area where the federal 
arguments are totally displaced. In City of Portland v. Tidyman (1988)81 the claimant attacked 
ordinances that sought to restrict space and location of adult businesses solely on the authority of 
Robertson and its progeny, arguing that the city was clearly aimed only at suppressing the 
content of its speech. While this was at least arguably still an open question under federal law, 
the last case is the only speech argument in my sample where no federal argument was viable.82 
The claimant in State v. Stoneman (1996)83 was convicted of purchasing child pornography and 
argued that Henry clearly established that all obscenity, regardless of the actions depicted, were 
protected speech. 
After its early efforts, the Oregon Supreme Court’s free speech law established a 
significant alternative to federal law that, for the most part, remained stable and reasonably 
supportive of the claims offered. Claimants turned to both claims as alternative and truly 
independent legal claims. None of the free speech claimants attacked the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decisions or policies, or sought to simply import federal doctrine alone into state law as evasion 
of some change. Even Stoneman, the clearest example where only state law was viable, focused 
solely on the internal logic of the state legal doctrine rather than concern with attack the choices 
made at the federal level.  
 
                                                
80 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). But it is possible that these arguments might have 
shifted if they were made after the U.S. Supreme Court expanded protection for hate speech in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
81 306 Or. 174.  
82 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding that child pornography, even if not 
technically obscene, may still be proscribed by the state).  
83 323 Or. 536.  
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Equal protection  
Section 20 states that “[n]o law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens 
privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.”84 
Linde (1970b) criticized the long practice of treating this provision as identical to the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause and moved to end it as a justice. The Court sought to 
“reject[] the basic federal methodology” of sliding tiers of scrutiny (Schuman 1988: 225). The 
development of this rule was slow and unclear, and at times still looked similar to the federal 
test. Schuman (1988: 245) summarizes the developing law, that the discrimination against an 
identifiable class where it is based on prejudice or stereotype will be impermissible, classes 
created by a statute (such as taxpayers) are permissible so long as the class is open for other 
people to enter it, and actions against individuals must follow some systematic criteria. While a 
few Section 20 arguments were made attacking general classifications in my sample, the most 
common use was to attack prosecutorial decisions as lacking a systematic basis for the decision 
to treat one defendant differently from another defendant.  
A number of the attacks on class legislation were of relatively limited development, at 
times still referring to the tiers of scrutiny approach. For example, two cases attacked tax 
classifications for creating different groups of taxpayers without a rational basis for the 
treatment.85 The idea of a statutorily created class arose in a challenge by town residents to the 
annexation of their town to another; the claimants admitted that federal law likely was not 
violated but argued that Section 20 still forbid the creation of different classes of voters and 
                                                
84 Oregon Const. Art. I, Sec. 20.  
85 Wilson v. Dept. of Revenue, 302 Or. 128 (1986); Pollin v. Dept. of Revenue, 326 Or. 427 
(1998). 
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denying one of those classes a vote on a subject that will affect them.86 In two 1990 cases, 
claimants attacked limitations on civil actions, one involving minors and the other suits against a 
governmental body, arguing that the legislature denied an important right to one class of citizens 
and not to others without justification.87 While these arguments all focused on Section 20, they 
tended to be confused on the exact application and thus still fell back to standard federal 
language. The claimant in Zockert v. Fanning (1990)88 noted that the “approach of Oregon courts 
in recent years … has been ill-defined.”89 The claimant then discussed the various cases key to 
this developing doctrine and applied each of the different approaches to the question of whether 
indigent natural fathers are entitled to state paid legal representation.  
Arguments over the administration of laws have been clearer, however. The Court held 
that Section 20 “reaches forbidden inequality in the administration of laws under delegated 
authority as well as in legislative enactments.”90 While discretion in the administration of law 
alone was not inherently suspect, the discretion must be exercised on the basis of some 
meaningful criteria and be able to offer a satisfactory explanation for differential treatment.91 
Arbitrary enforcement arguments were quite common in death penalty cases in particular. A 
number specifically complained of unequal treatment in plea offers. One case noted that the 
prosecutor offered a plea deal to some defendants but not others even though their crimes were 
similar without sufficient justification.92 In a similar case, the claimant complained that he was 
denied a plea deal given to similarly situated defendants because the prosecutor gave the final 
                                                
86 Mid-County Future Alternatives Committee v. City of Portland, 310 Or. 152 (1990).  
87 Sealey By and Through Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387 (1990); Van Wormer v. City of Salem, 
309 Or. 404 (1990).  
88 310 Or. 514.  
89 Zockert, 310 Or. 514, Appellant’s brief at 35.  
90 State v. Clark, 291 Or. 231, 239 (1981).  
91 State v. Freeland, 295 Or. 367 (1983).  
92 State v. Hayward, 327 Or. 397 (1998).  
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decision to the victim’s family.93 Other death penalty claimants sought to link the arbitrary 
enforcement aspect of Section 20 to the broader criticism of the prosecutor’s power in death 
penalty cases. One claimant argued that allowing the prosecutor to choose between two different 
underlying crimes that were identical is inherently arbitrary because there is no meaningful 
criteria to choose between the two charges.94 Claimants also targeted treatment from the trial 
court in addition to the prosecutor. One noted that two dozen other capital defendants received a 
jury instruction that he was denied and another attacked a court’s decision to allow only some 
capital defendants to go back to the penalty phase after legislative changes were made to capital 
sentencing regime.95 Outside of the criminal system, a lawyer utilized this doctrine to attack his 
bar disciplinary action arguing that his behavior was identical to a large number of other lawyers 
who engaged in the exact same behavior.96 
Section 20 became a significant source of state constitutional litigation as the Court 
developed the doctrine. While the class based arguments showed a degree of confusion over the 
meaning of the state doctrine, the arbitrary enforcement principle was clearer and claimants more 
easily applied it to a variety of governmental actions against discrete individuals.  
 
Death penalty  
As with Ohio, Oregon saw a high degree of constitutional activity regarding the death 
penalty. In Oregon, however, lawyers deployed state constitutional attacks upon the death 
                                                
93 State v. McDonnell, 310 Or. 98 (1990).  
94 State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564 (1990).  
95 State v. Langley, 331 Or. 430 (2000); State v. Rogers, 330 Or. 282 (2000).  
96 In re Conduct of Schenck, 320 Or. 94 (1994).  
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penalty process and sentencing.97 This is true despite the fact that the voters added Article I, 
Section 40 that specifically reinstated capital punishment notwithstanding Sections 15 and 16. 
Lawyers still attempted to push the Court to maintain the primacy approach and continue to 
provide a separate state standard for cruel and unusual punishment. Showing the typical 
tenaciousness of death penalty litigators, they continued to push these arguments well after the 
Court clearly rejected the claim, but in an increasingly minimal fashion.  
State constitutional challenges were made generally to attack the procedures utilized in 
the Oregon death penalty and not the validity directly. Claimants admitted that Section 40 was 
clearly intended to protect the death penalty from facial invalidity, but maintained that these 
provisions still held weight as to the procedures used to reach the method. In State v. Isom 
(1988)98 particular weight was placed upon Section 15, then requiring that “[l]aws for the 
punishment of crime shall be founded on the principles of reformation, and not vindictive 
justice.”99 Claimant argued that coupled with the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment 
clause in Section 16, the state was prohibited from utilizing any procedure that was aimed at 
vengeance and argued that the newly enacted system was aimed at nothing more than vengeance. 
The Oregon Supreme Court rather forcibly rejected this theory in 1988 holding that Section 40 
was clearly intended to suspend all effects from Sections 15 and 16.100 Despite this rejection a 
number of claimants continued to press this argument, admitting that the Court rejected the claim 
                                                
97 Another significant difference is that Ohio has executed 46 people since 1976 where Oregon 
has only executed 2, apparently both specifically ended their appeals and asked for the execution. 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (accessed 3/15/12).  
98 306 Or. 587, Appellant’s brief at 83.  
99 As quoted in State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115, 135 (1988). Section 15 was amended in 1996 and 
now reads, “Laws for the punishment of crime shall be founded on these principles: protection of 
society, personal responsibility, accountability for one’s actions and reformation.”  
100 Wagner, 305 Or. at 138-39. This denial actually became the basis for a Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge rejected on appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court in this case.  
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but seeking to preserve it and asking for reconsideration101 but over time they began to give up 
on a substantive discussion and just included it in a brief kitchen sink argument. Some cases 
continued to try and work around Section 40 with more creative arguments trying to backdoor 
some proportionality review used in other criminal cases.102 The most creative claimant argued 
that Section 13’s prohibition of treating prisoners “with unnecessary rigor” as interpreted by a 
classic primacy case103 requires invalidation of the death sentence because the state failed to 
prove death was a necessary sentence.104  
More narrowly, a common challenge attacked the death qualification procedure. The U.S. 
Supreme Court allowed prospective jurors to be removed where they were categorically opposed 
to the death penalty and would not consider the sentence.105 Unfortunately for the claimants, the 
Oregon Court had accepted similar death qualification procedures as early as 1951.106 State 
constitutional arguments in this area appear similar to some of the pre-Linde years, focusing on 
the policy outcomes of death qualification to convince the Court to “reach a different conclusion 
under the Oregon Constitution.”107 Interestingly, the claimants use social scientific data showing 
that death qualification leads to juries that are biased to reach a guilty verdict that the U.S. 
Supreme Court itself explicitly rejected in 1986. The data, and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s 
dissent interpreting it, were used to both attack the consequences of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision and to convince the Oregon Court that its 1951 decision is so outdated as to deserve 
                                                
101 State v. Miranda, 309 Or. 121 (1990); State v. Nefstad, 309 Or. 523 (1990). 
102 See State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564 (1990), Appellant’s brief at 192.  
103 Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611 (1981). 
104 Montez, 309 Or. 564, Appellant’s brief.  
105 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).  
106 State v. Leland, 190 Or. 598 (1951).  
107 State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587 (1988), Appellant’s brief at 53.  
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repudiation.108 As with the arguments over the continued validity of Sections 15 and 16, the 
Oregon Court approved death qualification in 1988109 but claimants continued to press the issue 
in later cases, calling on the Court to bow to the continued evidence about the ill-effects of the 
practice and change its mind, before ultimately abandoning significant discussion of the issue 
and relegating it to a short statement as part of the kitchen sink argument so many death penalty 
briefs conclude with.  
Despite a large hurdle in the form of Section 40’s protection for capital punishment, 
claimants still attempted to press significant state constitutional limitations as an alternative to 
the quickly evolving federal doctrines. In the face of a resistant Court that refused to accept ways 
around these limits, the arguments gradually faded leaving claimants to focus on other aspects of 
the criminal process in individual cases, such as search and seizure or self-incrimination.  
 
Other areas  
Interestingly, the Oregon Supreme Court’s commitment to primacy did not always lead to 
expanded rights protection. In State v. Campbell (1985) the Court, after discussing its duty to 
settle state law first, adopted the federal reasoning for when hearsay statements violate a 
defendant’s right to confront her accusers.110 Despite this direct linkage a number of claimants 
still noted the state aspect even if they focused more heavily on federal analysis as adopted by 
Campbell.111 One claimant did attack this linkage, attempting to convince the Court to break with 
                                                
108 Some form of this argument is made by Appellants in Isom, 306 Or. 587; State v. Miranda, 
309 Or. 121 (1990); State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45 (1990); State v. Nefstad, 309 Or. 523 (1990); State 
v. Langley, 331 Or. 430 (2000).  
109 Wagner, 305 Or. 115.  
110 299 Or. 633. The Court adopted the reasoning from Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  
111 State v. Cervantes, 319 Or. 121 (1994); State v. Kirtzman, 323 Or. 598 (1996); State v. 
Wilson, 323 Or. 498 (1996) 
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federal shifting federal reasoning after the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts are not 
necessarily compelled to conduct an inquiry into the reliability of hearsay statements.112 The 
claimant criticized the Court for its adoptionism in this one area stating, “[i]f this court is going 
to adopt current federal reasoning, it must reevaluate the quality of that reasoning with every new 
federal test.”113 After a detailed analysis of the heavy criticism from law reviews and legal 
commentators of this recent federal change, the claimant argued that this new federal decision “is 
a poorly reasoned deviation from prior precedent and from scholarly opinion, and should not be 
followed by this court.”114 The claimant stressed that the original federal reasoning adopted by 
the Oregon Court was reasonable and simply should be maintained, that the Court should not feel 
required to shift its home law every time federal reasoning underwent a change. This attempt, 
however, failed and the later claimants simply applied the law as adopted.   
In self-incrimination cases, we see an attempt to actually reduce state protections below 
the level of protection guaranteed by federal law. In State v. Smith (1986) the claimant presented 
a relatively weak assertion that the state self-incrimination clause required Miranda-type 
warnings as a supplement to a more focused federal argument. A plurality of the Oregon 
Supreme Court rejected this invitation and held that long-standing Oregon law required only that 
confessions be voluntary to be admissible, that warnings were not required. The plurality 
especially warned of the risk of tying state law to federal: “To adopt an Oregon Miranda rule 
identical to the federal rule and tie it to future interpretation by the federal caselaw would be 
foolish. We do not know what may be waiting in the alley.”115 The plurality acknowledge the 
fact that federal law still had to be applied, but refused to extend state protections even to the 
                                                
112 Bourjaily v. U.S., 483 U.S. 171 (1987).  
113 State v. Cornell, 314 Or. 673 (1992), Appellant’s brief at 59.  
114 Cornell, 314 Or. 673, Appellant’s brief at 60.  
115 State v. Smith, 301 Or. 681, 701 (1986).  
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level of the federal doctrine. However, in State v. Magee (1987),116 a full bench appeared to limit 
Smith to cases where a person was simply being questioned without any accusation against them 
or custodial situation. Magee opened the door again to warnings under state law where the 
suspect was in custody or subject to the adversarial process in some way. A number of claimants 
sought to exploit this division for custodial interrogations arguing alternative state and federal 
points for issues about warnings and the waiver thereof.117 In some narrow factual settings we 
see federal retrenchment play a continued role, but still claimants rarely invoked the kind of 
policy attack arguments that existed pre-Linde in Oregon and in other states because the Oregon 
Court continued to provide a clear state basis for such arguments. For example, in State v. 
Miranda (1990)118 the claimant immediately acknowledged that federal law supported the 
impeachment use of illegally obtained statements119 but relied on a 1988 Oregon precedent120 
rejecting the use of such statements. A similar situation was present in a case about whether 
statements were admissible after an attorney had attempted to intervene but the police did not 
inform the suspect of this fact. Here the federal law was again unsupportive, but the Oregon 
Court seemed to suggest that state law prohibited such actions.121 Thus the claimant noted this 
retrenchment from the U.S. Supreme Court but pointed out how that decision expressly noted 
“that a number of state courts had taken the opposite position” and that Oregon was such a court 
                                                
116 304 Or. 261. The three members of the Smith plurality concurred on federal law grounds but 
reiterated that state law should not provide a remedy in this case.  
117 State v. Buchholz, 309 Or. 442 (1990), Appellant’s brief; State v. Davis, 313 Or. 246 (1992), 
Respondent’s brief at 46; State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396 (1996), Appellant’s brief at 77; State v. 
Toevs, 327 Or. 525 (1998), Appellant’s brief at 21.  
118 309 Or. 121.  
119 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).  
120 State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587 (1988).  
121 Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59 (1979); State v. Sparklin, 
296 Or. 85 (1983). The Oregon Court is unclear on the extent to which it is relying on state law 
in these cases.  
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and that whatever changes occurred in federal law, the state protections should remain intact.122 
After this argument was successful, two later claimants sought to utilize it as the primary claim 
in cases involving suspects’ invocation of their right to counsel.123 Even with the early mixed 
signals about the reach of the state provision, and the clear examples of federal retrenchment, 
claimants still engaged with primarily legal arguments over the kinds of policy attacks on federal 
law that are common elsewhere.  
 
Conclusion  
The Oregon Supreme Court embraced Linde’s primacy theory, championing the view 
that state law should be primary. Interestingly, the early engagement with state constitutional law 
was driven by the Court, or most likely by Linde and his closest allies, sua sponte. While this is 
contrary to rules of judicial behavior discussed in Chapter 1, it demonstrates a powerful 
commitment to state constitutional law through the leadership of the Court. By not only ordering 
consideration of state issues but also going further to issue early decisions in multiple areas with 
little assistance from the bar, the Court provided a high degree of guidance by giving lawyers the 
source material to work with. And more than any other state in my study, lawyers responded to 
this guidance. State constitutional law became normalized by the Oregon Court. After the early 
establishment of primacy, lawyers demonstrated attention to state law in much the same way 
they would approach any other legal issue. They applied an increasingly thorough body of state 
precedent to new and different situations. Claimants gave little attention to the wide range of 
factors coded in my analysis because they had no need to reach outside of this precedent. Similar 
                                                
122 State v. Simonsen, 319 Or. 510 (1994), Appellant’s brief at 36, 37.  
123 State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38, Appellant’s brief; State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335 (1998), 
Respondent’s brief.  
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to the Washington experience, policy critiques of federal law nearly completely disappeared 
because lawyers no longer had to work solely with federal principles and logic. Perhaps most 
interesting is that Oregon claimants utilized state arguments in a broad set of areas, some where 
federal law was still supportive and others where state law was only given a limited 
development. While it may be true that some areas saw less thorough state constitutional 
arguments than others, it is also clear that in the aggregate lawyers presented both the highest 
frequency of and most thorough examination of state constitutional claims than any other state in 
this study.  
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 The previous chapters presented a series of case studies aimed at providing insight into 
the dynamic interaction between lawyers and state high courts. In this chapter, I outline some 
comparative analysis of both the aggregate trends and the substantive content of state arguments 
across the various states chosen for study. I close with some suggestion of the importance of my 
findings and potential future research trajectories.  
 
Comparative thoughts: the aggregate trends 
Figure 8.1. Aggregate percentage of federal and state arguments, all years.  
Looking at the aggregate ratio between state and federal arguments, there is clearly 
substantial variation between states, as illustrated in Figure 8.1. The states show a trend that 
appears to track the degree of internal encouragement fairly well. The Ohio Supreme Court was 
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resistant to judicial federalism and gave no significant signal of interest in an independent body 
of state rights law and the legal bar reflected this disinterest, offering few state claims. In New 
York, where the Court of Appeals engaged in an ad hoc process willing to accept some state 
arguments with little guidance outside of the Hobson cases, lawyers responded with a higher 
number of state arguments but primarily driven by the Hobson cases. The consistent adoption of 
state constitutional theories leads to a significantly higher number of state constitutional 
arguments. In Washington, the criteria test may not have made state constitutional claims the 
norm, but they certainly became more frequent. The adoption of primacy in Oregon, on the other 
hand, has clearly lead to significantly greater attention towards state constitutional rights issues 
from the legal bar. Of course, the attention to state constitutional arguments varied significantly 
by year as well as between states.  
 
Figure 8.2. Percentage of state arguments by year, all states. For Ohio the date range is 1978-
2000.  
Variation in the frequency of state arguments over time is clearly common. There is little 
regular attention to state constitutional claims in the 1970s; the few relatively high spikes are the 
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function of an abnormally low number of cases (Oregon in 1970 and ‘72) or possibly incomplete 
sample issues (Washington in 1974). Generally we see an increasing trend in the 1980s in 
response to the signals of federal retrenchment and internal encouragement. This is most 
dramatically illustrated in Oregon. The spike in the early ‘80s is greater than in any other state 
and after 19841 the proportion is essentially evenly split between state and federal rights claims. 
With the adoption of primacy and the Linde led effort to establish an early set of state based 
rights precedent without concern for developments in federal law, lawyers were not only told to 
argue state issues but were given a set of precedents to apply to subsequent cases. Interestingly, 
New York and Washington had similar percentages of state arguments through the early 1990s. 
While the Washington Supreme Court may have adopted a constitutional theory, the criteria 
approach still tended to emphasize federal retrenchment and this was a prime driving force in 
New York. But the two states diverged greatly after 19942 due to one primary difference: the 
New York Court of Appeals settled the Hobson doctrine and delegated the one clear state 
constitutional doctrine to lower courts as part of its growing resistance to rights claims in general 
and without the one consistent independent doctrine lawyers reverted to the more ad hoc 
approach of presenting state arguments. Contrary to this experience, the Washington Supreme 
Court never abandoned the criteria approach, instead it consistently reiterated this theory and 
accepted and decided state claims where properly made; in other words, the encouragement from 
the court never declined. In contrast to these three states, we see no trend in Ohio towards state 
                                                
1 While 2000 shows a significant drop in the proportion of state rights arguments, this may 
simply be caused by an usually high percentage of death penalty cases that had abandoned most 
state claims as discussed in Chapter 7. Although, it could also be the start of a declining trend.  
2 While New York in 1998 does show a high percentage (30%) of state arguments, this is caused 
by an unusually low number of cases (12) and a high number of missing briefs (4). Only 3 state 
arguments were made in New York, the same number as in Ohio, where Oregon and Washington 
each had 13.   
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claims. Apart from spikes in 1986 and 1994, no year saw state arguments comprising much more 
than 10% of the rights arguments. Faced with a state high court that largely rejecting the 
potential for independent state rights doctrine, lawyers responded with similarly little attention. 
Turning to issue areas, the aggregate trends similarly show variations across subject matter and 
between states.  
 
Figure 8.3. Percentage of state arguments by rights area, all states. New York has no 
establishment clause and Oregon does not have a due process clause.  
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Figure 8.4. Total number of state arguments by rights area, all states.  
Breaking down state arguments by issue area shows the wide variation between states 
and across issues. Figures 8.3 and 8.4 present this data by percentage of arguments and total state 
claims, respectively, to allow for easier interpretation of the percentages. Given the high degree 
of federal retrenchment in search and seizure law, it is unsurprising that the frequency of state 
search arguments were the highest for Washington and Oregon, and in New York it was nearly 
equal to the self-incrimination (Hobson) cases. However, only in the previous two was the 
proportion of search arguments state based in a significant way, with half of the Oregon 
arguments and more than a third in Washington. In other areas of criminal procedure we see a 
less prominent emphasis on state claims, outside of Oregon at least. Self-incrimination saw a 
relatively high proportion of state arguments in both New York and Oregon, influenced by the 
particular internal dynamics of each state. Across the other areas of criminal procedure rights, 
state constitutional activism is generally limited for most states, especially in Ohio and New 
York where no significant internal encouragement occurred in these areas and lawyers deployed 
state arguments instrumentally to address particular instances of federal retrenchment. In both 
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Oregon and Washington, significant attention was provided to jury claims due to internal 
doctrinal developments, and unexpectedly Oregon developed an early doctrine on double 
jeopardy that influenced lawyers to rely on state claims in an overwhelming proportion.  
Turning to non-criminal rights areas, and leaving aside religion cases that saw minimal 
attention under either federal or state law, there is a greater degree of separation between states. 
Washington saw double the frequency of state speech (though it was not dramatically different in 
the proportion of claims) and in equal protection arguments than either Ohio or New York. In 
both areas federal law remained relatively stable and protective, apart from a few particular 
issues, and the increased attention was driving by the free speech decisions emanating from Coe 
and ERA and post-Gunwall developments in equal protection. Due process issues, however, saw 
little attention to state constitutional arguments—Oregon lacks a due process clause so that area 
was excluded. Outside of the more contentious areas of substantive privacy arguments, due 
process focused primarily on procedural issues where federal law remained stable. Interestingly, 
Oregon’s strong primacy commitment is evident in the high proportion of state constitutional 
arguments across all issue areas. Excluding religion cases, state arguments accounted for more 
than a third of all arguments in every issue area except for cruel and unusual punishment claims, 
where lawyers were faced with significant impediments to state claims.  
The experience in Ohio is somewhat harder to detail. As discussed in Chapter 4, Ohio 
saw little attention to state claims apart from a relatively small number of cases driven by 
instances of federal retrenchment. However, the area of strongest federal retrenchment, search 
and seizure, saw minimal state constitutional attention. This is surprising and suggests that the 
support structure may require some minimal degree of support to develop even in areas of fairly 
strong retrenchment. Apart from a single weak statement, the Ohio Supreme Court refused to 
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develop state search law and thus lawyers had no body of state law to even begin with or reason 
to believe the Court might be receptive to the claims. While the New York Court of Appeals may 
not have consistently articulated a theory of state search law, it did demonstrate a willingness to 
evade some instances of federal retrenchment and thus lawyers were given some minimal 
encouragement to believe that state search claims may be useful and appropriate. It could be 
possible to read this evidence as supporting Gardner’s (1992) assertion that lawyers rarely utilize 
state claims because they do not work, but to be convincing there would need to be some 
evidence of an early attempt to convince the Ohio Court that failed and in Ohio there is no such 
evidence. Lawyers simply seemed to have ignored the potential area throughout the scope of my 
study.  
 
The content of state constitutional argument 
 
Figure 8.5. Percentage of state arguments citing each legal factor, all states.  
Turning to the content of state constitutional arguments beyond their simple frequency, 
there are broad similarities with a few interesting outliers. Figure 8.5 presents the percentage of 
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state arguments that cited each particular legal factor. The only legal claim that saw a high 
degree of use was home state law where all states saw relatively common use. In part this is 
because of the loose coding rules that includes any mention of statute or common law, as well as 
prior state decisions based on federal law where the claimant seeks to reframe it as state based, in 
addition to legitimate instances of independent state constitutional doctrine. With the exception 
of Washington, the other areas saw little general attention. Washington shows a significantly 
greater degree of attention to issues of textual difference, constitutional history, structure, and 
state interest driven by the Gunwall endorsement of the criteria approach—and it should be noted 
that Figure 8.5 shows the percentages for all years, as Figure 6.5 shows the percentages for all of 
these factors were significantly higher post-Gunwall. While lawyers in all states generally 
ignored structure and state interest issues, and even in Washington the substantive arguments in 
these areas were minimal at best, the arguments in the other areas were significant and 
substantive generally in Washington but saw minimal attention in other states. This is most 
clearly true in the area of state constitutional history where Washington litigants utilized some 
state history claim in about a quarter of all state constitutional arguments (and more than a third 
after Gunwall), none of the other states saw significant attention to history. Primary source 
research is time consuming and difficult at times and thus lawyers generally avoid it; 
Washington litigants generally had a shortcut because many Washington Supreme Court 
precedents discussed some history providing lawyers with an easy source of research. 
Interestingly, Ohio litigants showed greater attention to textual differences than litigants in New 
York or Oregon, though still much less than Washington. This is best explained by the lack of 
any internal guidance on the meaning of state law, leaving lawyers with little to work with in 
making state constitutional claims. Textual differences are relatively easy arguments to make and 
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lawyers turned to them with some frequency. Interestingly, Ohio litigants were also most likely 
to look to other state cases on the legal point in question, again filling the hole left by the Ohio 
Supreme Court’s refusal to engage with state law. The Oregon experience, in contrast, 
demonstrates a similar point: lawyers rely on the guidance from home courts in making state 
constitutional arguments. Where lawyers receive little guidance from the state high court, as in 
Ohio, they have to more frequently dig into less familiar kinds of legal arguments (or policy 
disputes as discussed below) and where they receive a high degree of guidance through the 
production of state constitutional doctrine, as in Oregon, there is little need to reach beyond this 
precedent. Oregon claimants show a heavy reliance on home state law, and a much greater 
degree is based on internal state constitutional development in this category than any other state, 
with minimal attention to all of the other legal claims. This does not equate to poor legal 
arguments, it just demonstrates a different form of argument. Provide with a sufficient 
foundation of precedents to work with, lawyers in Oregon had no reason to reach further to find 
additional support; in fact, their arguments generally looked like constitutional arguments in any 
“normal” federal constitutional claim where lawyers rarely delve into historical research or 
textual analysis.  
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Figure 8.6. Percentage of state arguments by total factors cited, all states.  
Figure 8.6 shows the rough complexity of state constitutional arguments by totaling the 
number of factors presented. Ohio and New York show broadly similar trends with 89% and 
92%, respectively, of arguments presenting 2 or fewer of the legal factors. In Oregon that 
percentage jumps to 97%, again expressing the depth of state precedent that became the primary 
source of state constitutional arguments in Oregon. In Washington, however, we see the effect of 
the criteria approach in achieving some significant degree of increased complexity in the legal 
factors offered to justify an independent state constitutional analysis with 65% of the arguments 
citing 2 or fewer factors—53% if we limit the scope to only post-Gunwall cases. While 
compliance with the criteria test was far from perfect, lawyers responded to the Washington 
Supreme Court’s guidance with greater attention to these various legal factors.  
 
Revisiting expectations 
Examination of the four specific states and the remand sample largely bears out my 
expectations set out in Chapter 1 that the support structure for judicial federalism would be 
 
 
176 
generally quite weak absent court signals. Without these signals lawyers tended to rely solely on 
federal claims for rights arguments. As courts send signals about legal changes, however, 
lawyers did respond with state rights claims, but in different ways as expected.  
Where federal retrenchment occurred, constitutional rights claims turned increasingly to 
state arguments. As federal rights doctrines start to sour on rights claimants, they begin to 
discover the state alternative. Initially, offering state arguments as a supplement to federal 
arguments seeking to distinguish these negative precedents. As federal law becomes more clearly 
negative, claimants abandon federal claims altogether. The state arguments in areas of federal 
retrenchment, however, rarely utilize the traditional legal factors generally expected from 
lawyers. Instead, the arguments primarily rely upon policy attacks upon the changing direction of 
federal law. Rather than explore the text or history of state provisions that state courts had 
largely ignored, claimants attacked the Supreme Court’s new direction as poorly thought out, 
inconsistent with prior federal doctrine, and ultimately dangerous to American liberties. 
Claimants seek to convince the state high court to simply evade retrenchment and apply the prior 
federal doctrine under the window dressing of the state constitutional provision. The remand 
sample demonstrates this effect most dramatically in illustrating the dramatic change caused by 
Supreme Court reversal without any significant other change, but the experience in Ohio, New 
York, and the early years in Washington and Oregon also show similar trends of state arguments 
primarily in response to federal retrenchment. The experience observed in Ohio, however, 
suggests that some minimal level of state court interest may be required as even the strong 
degree of federal retrenchment in search and seizure law had a minimal effect on how lawyers 
argued rights claims. 
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State court encouragement, similarly, has the expected effects of not only leading to more 
state arguments, but also arguments that are less clearly focused solely on policy critiques of the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Guidance from state high courts provides lawyers with a path to follow in 
arguing an unfamiliar form of rights claims. The Hobson cases in New York led to state 
constitutional rights claims that were vastly different in form and tone than rights claims in other 
areas in the same state. They became less dependent on or concerned with federal developments 
and, instead, focused on the internal logic of the state rule. The Hobson cases, however, were 
constrained to this particular doctrine and had no discernible impact upon arguments in other 
issue areas. The adoption of broader theories in Washington and Oregon had a naturally broader 
impact. In Washington, lawyers still focused primarily on areas of federal retrenchment but the 
content of the arguments shifted dramatically to the required criteria and less on the policy 
implications of federal law. In Oregon, in contrast, the adoption of primacy coupled with the 
Court’s willingness to create early state precedents sua sponte led to fairly dramatic shifts in how 
arguments were presented. In most issue areas, state constitutional rights arguments became 
normalized with lawyers treating state issues as they would any other legal issues. They had no 
reason to explore in depth the history or text of constitutional provisions, but also rarely invoked 
policy arguments or invited the Court to simply evade federal law; instead, the arguments were 
centered on parsing, distinguishing, and applying the growing body of state law. And only in 
Oregon is there evidence of consistent state constitutional arguments in areas where federal law 
is relatively stable and protective.  
 
Importance and future research 
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This study is important in both a narrow and broad sense. Narrowly, it adds to the picture 
of judicial federalism over the first three decades of the phenomenon’s development. In one 
sense it confirms a long asserted statement about the limitations of legal arguments by 
demonstrating that in actuality state constitutional arguments are generally quite weak and 
limited, but this gap filling alone only goes so far. I also demonstrate the ability of state high 
courts to overcome this limitation through active encouragement by adopting broad approaches 
to state constitutional law and requiring lawyers to follow those approaches. This suggests a way 
for state high courts to strengthen their record of independent state constitutional law, though it is 
a difficult path requiring a strong internal commitment that seems lacking in most state high 
courts. Given the state of American federalism, state courts will continue to play an important 
role in rights protection and my study sheds light on how lawyers and courts may interact to 
achieve that enforcement.  
More broadly, this study adds to our knowledge about the interactive dynamics of legal 
development. Courts and lawyers are not completely separate entities because they rely upon the 
arguments and signals from each other to develop legal doctrine. I demonstrate how lawyers and 
courts interact to develop and support novel approaches to state constitutional law, an area of law 
that is generally neglected in rights litigation. This research suggests that a committed court can 
alter litigant behavior substantially given motivation and time.  
Of course this research is limited in scope and significant additional avenues of research 
present themselves. An important question left unexplored here is the degree to which legal 
arguments affect the actual decisions of state courts. One way to explore this would be through 
multivariate statistical analysis including attitudinal, institutional, environmental variables along 
with a variable for the presence or absence of a state constitutional argument. We should observe 
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a significant effect on the willingness of state courts to adopt an independent state constitutional 
rule and, potentially, a significant decrease in attitudinal and institutional variables if legal 
arguments are a significant force in judicial decision-making. Another avenue is to examine the 
internal dynamics of state courts. My study unfortunately is forced to treat state high courts as 
black boxes, accepting legal inputs and producing results with no real understanding of how the 
courts reached that result. We can infer this internal process from findings of internal decision-
making dynamics found at the federal level, but we simply have little knowledge of those 
dynamics at the state level. Studying the internal memorandum, draft opinions, or 
correspondence—assuming any exist—of a state court would allow scholars to better understand 
the support of judicial federalism as well as many other areas of state law. In particular, it would 
be interesting and important to explore the early Linde era on the Oregon Supreme Court to 
better understand the resistance to primacy and why the Court was ultimately so willing to 
decide the issues sua sponte where most other courts refused to do so. Additionally, given my 
concern about arguments seeking expanded rights protection, I neglected to explore the response 
from other actors, in particular government lawyers. Understanding the broader success and 
failure of judicial federalism will likely involve the counter-mobilization from governmental 
actors. This may be particularly interesting in Oregon where there is some evidence that the 
Attorney General’s office strongly resisted the primacy approach.  
Further, my research has some comparative implications. For example, when Canada 
adopted its Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982, lawyers were given an unprecedented 
means of attacking government actions but had zero guidance on the meaning of any of the 
provisions. Studying how Canadian lawyers developed these early constitutional arguments, 
where they drew support from, and how they adapted to the Supreme Court of Canada’s initial 
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decisions may provide some interesting insight into the early development of Canadian 
constitutional rights law. Similarly, my research may have some value in European constitutional 
development where the rise of supranational institutions has lead to a multi-layered set of 
constitutional rights in some countries with the potential for similar tensions seen in the U.S.   
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Appendix A 
 
Remand Sample 
 
 
Delaware (2)  
Fensterer v. State, 509 A.2d 1106 (Del., 1986) on remand from Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 
15 (1985) reversing Fensterer v. State 493 A.2d 959  (Del., 1985).  
Van Arsdall v. State, 524 A.2d 3 (Del., 1987) on remand from Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 
673 (1986) reversing Van Arsdall v. State, 486 A.2d 1 (Del., 1984). 
 
Florida (1)  
Haliburton v. State, 514 So.2d 1088 (Fla., 1987) on remand from Florida v. Haliburton, 475 
U.S. 1078 (1986) vacating and remanding Haliburton v. State, 476 So.2d 192 (Fla., 
1985).  
 
Illinois (1)  
People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26 (Ill., 2006) on remand from Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 
(2005) reversing People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202 (Ill., 2003).  
 
Massachusetts (3)  
Com. v. Oakes, 551 N.E.2d 910 (Mass., 1990) on remand from Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 
576 (1989) reversing Com. v. Oakes, 518 N.E.2d 836 (Mass. 1988).  
Com. v. Sheppard, 476 N.E.2d 541 (Mass., 1985) on remand from Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 
468 U.S. 981 (1984) reversing Com. v. Sheppard, 441 N.E.2d 725 (Mass., 1982). 
Com. v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass., 1985) on remand from Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 
727 (1984) reversing Com. v. Upton, 458 N.E.2d 717 (Mass., 1983).  
 
Michigan (1)  
People v. Long, 359 N.W.2d 194 (Mich., 1984) on remand from Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032 (1983) reversing People v. Long, 320 N.W.2d 866 (Mich., 1982). 
 
Minnesota (4)  
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 311 N.W.2d 843 (Minn., 1981) 
on remand from Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 
U.S. 640 (1981) reversing International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. 
Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79 (Minn., 1980). 
State v. Carter, 596 N.W.2d 654 (Minn., 1999) on remand from Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 
83 (1998) reversing State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169 (Minn., 1997).  
State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn., 1990) on remand from Minnesota v. 
Hershberger, 495 U.S. 901 (1990) vacating and remanding State v. Hershberger, 444 
N.W.2d 282 (Minn., 1989).  
State v. Murphy, 380 N.W.2d 766 (Minn., 1986) on remand from Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 
420 (1984) reversing State v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340 (Minn., 1982).  
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Nevada (1)  
Desimone v. State, 996 P.2d 405 (Nev., 2000) on remand from Nevada v. Desimone, 518 U.S. 
1030 (1996) vacating and remanding Desimone v. State, 904 P.2d 1 (Nev., 1995).  
 
New York (7)  
 
Immuno AG v. J. Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235 (1991) on remand from Immuno v. Moor-
Jankowski, 497 U.S. 1021 (1990) vacating and remanding Immuno AG v. J. Moor-
Jankowski, 74 N.Y.2d 548 (1989).  
People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 68 N.Y.2d 553 (1986) on remand from Arcara v. Cloud 
Books, 478 U.S. 697 (1986) reversing People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, 65 N.Y.2d 
324 (1985). 
People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49 (1982) on remand from New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) 
reversing People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447 (1980). 
People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431 (1986) on remand from New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) 
reversing People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491 (1984). 
People v. Conyers, 52 N.Y.2d 454 (1981) on remand from New York v. Conyers, 449 U.S. 809 
(1980) vacating and remanding People v. Conyers, 49 N.Y.2d 174 (1980).  
People v. Ferber, 57 N.Y.2d 256 (1982) on remand from New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 
(1982) reversing People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674 (1981). 
People v. P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d 296 (1986) on remand from New York v. P.J. Video, 475 U.S. 
868 (1986) reversing People v. P.J. Video, 65 N.Y.2d 566 (1985). 
 
 
 
Ohio (3)  
American Association of University Professors, Central State University Chapter v. Central 
State University, 717 N.E.2d 286 (Ohio, 1999) on remand from Central State Univeristy 
v. American Association of University Professors, Central State University Chapter, 526 
U.S. 124 (1999) reversing American Association of University Professors, Central State 
University Chapter v. Central State University, 699 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio, 1998).  
State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio, 1997) on remand from Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 
(1996) reversing State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio, 1995).  
State v. Wyant, 624 N.E.2d 722 (Ohio, 1994) on remand from Ohio v. Wyant, 508 U.S. 969 
(1993) vacating and remanding State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450 (Ohio, 1992). 
 
Pennsylvania (1)  
Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591 (Pa., 2002) on remand from City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 
529 U.S. 277 (2000) reversing Pap’s A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273 (Pa., 1998).  
 
Texas (1)  
Cobb v. State, 85 S.W.3d 258 (Tex. Crim. App., 2002) on remand from Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 
162 (2001) reversing Cobb v. State, 93 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App., 2000). 
 
Virginia (2)  
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Com. v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674 (Va., 2003) on remand from Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 
(2003) reversing Com. v. Hicks, 563 S.E.2d 674 (Va., 2002).  
Elliot v. Com., 593 S.E.2d 263 (Va., 2004) on remand from Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 
(2003) reversing Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va., 2001).  
 
Washington (4)  
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash.2d 203 (1992) on remand from City of 
Seattle v. First Covenant Church of Seattle, Wash., 499 U.S. 901 (1991) vacating and 
remanding First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 114 Wash.2d 392 (1990). 
State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wash.2d 631 (1984) on remand from Washington v. Bartholomew, 
463 U.S. 1203 (1983) reversing State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wash.2d 173 (1982).  
State v. Recuenco, 163 Wash.2d 428 (2008) on remand from Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 
212 (2006) reversing State v. Recuenco, 154 Wash.2d 156 (2005).  
Witters v. State, Com’n for the Blind, 112 Wash.2d 363 (1989) on remand from Witters v. 
Washington Dept. of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) reversing Witters v. 
State, Com’n for the Blind, 102 Wash.2d 624 (1984).  
 
Wisconsin (2)  
State v. Knapp, 700 N.W.2d 899 (Wis., 2005) on remand from Wisconsin v. Knapp, 542 U.S. 952 
(2004) vacating and remanding State v. Knapp, 666 N.W.2d 881 (Wis., 2003).  
State v. Mitchell, 504 N.W.2d 610 (Wis., 1993) on remand from Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 
476 (1993) reversing State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (Wis., 1992);  
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Appendix B 
 
Ohio Sample 
 
1978 
State v. Barker, 53 Ohio St.2d 135 
State v. Black, 54 Ohio St.2d 304 
State v. Burgun, 56 Ohio St.2d 354 
State v. Chase, 55 Ohio St.2d 237 
State v. Curtis, 54 Ohio St.2d 128 
State v. Darrington, 54 Ohio St.2d 321 
State v. Davis. 56 Ohio St.2d 51 
State v. Faulkner, 56 Ohio St.2d 42  
State v. Kaiser, 56 Ohio St.2d 29 
State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204 
State v. Roberts, 55 Ohio St.2d 191 
State v. Smith, 56 Ohio St.2d 405 
State v. Williams, 55 Ohio St.2d 82 
Warren Molded Plastics, Inc. v. Williams, 56 Ohio St.2d 352 
 
1980 
Akron-Canton Regional Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio.St.2d 403 
Blue Cross of Northwest Ohio v. Jump, Supt. Of Ins., 61 Ohio.St.2d 246 
Blue Cross of Northeast Ohio v. Ratchford., 64 Ohio.St.2d 256 
Costanzo v. Gaul, 62 Ohio.St.2d 106 
Dupler v. Mansfield Journal Company, Inc., 64 Ohio St.2d 116 
Garcia v. Siffrin Residential Assn., 63 Ohio St.2d 259  
Holladay Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 61 Ohio St.2d 335 
Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St.2d 65  
Holmes v. Union Gospel Press, 64 Ohio St.2d 187 
McCruter v. Board of Review, 64 Ohio St.2d 277 
Meeks v. Papadopulos, 62 Ohio St.2d 187 
Ohio Suburban Water Comp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 62 Ohio St.2d 17 
State ex rel. Hammond v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 64 Ohio St.2d 237 
State ex rel. Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St.2d 341 
State v. Daniels, 61 Ohio St.2d 220 
State v. Deener, 64 Ohio St.2d 335  
State v. Flynt, 63 Ohio St.2d 132 
State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 
State v. Madison, 64 Ohio St.2d 322 
State v. Moritz, 63 Ohio St.2d 150  
State v. Pierce, 64 Ohio St.2d 281  
State v. Stricklen, 63 Ohio St.2d 47 
State v. Thomas, 61 Ohio St.2d 254 
State v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d 382 
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State v. Wilkinson, 64 Ohio St.2d 308 
State v. Young, 62 Ohio St.2d 370  
Vorisek v. Village of North Randall, 64 Ohio St.2d 62  
 
1982 
Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St.2d 152 
City of Columbus v. New, 1 Ohio St.3d 221 
Hendrix v. Eight and Walnut Corp., 1 Ohio St.3d 205  
Negin v. Board of Bldg. and Zoning Appeals of City of Mentor, 69 Ohio St.2d 492 
Norton Outdoor Advertising, Inc., v. Village of Arlington Heights, 69 Ohio St.2d 539 
Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission, 69 Ohio St.2d 361 
State ex rel. Buckeye International, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ohio St.2d 200 
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19  
State v. Liberatore, 69 Ohio St.2d 583  
State v. Lilliock, 70 Ohio St.2d 23 
State v. Moss, 69 Ohio St.2d 515  
State v. Puente, 69 Ohio St.2d 136  
State v. Roberts, 1 Ohio St.3d 36  
Union Bank Co. v. Brumbaugh, 69 Ohio St.2d 202 
Village of Covington v. Lyle, 69 Ohio St.2d 659 
 
1984 
Birch v. Birch, 11 Ohio St.3d 85  
City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Bowers, 9 Ohio St.3d 148 
Columbus and Southern Ohio Electric Co. v. Public Utitlities Commission of Ohio, 10 Ohio 
St.3d 12 
Farrier v. Connor, 12 Ohio St.3d 219  
In re Burton, 11 Ohio St.3d 147  
In re Miller, 12 Ohio St.3d 40  
Milkovich v. News Herald, 15 Ohio St.3d 292 
Opalko v. Marymount Hospital, Inc., 9 Ohio St.3d 63  
State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74 
State v. Bickerstaff, 10 Ohio St.3d 62 
State v. Buchholz, 11 Ohio St.3d 24 
State v. Burkholder, 12 Ohio St.3d 205 
State v. Caponi, 12 Ohio St.3d 302  
State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59  
State v. Keairns, 9 Ohio St.3d 228  
State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150  
State v. Pembaur, 9 Ohio St.3d 136  
State v. Tanner, 15 Ohio St.3d 1  
Village of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 9 Ohio St.3d 69 
 
1986 
Board of Educ. of the South-Western City Schools v. Kinney, 24 Ohio St.3d 184 
City of Portsmouth v. McGraw, 21 Ohio St.3d 117 
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Evans v. Chapman, 28 Ohio St.3d 132 
Ewing v. Lindley, 23 Ohio St.3d 222 
Fricker v. Stokes, 22 Ohio St.3d 202 
Gutter v. Dow Jones, Inc., 22 Ohio St.3d 286  
In re Schmidt, 25 Ohio St.3d 331  
Scott v. News Herald, 25 Ohio St.3d 243  
Shriners’ Hospital for Crippled Children v. Hester, 23 Ohio St.3d 198 
State ex rel. Dayton Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 44 v. State Employment Relations 
Board, 22 Ohio St.3d 1 
State ex rel. Keefe v. Eyrich, 22 Ohio St.3d 164  
State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120  
State v. Bock, 28 Ohio St.3d 108 
State v. Brooks, 25 Ohio St.3d 144 
State v. Delfino, 22 Ohio St.3d 270  
State v. Halczyczak, 25 Ohio St.3d 301 
State v. Jackson, 22 Ohio St.3d 281  
State v. Martin, 21 Ohio St.3d 91 
State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St.3d 43  
State v. Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity, 23 Ohio St.3d 141 
State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33 
State v. Wilmoth, 22 Ohio St.3d 251 
Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N&D Machining Service, Inc., 24 Ohio St.3d 41 
 
1988 
Avon Lake School Dist. v. Limbach, 35 Ohio St.3d 118 
City of Maumee v. Gabriel, 35 Ohio St.3d 60  
Cleveland Gear Co. v. Limbach, 35 Ohio St.3d 229 
Fox v. City of Lakewood, 39 Ohio St.3d 19  
Karches v. City of Cincinnati, 38 Ohio St.3d 12  
Lyons v. Limbach, 40 Ohio St.3d 92 
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Public Utilities Commission, 38 Ohio St.3d 266 
Perez v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting, 35 Ohio St.3d 215 
Sharp v. Union Carbide Corp., 38 Ohio St.3d 69 
State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Company v. Barnes, 38 Ohio St.3d 165 
State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 
State v. Clark, 38 Ohio St.3d 252  
State v. Eastham, 39 Ohio St.3d 307 
State v. Glover, 35 Ohio St.3d 18 
State v. Henderson, 39 Ohio St.3d 24 
State v. Hix, 38 Ohio St.3d 129 
State v. Hooks, 39 Ohio St.3d 67 
State v. Milligan, 40 Ohio St.3d 341  
State v. Posey, 40 Ohio St.3d 420 
State v. VFW Post 3562, 37 Ohio St.3d 310  
State v. Weaver, 38 Ohio St.3d 160  
Strock v. Pressnell, 38 Ohio St.3d 207 
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Varanese v. Lake-Geauga Printing Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 78 
 
1990 
Banbury Village, Inc. v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision, 53 Ohio St.3d 251 
Celebrezze v. Netzley, 51 Ohio St.3d 89 
City of South Euclid v. Richardson, 49 Ohio St.3d 147 
Granzow v. Bureau of Support of Montgomery County, 54 Ohio St.3d 35 
In re Boggs, 50 Ohio St.3d 217 
Jones v. Franklin County Sheriff, 52 Ohio St.3d 40 
Ketchel v. Bainbridge Township, 52 Ohio St.3d 239 
Kinsey v. Board of Trustees of Police and Firemen’s Disability, 49 Ohio St.3d 224 
Menefee v. Queen City Metro, 49 Ohio St.3d 27 
Ohio Academy of Nursing Homes, Inc., v. Barry, 56 Ohio St.3d 120  
Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho, 52 Ohio St.3d 56 
State ex rel. Baker v. Troutman, 50 Ohio St.3d 270 
State ex rel. Ormet Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 54 Ohio St.3d 102 
State ex rel. Vana v. Maple Heights City Council, 54 Ohio St.3d 91 
State v. Comen, 50 Ohio St.3d 206  
State v. Conrad, 50 Ohio St.3d 1 
State v. Crago, 53 Ohio St.3d 243 
State v. Dailey, 53 Ohio St.3d 88 
State v. Parker, 53 Ohio St.3d 82 
State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71 
State v. Self, 56 Ohio St.3d 73 
State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.3d 58 
Tasin v. Sifco Industries, Inc., 50 Ohio St.3d 102 
 
1992  
Baker v. City of West Carrollton, 64 Ohio St.3d 446 
Chicago Freight Car Leasing Company v. Limbach, 62 Ohio St.3d 489 
In re Miller, 63 Ohio St.3d 99 
Leon v. State of Ohio Board of Psychology, 63 Ohio St.3d 683 
Ohio Edison Company v. Public Utilities Commission, 63 Ohio St.3d 555 
Provens v. Stark County Bd of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 64 Ohio 
St.3d 252  
Savage v. Sveda, 64 Ohio St.3d 42 
Shearman v. Van Camp, 64 Ohio St.3d 468  
State ex rel. Blake v. Industrial Commission, 65 Ohio St.3d 453 
State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Trumbull County Board of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 175 
State ex rel. Markulin v. Ashtabula County Board of Elections, 65 Ohio St.3d 180 
State ex rel. Smiddy v. Industrial Commission, 63 Ohio St.3d 473  
State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. Tenth Dist. Ct. of Appeals, 63 Ohio St.3d 354 
State v. Brown, 63 Ohio St.3d 349 
State v. Brown, 64 Ohio St.3d 649 
State v. Brown, 65 Ohio St.3d 483 
State v. Cook, 65 Ohio St.3d 516 
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State v. Davis, 63 Ohio St.3d 44 
State v. Dever, 64 Ohio St.3d 401 
State v. Gillard, 64 Ohio St.3d 304 
State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514 
State v. Hathman, 65 Ohio St.3d 403  
State v. Hernandez, 63 Ohio St.3d 577 
State v. Knuckles, 65 Ohio St.3d 494 
State v. Murphy, 65 Ohio St.3d 554 
State v. Rojas, 64 Ohio St.3d 131 
State v. Spates, 64 Ohio St.3d 269 
Stone v. Stow, 64 Ohio St.3d 156 
 
1994 
Caddell v. Ohio Bur. of Work. Comp., 71 Ohio St.3d 300 
Cleveland Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 70 Ohio St.3d 73 
Cooper Tire & Rubber Comp. v. Limbach, 70 Ohio St.3d 347 
Dublin School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St.3d 604   
Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 68 Ohio St.3d 221  
Farbey v. McDonald Village Police Dept., 70 Ohio St.3d 351 
Howard v. Catholic Social Services of Cuyahoga County, Inc. 70 Ohio St.3d 141 
Huntington National Bank v. Limbach, 71 Ohio St.3d 261 
McGowen v. Tracy, 70 Ohio St.3d 279 
Ohio Domestic Violence Network v. Public Utilities Comm., 70 Ohio St.3d 311 
Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377  
Rick Case Motors, Inc. v. Tracy, 71 Ohio St.3d 380 
Soke v. Plain Dealer, 69 Ohio St.3d 395 
Springfield Local Bd of Education v. Summit County Bd. of Revision, 68 Ohio St.3d 493 
State ex rel. Crabtree v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, 71 Ohio St.3d 504 
State ex rel. First National Supermakrets, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ohio St.3d 582 
State ex rel. Jarrett v. Industrial Commission, 69 Ohio St.3d 127 
State ex rel. McMaster v. School Employees Retirement System, 69 Ohio St.3d 130 
State ex rel. St. Francis-St. George Hostpital v.  Industrial Commission, 70 Ohio St.3d 498 
State ex rel. Unger v. Industrial Commission, 70 Ohio St.3d 672 
State v. Carter, 69 Ohio St.3d 57 
State v. Sumlin, 69 Ohio St.3d 105 
 
1996 
Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 
Dobbins v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 75 Ohio St.3d 533 
Hack v. Gillespie, 74 Ohio St.3d 362 
Hilliard v. Elfrink, 77 Ohio St.3d 155 
In re Adoption of Zschach, 75 Ohio St.3d 648 
In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Carr, 76 Ohio St.3d 320 
Seven Hills v. Aryan Nations, 76 Ohio St.3d 304 
State ex rel. OTR v. Columbus, 76 Ohio St.3d 203 
State ex rel. Patterson v. Indus. Comm., 77 Ohio St.3d 201 
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State ex rel. Wright v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 75 Ohio St.3d 82 
State v. Allard, 75 Ohio St.3d 482 
State v. Ballew, 76 Ohio St.3d 244 
State v. Benge, 75 Ohio St.3d 136 
State v. Brooks, 75 Ohio St.3d 148  
State v. Davis, 76 Ohio St.3d 107  
State v. Eley, 77 Ohio St.3d 174 
State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525 
State v. Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d 425 
State v. Hochhausier, 76 Ohio St.3d 455 
State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d 555 
State v. Peagler, 76 Ohio St.3d 496 
State v. Thompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 558 
State v. Wickline, 74 Ohio St.3d 369 
State v. Wilson, 74 Ohio St.3d 381  
State v. Winstead, 74 Ohio St.3d 277 
Zalud Oldsmobile Pontiac, Inc. v. Tracy, 77 Ohio St.3d 74 
 
1998 
AL Post 0184 v. Liquor Control Commission, 82 Ohio St.3d 108 
Bunger v. Lawson Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 463 
Clagg v. Baycliffs Corp., 82 Ohio St.3d 277 
Goldberg Companies, Inc. v. Richmond Heights City Council, 81 Ohio St.3d 207 
Society National Bank v. Wood County Bd. of Revision, 81 Ohio St.3d 401 
State ex rel. BSW Development Group v. City of Dayton, 83 Ohio St.3d 338 
State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Retirement Board, 83 Ohio St.3d 67 
State ex rel. Justus v. Industrial Commission, 83 Ohio St.3d 364 
State ex rel. Pizza v. Rezcallah, 84 Ohio St.3d 116 
State v. Benton, 82 Ohio St.3d 316 
State v. Clemons, 82 Ohio St.3d 438 
State v. Getsy, 84 Ohio St.3d 180 
State v. Droste, 83 Ohio St.3d 36 
State v. Green, 81 Ohio St.3d 100 
State v. Keenan, 81 Ohio St.3d 133 
State v. Keene, 81 Ohio St.3d 646 
State v. Mason, 82 Ohio St.3d 144 
State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438 
State v. Mitts, 81 Ohio St.3d 223 
State v. Raglin, 83 Ohio St.3d 253 
State v. Reynolds, 80 Ohio St.3d 670 
State v. Tucker, 81 Ohio St.3d 431 
State v. Zucal, 82 Ohio St.3d 215 
Williams v. Aetna Finance Comp., 83 Ohio St.3d 464 
 
2000 
Henley v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142 
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Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton v. Beavercreek, 89 Ohio St.3d 121 
Humphrey v. Lane, 89 Ohio St.3d 62 
McKimm v. Ohio Elections Commission, 89 Ohio St.3d 139 
Painsville Bldg. Dept v. Dworken & Bernstein Co., 89 Ohio St.3d 564 
Shemo v. Mayfield Heights, 88 Ohio St.3d 7 
State ex rel. Bray v. Russell, 89 Ohio ST.3d 132 
State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208 
State v. Jones, 90 Ohio St.3d 403 
State v. Carter, 89 Ohio St.3d 593 
State v. Green, 90 Ohio St.3d 352 
State v. Johnson, 88 Ohio St.3d 95 
State v. Jones, 88 Ohio St.3d 430 
State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d 479 
State v. Madrigal, 87 Ohio St.3d 378 
State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 
State v. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59 
State v. Smith, 89 Ohio St.3d 323 
State v. Smith, 87 Ohio St.3d 424  
State v. Stallings, 89 Ohio St.3d 280 
State v. Williams, 88 Ohio St.3d 513 
Steele v. Hamilton County Community Health Board, 90 Ohio St.3d 176 
Weiss v. Public Utilities Commission, 90 Ohio St.3d 15 
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Appendix C 
 
New York Sample 
 
 
1970 
8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124 
Franklin v. Mandeville, 26 N.Y.2d 65 
People v. Burton, 27 N.Y.2d 198  
People v. Burwell, 26 N.Y.2d 331  
People v. Chestnut, 26 N.Y.2d 481 
People v. Floyd, 26 N.Y.2d 558  
People v. Gonzalez, 27 N.Y.2d 53  
People v. Hetherington, 27 N.Y.2d 242  
People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.2d 119  
People v. Mack, 26 N.Y.2d 311  
People v. Montgomery, 27 N.Y.2d 601  
People v. Pereira, 26 N.Y.2d 265  
People v. Radich, 26 N.Y.2d 114  
People v. Rahming, 26 N.Y.2d 411  
People v. Ramos, 26 N.Y.2d 272  
People v. Reyes, 26 N.Y.2d 97 
People v. Rios, 27 N.Y.2d 202  
People v. Robles, 27 N.Y.2d 155  
People v. Todaro, 26 N.Y.2d 325 
People v. Zabrocky, 26 N.Y.2d 530 
 
1972  
Byrn v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194 
Ferlito v. Judges of County Court, Suffolk County, 31 N.Y.2d 416  
Gold v. Lomenzo, 29 N.Y.2d 468 
In re Sampson, 29 N.Y.2d 900  
Kovarsky v. Housing and Development Administration of the City of New York, 31 N.Y.2d 184  
New Rochelle Water Co. v. Public Service Commission, 31 N.Y.2d 397  
Oliver v. Postel, 30 N.Y.2d 171  
People v. Abronovitz, 31 N.Y.2d 160  
People v. Bennett, 30 N.Y.2d 283  
People v. Bennett, 29 N.Y.2d 462  
People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 279  
People v. Fink, 29 N.Y.2d 443  
People v. Gary, 31 N.Y.2d 68  
People v. Gnozzo, 31 N.Y.2d 134  
People v. Goodman, 31 N.Y.2d 262  
People v. Hinton, 31 N.Y.2d 71  
People v. Keough, 31 N.Y.2d 281  
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People v. Paquette, 31 N.Y.2d 379 
People v. Tanner, 30 N.Y.2d 102  
Sumpter v. White Plains Housing Authority, 29 N.Y.2d 420 
 
1974 
Abrams v. Bronstein, 33 N.Y.2d 488  
Association of the Bar of the City of New York v. Lewisohn, 34 N.Y.2d 143  
Bergstein v. Bd of Ed., Union Free School District, 34 N.Y.2d 318  
DuBois v. Town Bd Of New Paltz, 35 N.Y.2d 617  
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121  
Padilla v. Wyman, 34 N.Y.2d 36  
People ex rel. Donohoe v. Montanye, 35 N.Y.2d 221  
People v. Blake, 35 N.Y.2d 331  
People v. Cruz, 34 N.Y.2d 362  
People v. DeTore, 34 N.Y.2d 199  
People v. Duka, 34 N.Y.2d 483  
People v. Eboli, 34 N.Y.2d 281  
People v. Esajerre, 35 N.Y.2d 463 
People v. Fustanio, 35 N.Y.2d 196  
People v. Labree, 34 N.Y.2d 257  
People v. Mature Enterprises, 35 N.Y.2d 520  
People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227  
People v. Singleteary, 35 N.Y.2d 528  
People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77  
People v. Troiano, 35 NY2d 476  
People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351  
Russian Church of Our Lady of Kazan v. Dunkel, 33 N.Y.2d 456 
 
1976 
American Bible Society v. Lewisohn, 40 N.Y.2d 78  
DeGrego v. Levine, 39 N.Y.2d 180  
Fred F. French Investing Comp. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587  
Horodner v. Fisher, 38 N.Y.2d 680  
Koner v. Procaccino, 39 N.Y.2d 258  
Matter of Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653 
People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682  
People v. Allende, 39 N.Y.2d 474  
People v. Brown, 40 N.Y.2d 183 
People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529  
People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446  
People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210  
People v. Doerbecker, 39 N.Y.2d 448  
People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580  
People v. Droz, 39 N.Y.2d 457  
People v. Eason, 40 N.Y.2d 297  
People v. Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656  
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People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479  
People v. Huffman, 41 N.Y.2d 29  
People v. Jackson, 41 N.Y.2d 146  
People v. Jones, 39 N.Y.2d 694  
People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173 
People v. Parker, 41 N.Y.2d 21  
People v. Parks, 41 N.Y.2d 36  
People v. Remeny, 40 N.Y.2d 527  
People v. Rizzo, 40 N.Y.2d 425  
People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97  
People v. Yannicelli, 40 N.Y.2d 598  
Sussman v. New York State Organized Crime Task Force, 39 N.Y.2d 227 
 
1978 
Clove Lakes Nursing Home v. Whalen, 45 N.Y.2d 873  
Harris v. Mechanicville Central School District, 45 N.Y.2d 279 
Health Insurance Association of America v. Harnett, 44 N.Y.2d 302  
Holly S. Clarendon Trust v. State Tax Commission, 43 N.Y.2d 933  
Hynes v. Moskowitz, 44 N.Y.2d 383  
People v. Bevilacqua, 45 N.Y.2d 508  
People v. Ciaccio, 45 N.Y.2d 626  
People v. Clark, 45 N.Y.2d 432  
People v. Grant, 45 N.Y.2d 366  
People v. Havelka, 45 N.Y.2d 636 
People v. Hodge, 44 N.Y.2d 553  
People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589  
People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171  
People v. Key, 45 N.Y.2d 111  
People v. McGrath, 46 N.Y.2d 12  
People v. Medina, 44 N.Y.2d 199  
People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300 
People v. Sciacca, 45 N.Y.2d 122  
People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154  
People v. Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559 
People v. Smith, 44 N.Y.2d 613 
Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152 
 
1980 
Aldens, Inc. v. Tully, 49 N.Y.2d 525  
American Insurance Association v. Lewis, 50 N.Y.2d 617  
Koffler v. Joint Barr Association, 51 N.Y.2d 140  
People v. Arroyave, 49 N.Y.2d 264 
People v. Berzups, 49 N.Y.2d 417  
People v. Brnja, 50 N.Y.2d 366  
People v. Casassa, 49 N.Y.2d 668  
People v. Chestnut, 51 N.Y.2d 14  
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People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231  
People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583  
People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286 
People v. Marrero, 51 N.Y.2d 56  
People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476  
People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400 
People v. Savage, 50 N.Y.2d 673  
People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640 
People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24  
People v. Washington, 51 N.Y.2d 214 
People v. Whidden, 51 N.Y.2d 457  
Society for Ethical Culture In the City of New York v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449 
 
1982 
Arrington v. The New York Times Comp., 55 N.Y.2d 433  
Board of Education, Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27  
Crosby v. State, Workers’ Compensation Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 305  
Esler v. Walters, 56 N.Y.2d 306  
Matter of Davis’ Estate, 57 N.Y.2d 382  
Matter of Vanderbilt (Rosner-Hickey), 57 N.Y.2d 66  
People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27  
People v. Arroyo, 54 N.Y.2d 567 
People v. Beam, 57 N.Y.2d 241  
People v. Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 14  
People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335  
People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470  
People v. Knapp, 57 N.Y.2d 161  
People v. McCray, 57 N.Y.2d 542  
People v. Orlando, 56 N.Y.2d 441 
People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136  
People v. Ricco, 56 N.Y.2d 320  
People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476  
People v. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51  
People v. Young, 55 N.Y.2d 419  
People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110  
Tolub v. Evans, 58 N.Y.2d 1  
Tucker v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 378 
 
1984 
Burrows v. Board of Assessors for the Town of Chatham, 64 N.Y.2d 33  
People v. Dodt, 61 N.Y.2d 408 
People v. Ellis, 62 N.Y.2d 393  
People v. Ferro, 63 N.Y.2d 316  
People v. Gonzalez, 62 N.Y.2d 386  
People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187  
People v. Leonard, 62 N.Y.2d 404  
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People v. Levan, 62 N.Y.2d 139  
People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152  
People v. Lombardo, 61 N.Y.2d 97 
People v. Lucarano, 61 N.Y.2d 138 
People v. Maerling, 64 N.Y.2d 134  
People v. Milaski, 62 N.Y.2d 147  
People v. Mitchell, 61 N.Y.2d 580 
People v. Scott, 63 N.Y.2d 518  
People v. Smith, 62 N.Y.2d 306 
Plummer v. Rothwax, 63 N.Y.2d 243  
Rivera v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 501  
Torres v. Little Flower Children’s Services, 64 N.Y.2d 119  
Von Wiegen v. Committee on Professional Standards, 63 N.Y.2d 163 
 
1986 
423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474  
Alphonse v. Martini, 68 N.Y.2d 283  
Cahill v. Public Service Commission, 69 N.Y.2d 265  
Church of St. Paul and St. Andrew v. Barwick, 67 N.Y.2d 510 
D’Angelo v. Cole, 67 N.Y.2d 65  
de St. Aubin v. Flacke, 68 N.Y.2d 66  
Morgenthau v. Citisource, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 211  
People v. Bethea, 67 N.Y.2d 364  
People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338  
People v. Chin, 67 N.Y.2d 22 
People v. Ferguson, 67 N.Y.2d 383  
People v. Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234  
People v. Hollman, 68 N.Y.2d 202  
People v. McGee, 68 N.Y.2d 328  
People v. Thomas, 68 N.Y.2d 194  
People v. Velasquez, 68 N.Y.2d 533  
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485  
Sheehan v. County of Suffolk, 67 N.Y.2d 52 
 
1988 
Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432  
Lucas v. Scully, 71 N.Y.2d 399  
O’Neill v. Oakgrove Construction, Inc, 71 N.Y.2d 521  
Parkview Associates v. City of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 274  
People v. Baptiste, 72 N.Y.2d 356  
People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376  
People v. Colon, 71 N.Y.2d 410  
People v. Gensler, 72 N.Y.2d 239 
People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635  
People v. Hamlin, 71 N.Y.2d 750  
People v. Hudy, 73 N.Y.2d 40  
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People v. Kohl, 72 N.Y.2d 191  
People v. Okafore, 72 N.Y.2d 81  
People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705  
People v. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689  
People v. Rodriguez, 71 N.Y.2d 214 
People v. Tambe, 71 N.Y.2d 492  
People v. Winkler, 71 N.Y.2d 592  
Rochester Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Com’n of the State of New York, 71 N.Y.2d 313 
Winkler v. Spinnato, 72 N.Y.2d 402 
 
1990 
1616 Second Avenue Restaurant, Inc. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 75 N.Y.2d 158 
Cahill v. Public Service Commission, 76 N.Y.2d 102  
Forti v. New York State Ethics Commission, 75 N.Y.2d 596  
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218  
Golden v. Clark, 76 N.Y.2d 618  
Laureno v. Kuhlmann, 75 N.Y.2d 141 
People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331  
People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95  
People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517  
People v. Dunn, 77 N.Y.2d 19  
People v. Hernandez, 75 N.Y.2d 350  
People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190  
People v. Jenkins, 75 N.Y.2d 550  
People v. Kern, 75 N.Y.2d 638  
People v. Keyes, 75 N.Y.2d 343 
People v. Natal, 75 N.Y.2d 379 
People v. Scalza, 76 N.Y.2d 604 
Savastano v. Nurnberg, 77 N.Y.2d 300  
Schneider v. Sobol, 76 N.Y.2d 309  
Seelig v. Koehler, 76 N.Y.2d 87 
 
1992 
600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130  
Brady v. State, 80 N.Y.2d 596  
Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Jewish Community Relations Council, 79 N.Y.2d 227  
Liberman v. Gelstein, 80 N.Y.2d 429  
Lovelace v. Gross, 80 N.Y.2d 419  
Matter of Rowe, 80 N.Y.2d 336  
New York State School Boards Association v. Sobol, 79 N.Y.2d 333  
People ex rel. Hardy v. Sielaff, 79 N.Y.2d 618  
People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247  
People v. Dokes, 79 N.Y.2d 656  
People v. Corrigan, 80 N.Y.2d 326  
People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181  
People v. Keta, 78 N.Y.2d 474 
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People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444  
People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 549  
People v. Mitchell, 80 N.Y.2d 519 
People v. Morales, 80 N.Y.2d 450  
People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474  
Transit Casualty Company v. New York State Superintendent of Insurance, 79 N.Y.2d 13 
Ward v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 394  
 
1994 
Allen v. Howe, 84 N.Y.2d 665  
Delaraba v. Nassau County Police Department, 83 N.Y.2d 367 
Freeman v. Johnston, 84 N.Y.2d 52  
Gordon v. Brown, 84 N.Y.2d 574  
Hope v. Perales, 83 N.Y.2d 563  
Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 84 N.Y.2d 385 
People v. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d 208  
People v. Bora, 83 N.Y.2d 531 
People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663  
People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184  
People v. Inniss, 83 N.Y.2d 653  
People v. Sprowal, 84 N.Y.2d 113  
People v. Voliton, 83 N.Y.2d 192 
Saratoga Water Services, Inc. v. Saratoga County Water Authority, 83 N.Y.2d 205 
Scheiber v. St. John’s University, 84 N.Y.2d 120 
 
1996 
Archbishop Walsh High School v. Section VI of the New York State Public High School Athletic 
Association, Inc, 88 N.Y.2d 131  
Beckman v. Greentree Securities, Inc., 87 N.Y.2d 566  
Davis v. Brown, 87 N.Y.2d 626  
Goodwin v. Perales, 88 N.Y.2d 383  
Lunding v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 89 N.Y.2d 283  
People v. Angelo, 88 N.Y.2d 217  
People v. Batista, 88 N.Y.2d 650  
People v. Berk, 88 N.Y.2d 257  
People v. Damiano, 87 N.Y.2d 477  
People v. Foy, 88 N.Y.2d 742  
People v. Gonzalez, 88 N.Y.2d 289  
People v. Hameed, 88 N.Y.2d 232  
People v. Johnson, 87 N.Y.2d 357 
People v. Knowles, 88 N.Y.2d 763  
People v. Page, 88 N.Y.2d 1 
People v. Quackenbush, 88 N.Y.2d 534  
People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444  
People v. Ramirez-Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99  
People v. Vargas, 88 N.Y.2d 363  
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Pringle v. Wolfe, 88 N.Y.2d 426  
Town of Orangetown v. Magee, 88 N.Y.2d 41 
United Servies Automobile Association v. Curiale, 88 N.Y.2d 306 
 
1998  
Henry v. Milonas, 91 N.Y.2d 264 
Hynes v. Tomei, 92 N.Y.2d 613  
People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708  
People v. Cotto, 92 N.Y.2d 68  
People v. Longtin, 92 N.Y.2d 640  
People v. Muniz, 91 N.Y.2d 570 
Stahlbrodt v. Commissioner of Taxation and Finance of State of N.Y., 92 N.Y.2d 646 
 
2000 
Barr v. Crosson, 95 N.Y.2d 164  
Brothers v. Florence, 95 N.Y.2d 290  
Garden Homes Woodlands Company v. Town of Dover, 95 N.Y.2d 516  
People v. Couser, 94 N.Y.2d 631  
People v. Darling, 95 N.Y.2d 530  
People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486  
People v. Foley, 94 N.Y.2d 668 
People v. Henry, 95 N.Y.2d 563  
People v. Hernandez, 94 N.Y.2d 552 
People v. Lewis, 95 N.Y.2d 539  
People v. Rodriguez, 95 N.Y.2d 497 
People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509 
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Appendix D 
 
Washington Sample 
 
 
1970 
Bjorvatn v. Pacific Mechanical Construction, Inc., 77 Wash.2d 563 
Canteen Service, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 77 Wash.2d 870 
Clifford v. State, 78 Wash.2d 4 
Hawkins v. Rhay, 78 Wash.2d 389 
State v. Baker, 78 Wash.2d 327  
State v. Bauman, 77 Wash.2d 938 
State v. Emmett, 77 Wash.2d 520 
State v. Erho, 77 Wash.2d 553 
State v. Lane, 77 Wash.2d 860 
State v. Mempa, 78 Wash.2d 530  
State v. Prater, 77 Wash.2d 526 
State v. Williams, 78 Wash.2d 459 
State v. Zornes, 78 Wash.2d 9 
Ware v. Phillips, 77 Wash.2d 879 
 
1972 
Caughey v. Employment Sec. Dept., 81 Wash.2d 597 
City of Pasco v. Dixson, 81 Wash.2d 510 
Commonwealth Title Insurance Co. v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash.2d 391 
Lansinger v. Local Improvement Dist. 6368, City of Seattle, 80 Wash.2d 254 
Oil Heat Institute of Washington v. Town of Mukilteo, 81 Wash.2d 7 
Rupke v. State, Department of Motor Vehicles, 81 Wash.2d 662 
Seattle Police Officers’ Guild v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash.2d 307 
Snow’s Mobile Homes, Inc., v. Morgan, 80 Wash.2d 283 
Sorensen v. City of Bellingham, 80 Wash.2d 547 
State v. Boggs, 80 Wash.2d 427  
State v Carroll, 81 Wash.2d 95 
State v. Estill, 80 Wash.2d 196 
State v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc., 81 Wash.2d 259 
 
1974 
Aetna Life Ins. Comp. v. Washington Life and Disability Ins. Ass’n, 83 Wash.2d 523 
Bare v. Gorton, 84 Wash.2d 380  
City of Seattle v. Marshall, 83 Wash.2d 665 
Dillenburg v. Morris, 84 Wash.2d 353 
Flory v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 84 Wash.2d 568 
Fritz v. Gorton, 83 Wash.2d 275 
Lawrence v. City of Issaquah, 84 Wash.2d 146 
Monroe v. Tielsch, 84 Wash.2d 217 
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Northside School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 Wash.2d 685 
Orians v. James, 84 Wash.2d 819 
Reanier v. Smith, 83 Wash.2d 342 
State ex rel. Brundage v. Eide, 83 Wash.2d 676 
State v. Chapman, 84 Wash.2d 373 
State v. McFarland, 84 Wash.2d 391  
State v. Murray, 84 Wash.2d 527 
State v. Young, 83 Wash.2d 937 
Washington State Higher Education Assistance Authority v. Graham, 84 Wash.2d 813 
Young Americans for Freedom, Inc. v. Gorton, 83 Wash.2d 728 
 
1976 
Bitts, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash.2d 395 
City of Everett v. Fire Fighters, Local No. 350 of Intern. Ass’n of Fire Fighters, 87 Wash.2d 572 
Haddenham v. State, 87 Wash.2d 145  
Jansen v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 258  
King County Water Dist. No. 54 v. King County Boundary Review Bd., 87 Wash.2d 536 
Lange v. State, 86 Wash.2d 585  
Lindsay v. City of Seattle, 86 Wash.2d 698 
Silver Shores Mobile Home Park v. City of Everett, 87 Wash.2d 618 
State ex rel. Public Disclosure Commission v. Rains, 87 Wash.2d 626 
State v. Atteberry, 87 Wash.2d 556 
State v. Barkland, 87 Wash.2d 814 
State v. Boast, 87 Wash.2d 447 
State v. Hewett, 86 Wash.2d 487 
State v. Hull, 86 Wash.2d 527 
State v. Lee, 87 Wash.2d 932 
State v. Myers, 86 Wash.2d 419 
State v. Ralph Williams’ North West Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 87 Wash.2d 298 
State v. Wright, 87 Wash.2d 783 
Washington Massage Foundation v. Nelson, 87 Wash.2d 948 
West v. Ziebell, 87 Wash.2d 198 
Wood v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 501 
 
1978 
Aripa v. Dept. of Social and Health Services, 91 Wash.2d 135 
Bolser v. Washington St. Liquor Control Bd., 90 Wash.2d 223 
Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash.2d 592 
City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash.2d 584  
Davis v. Niagara Mach. Co., 90 Wash.2d 342 
Eagan v. Spellman, 90 Wash.2d 248  
Grant County v. Bohne, 89 Wash.2d 953 
In re Patterson, 90 Wash.2d 144  
Jewell v. Washington Utilities and Transportation Com’n, 90 Wash.2d 775 
Marchioro v. Chaney, 90 Wash.2d 298  
Matters of Jackson’s Adoption, 89 Wash.2d 945 
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Northend Cinema v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 709  
Rains v. Washington Dept. of Fisheries, 89 Wash.2d 740  
Save a Valuable Environment v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash.2d 862 
Schuster v. Schuster, 90 Wash.2d 626 
State v. Adams, 91 Wash.2d 86 
State v. Canady, 90 Wash.2d 808 
State v. Grant, 89 Wash.2d 678 
State v. Harris, 91 Wash.2d 145 
State v. Hegge, 89 Wash.2d 584 
State v. Hehman, 90 Wash.2d 45 
State v. Northest Passage, 90 Wash.2d 741  
State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash.2d 301 
United Chiropractors of Wash., Inc. v. State, 90 Wash.2d 1  
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Southwest Air Pollution Control Auth., 91 Wash.2d 77 
Wilson v. Bd. of Governors, 90 Wash.2d 649 
Young Americans for Freedom v. Gorton, 91 Wash.2d 204 
 
1980 
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Goheen v. General Motors Corp., 263 Or. 145 
Lenrich Associates v. Heyda, 264 Or. 122 
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State v. Tourtillott, 289 Or. 845 
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State v. Wedge, 293 Or. 598 
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State v. Jackson, 296 Or. 430 
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State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196 
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State v. Belcher, 306 Or. 343 
State v. Bridewell, 306 Or. 231 
State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157 
State v. Dixson, 307 Or. 195  
State v. Edgmand, 306 Or. 535 
State v. Isom, 306 Or. 587 
State v. Pidcock, 306 Or. 335 
State v. Slowikowski, 307 Or. 19 
State v. Wagner, 305 Or. 115 
State v. Wise, 305 Or. 78 
 
1990 
Hunter v. City of Eugene, 309 Or. 298 
In re Fadeley, 310 Or. 548 
Mid-County Future Alternatives Committee v. City of Portland, 310 Or. 152 
Sealey By and Through Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387 
State v. Ainsworth, 310 Or. 613 
State v. Buchholz, 309 Or. 442 
State v. Ford, 310 Or. 623 
State v. McDonell, 310 Or. 98 
State v. Miranda, 309 Or. 121 
State v. Moen, 309 Or. 45 
State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564 
State v. Nefstad, 309 Or. 523 
Van Wormer v. City of Salem, 309 Or. 404 
Whipple v. Department of Renue, 309 Or. 422 
Zockert v. Fanning, 310 Or. 514  
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AFSCME Local 2623 v. Department of Corrections, 315 Or. 74  
Hawkins v. City of La Grande, 315 Or. 57 
State by and Through Dept. of Transp. v. Lundberg, 312 Or. 568 
State v. Anfield, 313 Or. 554 
State v. Cornell, 314 Or. 673  
State v. Davis, 313 Or. 246 
State v. Esplin, 314 Or. 296  
State v. Henderson, 315 Or. 1 
State v. Hendrix, 314 Or. 170 
State v. Ingram, 313 Or. 139 
State v. Isom, 313 Or. 391 
State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247 
State v. McDonnell, 313 Or. 478 
State v. Meyrick, 313 Or. 125 
State v. Noble, 314 Or. 624 
State v. Paulson, 313 Or. 346  
State v. Phillips, 314 Or. 460 
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State v. Plowman, 314 Or. 157  
State v. Rhodes, 315 Or. 191 
State v. Rogers, 313 Or. 356 
State v. Wolfs, 312 Or. 646 
 
1994 
City of Eugene v. Miller, 318 Or. 480 
In re Conduct of Schenck, 318 Or. 402 
In re Conduct of Schenck, 320 Or. 94 
State v. Cervantes, 319 Or. 121 
State v. Cunningham, 320 Or. 47  
State v. Hoskinson, 320 Or. 83 
State v. Nagel, 320 Or. 24 
State v. Reid, 319 Or. 65 
State v. Simonsen, 319 Or. 510  
State v. Smith, 319 Or. 37 
State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573 
State v. Weaver, 319 Or. 212 
 
1996 
State ex rel. Sports Management News v. Nachtigal, 324 Or. 80 
State v. Charboneau, 323 Or. 38  
State v. Cole, 323 Or. 30  
State v. Dahl, 323 Or. 199  
State v. Herrin, 323 Or. 188 
State v. Kirtzman, 323 Or. 589 
State v. Moore, 324 Or. 396 
State v. Sargent, 323 Or. 455 
State v. Stoneman, 323 Or. 536 
State v. Williams, 322 Or. 620 
State v. Wilson, 323 Or. 498 
State v. Wright, 323 Or. 8 
 
1998 
Fidanque v. State ex rel. Oregon Government Standards and Practices Com’n, 328 Or. 1 
Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 327 Or. 485 
Pollin v. Department of Revenue, 326 Or. 427 
Reesman v. Highfill, 327 Or. 597 
State ex rel. Upham v. McElligott, 326 Or. 547 
State v. Barone, 328 Or. 68 
State v. Boone, 327 Or. 307 
State v. Hayward, 327 Or. 397 
State v. Martin, 327 Or. 17 
State v. Meade, 327 Or. 335 
State v. Morton, 326 Or. 466 
State v. Smith, 327 Or. 366 
 
 
213 
State v. Toevs, 327 Or. 525 
 
2000 
In re Conduct of Gatti, 330 Or. 517 
State ex rel. Click v. Brownhill, 331 Or. 500 
State v. Amini, 331 Or. 384 
State v. Fleetwood, 331 Or. 511 
State v. Langley, 331 Or. 430 
State v. Lotches, 331 Or. 455 
State v. McNeely, 330 Or. 457 
State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or. 431 
State v. Rogers, 330 Or. 282 
State v. Soldahl, 331 Or. 420 
State v. Tucker, 330 Or. 85 
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38 
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